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This thesis examines the naval campaign in the Solomons
during World War II with an emphasis on the relationship
between the campaign strategy and the tactics employed. The
strategic background is reviewed within the context of the
War in early 1942. A central theme developed is that in the
Solomons campaign both sides employed cruisers and DD ' s as
principal naval forces in place of the fully integrated
"battle fleets" envisioned as part of pre-war strategy. The
role of war gaming in American preparations for the war is
shown to explain in part the failure of American commanders
to modify existing doctrine in a timely manner during the
campaign. Data from the naval battles fought in the Solomons
is compiled in an original way and analyzed to explain the
factors which consistently influenced the outcome of the
eleven battles. Conclusions reached address the nature of
modern campaigns undertaken to widen a conflict ("horizontal
escalation" ) and the forces that may be required to pursue
such campaigns. The parallels between the use of surface
combatant task forces in World War II and their projected
employment today are noted and discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN IN PERSPECTIVE
The naval battles of the Solomons, fought largely with
surface combatants supported by land-based air, offer a
likely paradigm for evaluating American naval strategy today.
The forerunners of today's Surface Combatant Task Groups
(SCTGs) and Surface Action Groups (SAGs) were the cruiser-
destroyer task groups of the Solomons campaign. The employ-
ment developed for these modern surface forces embodies the
same principle as the American drive through the Solomons:
a campaign of limited scope, off the central axis of strategic
concerns and undertaken with the minimum resources necessary.
Just as the Solomons campaign saw the substitution of surface
task groups for large, carrier-based offensive forces, so do
we now ponder the use of modern SCTGs and SAGs in hostile
situations where Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) may be
unavailable. The tactical similarities suggest that an
examination of the Solomons effort may be a suitable foil for
today's new doctrines. Should this be the case, a first
realization must be that such operations will be fundamentally
different from those foreseen in current doctrine and the tac-
tics we will need to employ in "off axis" campaigns will be
significantly different from those normally envisioned for
the fleet. If the Solomons were any indication, our surface
combatant tactics must be well coordinated and supported by
11
non-task group elements to have any chance at power projection
in even a limited theatre. They must also be able to engage
in a bold war of attrition: the desperation and ad hoc nature
of the Solomons campaign made it particularly violent and
marked by heavy losses of men and material.
The Solomons campaign suggests other similarities to modern
strategy. Taken in the context of the entire war, the campaign
was a first attempt by the United States to take the war to
the enemy and the impact of Japanese losses in the Solomons
was far greater than the value of the territory lost. The
United States effort played a key role in diverting irreplac-
able Japanese war resources and, perhaps more importantly,
interrupting Japanese strategic planning. The American assault
on the Solomons in August 1942 was an unwelcome widening of
the Pacific conflict. Since a tenent of modern United States
strategy remains the use of such escalation as a deterrent
to Soviet aggression, an analysis of the strategic founda-
tions of the Solomons campaign should indicate the strengths
and weaknesses of such a strategy.
The United States' first offensive move in the Pacific,
the Solomons campaign spanned some sixteen months from August
1942 to January 1944. Begun as a counter to Japan's attempt
at severing the sea lanes to Australia, the ultimate outcome
of this series of violent land and sea actions was the ero-
sion of Japan's southern defensive perimeter and the first
Allied toehold in the Japanese empire. The desperation
12
which marked the onset of the campaign at Guadalcanal hung
over the entire American advance up the Solomons chain.
While the United States committed forces to the campaign in
a piecemeal fashion, the Japanese squandered irreplacable
resources in a futile attempt to save territory of question-
able strategic value. Indeed, as will be argued in the
following pages, the entire Solomons campaign was a strategic
stepchild of both sides, not considered crucial to the war's
winning and receiving only the allowance of forces befitting
a campaign of secondary importance. This was particularly
true in the case of the naval campaign in the Solomons where
each side for its own reasons failed to commit those naval
forces necessary to achieve a clear cut control of the waters
adjacent to the islands in question.
Perhaps ironically, both the United States and the
Japanese followed concepts of naval operations unique to their
own traditional rules of fleet employment. As the following
pages will indicate, this violation of self-set operational
standards resulted in a series of defeats for both sides,
defeats that were both tactical and strategic disappointments.
The Japanese fought brilliantly in the individual naval
actions of the campaign, often embarrassing American naval
forces. Their eventual loss of the campaign, however, was
the result of a strategy which committed forces to a piece-
meal, poorly supported effort. Conversely, American naval
13
tactical doctrine made a poor showing in the Solomons, yet
American tenacity in pursuing the campaign overrode these
shortcomings to win what eventually amounted to a contest
of wills.
The following analysis of the Solomons campaign will
emphasize the naval side of the campaign and those features
of the struggle that were instrumental in both the successes
and failures of the naval campaign. A detached analysis
of history is difficult; facts are clouded by both the
misperceptions of the present and those contemporary to
the events studied. The Solomons campaign has been a
particularly frequent victim of these misperceptions. A
primary step in providing a dispassionate look at the
Solomons campaign is the distillation of those essential
elements of the campaign.
For the purposes of this study, the characteristics
of the Solomons campaign can be divided into two categories,
strategic and tactical
.
A. STRATEGIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN
The strategic role of the Solomons campaign was unique
in the Pacific theatre. Strategically the campaign was:
1. A Holding Action- Designed to halt the Japanese
rampage through the Southwestern Pacific in mid
1942, the campaign was undertaken to keep the sea
lines of communication ("SLOCs" in today's ter-
minology) to Australia open. Strategically, the
assault on the Japanese held islands was a defen-
sive measure, not a primary thrust into the Japanese
empire.
14
2. Action Off a Major Axis - American and Allied plans
for winning the war did not consider the Solomons
a key piece in the overall strategy. Accordingly,
the effect of the campaign had a minimal impact on
the eventual outcome of the war although the fight-
ing in the Solomons diverted resources precious to
both sides.
3. Undertaken on Short Notice - The threat presented
by the Japanese-occupied Solomons only became
evident in early 1942 and the campaign to retake
the islands was planned in earnest only after the
Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and
June of that year.
4. Undertaken with Limited Resources- With the United
States following a policy of "Europe first" in the
early days of the war, few assets were available
to American Pacific forces to undertake the
Solomons campaign. Informally labeled "Operation
Shoestring," the move into the Solomons was done
with a bare minimum of forces at a time when the
United States was in an essentially defensive
position.
5. A Coordinated Maritime Campaign - The Solomons
campaign was the first attempt to buy the United
States Navy to project power ashore in the Pacific
theater. This first rollback of Japanese power
utilizing Navy and Marine Corps forces was the
progenitor of a unique and essentially naval form
of warfare where land, air, and sea territory were
all seized in a simple coordinated campaign.
6. A Littoral Naval Campaign- Following the dicta
of Mahan and other naval theorists, both American
and Japanese naval strategists saw sea control as
the product of large scale battle fleet engagements
on the high seas. The drawn out, violent war of
attrition for the waters of the Solomons was
anathema to the planning of both fleets and the
ultimate victory went to the side that best adapted
to the strategic requirements of this type of warfare
7
.
Fought With Forces Dictated by Arms Control
Agreements - The Washington and London Naval Treaties
drove the construction of those forces that clashed
in the Solomons, making arms control a principal
backdrop for the campaign. The unique method in
15
which each side approached the limitations and
restrictions of these treaties influenced each's
ability to successfully undertake required objec-
tives during the campaign.
B. TACTICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN
The tactical environment of the Solomons campaign was
unique to the experience of the American naval officers,
with engagements unforeseen in prewar planning and training,




Engagements of Forces of Less than Planned Battle
Fleet Strength- While the tactical doctrine of both
American and Japanese forces of the day called for
decisive engagements at sea to be fought by an
integrated force of submarine, carrier, battleship,
and assorted "light" forces, the employment of such
combined fleets was limited to specific instances
in the Solomons. In contrast to the doctrine of
both sides, cruiser and destroyer forces were
employed as the principal naval platforms for sea
control. In shifting these units from a supporting
to primary role the combatants were forced to employ
these previously limited use assets across a spec-
trum of tactically offensive and defensive missions.
2. Night Actions Fought at Close Quarters - United
States Navy doctrine had shied away from night
engagements holding long range gunnery in good
visibility the key to tactical success. Conversely,
the naval actions in the waters of the Solomons were
largely duels at close range where the Japanese at-
tempted to employ devastating torpedo attacks under
the cover of night. In response, the United States
Navy was compelled to engage in a form of warfare
it had consciously planned to avoid.
3. Use of Land-based Air in Support of Naval Qperations -
The development of carrier-based air forces was a
significant milestone for World War II naval tactics.
The Solomons campaign saw land-based aircraft as the
primary air support for the surface units engaged in
16
sea control operations. This use of external air
support provided an added dimension in the tactical
planning and command and control of the campaign.
4
.
Tactics Which the United States Navy Found Itself
111 Prepared For- Japanese night fighting techniques,
based on the use of long range torpedoes and quick,
decisive attacks were the inverse of American tactics
emphasizing long range gunnery. American commanders'
ineffective conduct of the close-in engagements forced
by the Japanese made control of the waters contiguous
to the Solomons tenuous and uncertain.
5. Technology and Tactical Opportunity - In addition,
the American ship had an important new sensor, radar,
which commanders did not exploit for several months.
As will be shown, these characteristics reflect the broad
context of the Solomons campaign. The analysis of the
campaign is done with these characteristics in mind.
Although the Solomons campaign was unenvisioned by
the prewar plans for the Pacific, it utilized strategic
and tactical concepts already in place and well established
in the United States Navy prior to the war. Many of these
notions were validated in the Solomons. However many
failed the ultimate test of peacetime preparations, that
of actual engagement with an enemy. We cling to similar
preconceptions today, both strategic and tactical. The
following pages will attempt to explore notions many of
which may also be applicable to modern American naval
planning and may have already been tested in the dark
violent waters off the Solomon Islands.
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II. STRATEGIC ROOTS OF THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN
A. CONVERGENT STRATEGIES: HOW EACH SIDE GOT TO THE SUMMER
OF '42
An irony of both Japanese and American strategies in the
Solomons is that neither country saw these barren islands as
central to winning the Pacific war. American plans prior to
the war failed to mention the Solomons, placing first prior-
ity in the western Pacific on the defense of the Philippines.
The confidence of early 1941, however, was supplanted by the
desperation of spring 1942. By this time MacArthur was in
Australia seriously worried about protecting this final bas-
tion of the Western Alliance while the Japanese had extended
their "Co-Prosperity Sphere" as far as the eastern coast of
New Guinea. If the American leadership was stunned by Japan's
early successes the Japanese leadership was also somewhat
dismayed. Having achieved tactical successes at an almost
dizzying pace, the Japanese leadership was forced to re-
appraise its strategic goals and decide on what next steps
would not only solidify these gains but also resolve those
issues that drove them to war in the first place.
1 . Japan: Struggling Forward
Paradoxically, the Japanese offense that had opened
in December, 1941 had been too successful and the roots of
the Solomons campaign lie in the sudden stall in Japanese
initiative that followed the startling successes of the
18
war's first months. With the fall of Singapore in February,
1942 the Japanese government saw four general alternatives
for the next move in the war:
1. advance into Australia after
2. capturing the islands insulating Australia from the
central Pacific and the United States (portions of
southeastern New Guinea, the eastern Solomons, the
New Hebrides)
3. drive westward across the Indian Ocean and attempt
a campaign against the Indian Subcontinent
4. drive across the central Pacific on a thrust aimed
at capturing Hawaii [Ref. 1: pp. 40-52].
In retrospect, the ambition of these plans seems
to border on hubris; from the perspective of both sides
in the spring of 1942, such plans were not wholly
unfathmable. The Philippines, Singapore and most of
Indoneia had all fallen before Dai Nippon and, as the
1
Kido B-ai roamed from Hawaii to the central Indian Ocean,
an out-eak of "victory fever" hit the Japanese people
and th<r leadership [Ref. 2: p. 340]. The reasons for
the cotdent mood appeared obvious, as though Japanese
"divinedestiny was on the verge of fulfillment.
Ki Butai was the Japanese designation for the
Nagumo k force that had launched the attack on Pearl
Harbor proceeded westward, engaging the British in
the Ind Ocean, raiding Ceylon, and finally returning
to Japan April, 1942.
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"Victory fever," was not an epidemic, however. Many
of Japan's leaders realized the shallow nature of their
country's logistic base and the grim prospects for a pro-
tracted conflict. Among the most cautious in addressing
future strategic plans were the senior officers of the
Japanese Combined Fleet, led by the conservative views of
Admiral Isokoru Yamamoto himself. These officers, well aware
of Japan's weaknesses and America's industrial potential,
saw a final alternative to the options outlined above: sue
for peace. The "fleet faction" had undertaken its heretofore
successful planning based on the premise of a short war. Japan
had apparently achieved the relatively limited goals that
were assumed prior to Pearl Harbor with the neutralization
of Allied power in the western Pacific. The counsel given
by Yamamoto--to seek a settlement now—was in keeping with
prior plans, based on a realistic grasp of own and enemy
limitations, and totally unacceptable to the Japanese
leadership. Selecting one of the other options became a
process of compromise between factions with widely diverse
notions of what Japan's strategic interests actually were.
[Ref. 3: pp. 292-297]
Of the four options, the Army-dominated Imperial
General Staff saw the first two as the most desirable. The
third, although proposed by some fleet leaders, was quickly
seen as too ambitious. The fourth was primarily supported
by Yamamoto and his Combined Fleet staff. The factional
20
nature of this split in opinion must be noted in understand-
ing the Japanese strategic decision making process. The
Australian option obviously appealed to the Army, although
it remains sketchy as to how much of Australia the Army
really wanted to take for Japan. The second option, forwarded
largely by the naval members of the General Staff, represented
a primary step to the first option and offered the advantage
of encircling Australia and severing its lines of communica-
tions with the United States. The central Pacific drive, on
the other hand, represented the Combined Fleet's—and partic-
ularly Yamamoto's—desire to see a massive decisive battle
with the United States fleet. Viewing their own limitations
and the American fleet's potential for growth, the true
Mahanian decisive fleet action fit into the "fleet faction's"
plans to fight as short a war as possible.
[Ref. 3: pp. 294-295]
In the end compromise won out. The decision made
in early April, 1942 was that the campaign to isolate
Australia would be undertaken and then Yamamoto would be
allowed to conduct his strike across the central Pacific.
[Ref. 3: p. 297] As part of the plan to surround and isolate
Australia, landings were planned at Port Moresby and in the
eastern Solomons at Tulagi, a small Australian-held island
near Guadalcanal. As part of this complex operation, land-
based air strikes were to hit several bases on Australia's
northeastern cape and a striking force was to engage the
21
American naval forces suspected of operating east of New
Guinea and south of the Solomons [Ref. 4]. This action,
scheduled for early May, would be followed by the even more
complex drive across the central Pacific in a thrust to
capture Midway and place a diversionary force on the Aleutians
[Ref. 2: pp. 134-136]
.
The first operation, the encirclement of Australia,
would become Operation "MO" and would result in the Battle
of the Coral Sea, May 3 and 4. The central Pacific drive
would become Operation "MI", the Midway/Aleutians assault
and the catalyst for the Battle of Midway, June 4-7. The
only solid gain from either operation was the seizure of the
eastern Solomons; these obscure islands would become Japan's
last strategic success in the war as well as the United
States' first.
2 . American Desperation
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor started a war
that was no surprise to the United States Navy in the broad-
est sense. The conclusion of World War I had left the United
States and Japan at a strategic stand-off in the Pacific.
As early as the twenties, the potential for conflict was
2
realized and the intense diplomatic negotiations of the
2See Hector Bywater , The Great Pacific War . Writing in
1929, Bywater, an English naval expert, wrote a fictional
account of a war between Japan and the United States that,
despite its flaws in tactical prediction, was amazingly accu-
rate in the strategic predictions he cast for the future
clash.
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1930s broke down in 1941 with a sense of inevitability.
American naval thought during the interwar period had been
developed in large measure towards a Pacific campaign
although placing the situation of the United States Navy of
early 1942 into perspective requires a more measured look at
the problems the service saw pertinent prior to the war's
onset.
Underlying the problems of American naval strategy
between the World Wars was the fact that America had suddenly
become a world power. Although Japan represented an obvious
threat from the westward, the United States Navy found plenty
of potential enemies lurking at other points of the compass
as well. The interwar Navy considered a variety of potential
foes, taking on virtually every major naval power in the
exercises and games conducted between the wars. The priority
for American naval power throughout these years remained
defense of the North American continent and the maintenance
of the Monroe Doctrine. While actions as far away as the
western Pacific and the western coast of Africa were envis-
ioned, the defense of the Caribbean and the continuation of
Western Hemisphere's autonomy were given top priority in the
formal war plans. This remained true as Navy's first serious
plans for fighting the Axis, the "Rainbow" series, was drafted
in 1939. [Ref. 5]
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After the disintegration of the joint American-
British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) command in February, 1942,
Admiral Ernest King, the Commander in Chief of the United
States Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations, realized
that maintaining open the sea lanes to Australia was vital
and, true to his belligerent reputation, King recommended an
immediate counter-offensive against the still advancing
Japanese [Ref. 6: pp. 183-189]. King's aggressive proposal
flew in the fact of the "Europe first" strategy touted by
General George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, and blessed
by Roosevelt as Commander in Chief of American forces. Ad-
ditionally, King pressed to have Admiral Chester Nimitz, the
Navy's senior commander in the Pacific, take the lead in the
Pacific theater as the Allied command fell apart after the
3fall of Singapore. In the end King's recommendations,
largely devised on the spot and yet in keeping with the
overall thrust of the formally agreed to war plans, became
the foundation of the Pacific war's strategy. The sensitive
issue of who would control the Pacific theater would emerge
repeatedly with a compromise in command structure taking on
an important role in the planning for the Solomons campaign.
However, the framework for victory in the Pacific was clear
3This recommendation also appeared to slight the grow-
ing image of General Douglas MacArthur fighting on in the
Philippines. [Ref. 6: p. 158]
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in King's mind and had been extensively rehearsed by the
Navy between wars since "... for twenty years, the Navy had
been preparing to fight a naval war against Japan . . . .
"
[Ref. 6: p. 190]. The Japanese empire, according to Navy
strategic plans, would be defeated by a series of naval
campaigns aimed at seizing key islands in an advance across
the central and southern Pacific towards the Japanese
homeland.
The principal problem the Navy faced in its strategic
planning for World War II was the paucity of forces available
to meet the worldwide role the nation and the Navy had
assumed. Desires to limit defense spending, reflected in
naval arms treaties, had produced an American fleet long
on hopes but short on ships. In evaluating comparative
fleet strengths some five months prior to Pearl Harbor, ADM
King, then Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, considered the
impact of fighting a "two ocean war" and found what he
considered deficiencies ranging from 9 to 55 percent in
the strength of the projected 1943 American fleet [Ref. 7]
.
When King took charge of the entire American fleet after
Pearl Harbor, it must have been clear to him that no amount
of thorough prewar planning could offset a shortfall in
raw numbers. The United States Navy needed to build before
it could fight and the war's first moves for the Navy were,
of necessity, strategically defensive in nature. For the
Pacific Fleet, this would require seeking engagements
25
with the Japanese on a selective basis and with minimum
hazarding of forces.
The ravaging of "Battleship Row" on December 7 made
the aircraft carrier the most valuable resource in the fleet.
When the war started the Pacific fleet had four carriers-
Hornet , Lexington , Saratoga , and Enterprise and Yorktown
joined the fleet shortly after Christmas. While Wasp would
be added to the inventory in mid-1942, programmed additions
to the carrier force were scheduled to follow the slow path
noted by King; the new Independence and Essex-class carriers
would not begin deploying until late 1943 and 1944
[Ref. 1: pp. 172-173]. The plans for the eventual major
American thrust across the Pacific would have to be post-
poned to allow the country's mobilization to catch up with
the Navy's plans.
The conflicting needs to conserve resources and still
somehow contain the Japanese clashed in the Solomons. In
terms of the sparse carrier forces outlined in the preceding
paragraph, each battle fought to date had cost the American
4Pacific Fleet one carrier. Nonetheless the Japanese foot-
hold in the Solomons represented a threat unforeseen prior
4At Coral Sea, Lexington was lost, and Yorktown was sunk
at Midway the following month. This attrition rate continued
with the loss of the Wasp in an effort to reinforce the
Solomons in September and the loss of the Hornet during the
Battle of Santa Cruz east of the Solomons in October.
26
to the war, but of such strategic significance that it could
not be ignored. The war's preplanned strategy had focused
on the central Pacific islands of the Marshall and Caroline
chains, with more than a passing interest in an assault
through the Aleutians and Kuriles. The Japanese landings
on Tulagi and Guadalcanal changed this for the moment.
Nimitz recommended staging an amphibious raid on Tulagi
during the final weeks of May, an idea that King found
acceptable but that the Army refused to support since
MacArthur formally commanded the Solomons region
[Ref. 8: p. 89]. After Midway both Nimitz and King turned
their attention towards the Solomons. MacArthur and Marshall
had proposed an assault on Japanese-held Rabaul, clearly in
MacArthur ' s area of responbility . King, who realized that
such an ambitious attack was too soon for the still strate-
gically defensive Navy, resolved not to allow any major
naval forces under MacArthur ' s control and counter proposed
with the idea of a full scale assault on the eastern Solomons
with intentions to continue up towards New Guinea and Rabaul
via the Solomons chain [Ref. 6: p. 215].
The timing of King's proposal made sense from the
point of view of both conserving forces and answering the
immediate problem posed by the Japanese in the Solomons.
With the potential to stage aircraft on the territory
seized in the Solomons, the campaign offered the promise of
tactical self sufficiency. This point became more critical
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after the campaign started when the American fleet was
reduced to a single carrier in October. Nonetheless, the
Solomons offered a campaign, tactically offensive, yet
essentially in keeping with the strategically defensive
approach taken in regards to the first year of the Pacific
war.
At this juncture it is important to note the parallel
paths of bureaucratic compromise that marked both American
and Japanese strategy in regards to the Solomons. As was
described in the previous section, elements of the Japanese
General Staff and Combined Fleet were forced into a compro-
mise that allowed three parties to get a portion of the
strategy they wanted. American intramural bargaining was
more subtle and perhaps more effective. In a contest of
wills, King seems to have outlasted Marshall both where the
southern Pacific offensive would take place and who would
direct it. Marshall's support of MacArthur, who admittedly
wanted to control the offensive, was undercut by MacArthur '
s
own erratic behavior. On May 28, MacArthur rejected the
Nimitz proposal for the Tulagi raid as an adjunct to the
Battle of Midway. Three weeks later MacArthur proposed a
full-scale frontal assault on Rabaul itself, an idea King
considered more foolhardy than bold [Ref. 8: p. 112]. King
in the meantime had surreptiously ordered Nimitz to complete
plans for the Solomons campaign, now officially known as
Operation WATCHTOWER. King's pressure on Marshall finally
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resulted in both service chiefs meeting on June 3 to make
a final decision. The compromise agreed to favored the Navy's
eastern Solomons plan and made the operation Nimitz ' by moving
the line of demarcation between Nimitz' SOPAC (Southern
Pacific Command, an element of his CINCPAC command) and
MacArthur's SOWPAC (Southwestern Pacific Command) westward
just far enough to encompass the eastern Solomons Islands
to be invaded initially [Ref. 6: p. 117]. This joint move
undercut MacArthur whose public image as an aggressive
military leader seems to have far exceeded the perception
both his military and civilian superiors had of his ability
as a commander. The opinion was confirmed on July 8 when
MacArthur and Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley, COMSOPAC, sent
a joint message voicing doubts as to their respective com-
mands* ability to support WATCHTOWER. King was incensed,
partially at one of his naval commanders siding with MacArthur,
but also because, "Three weeks ago MacArthur stated that ...
he could push right through to Rabaul. He now feels that he
cannot only undertake this extended operation (the complete
Solomons campaign, planned as described in the following
paragraph), but not even the Tulagi operation (WATCHTOWER)."
[Ref. 6: p. 219]
The uneven protestations of MacArthur and Ghormley
were too late. The Joint Chiefs had formally approved
WATCHTOWER on July 2 and King and Nimitz met in San Francisco
on July 4 and 5 to approve the final plans for this first
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thrust at the Japanese defensive perimeter. The landings
were to be under the tactical command of Rear Admiral
Richmond Kelly Turner who as King's war plans officer had
drawn up the grand strategy for the Solomons campaign.
This plan, conceived in early March, called for a three
phase operation:
1. Task I - WATCHTOWER, the seizure of the Santa Cruz
Islands and Tulagi. This would be under Ghormley's
overall command with operations to commence August
first.
2. Task II - the seizure of the remaining Solomons
and the New Guinea outposts of Lae, Salmuda, and
Papua.
3. Task III - the seizure of what had become the vitally
strategic Japanese base at Rabaul and neighboring
positions in New Guinea and New Ireland. [Ref. 4:
pp. 260-262] [Ref. 6: pp. 217-219]
Tasks II and III were to be under MacArthur * s control and
were ostensibly in preparation for his promised return
to the Philippines.
Apparently King and Nimitz did not consider the
Solomons offensive overall to be of paramount strategic
importance. At the July 19 42 conference the two admirals
agreed that the priorities for the Pacific war after Task
II would shift to the central Pacif ic-Truk, Saipan, Guam-
gradually closing in on the Japanese homelands from the
east [Ref. 6: p. 218] . In returning to its favored
strategy, the Navy seems to have tacitly omitted the
Philippines as a vital strategic objective for winning
30
the war. It can also be inferred that the Solomons cam-
paign, although vital as a first Pacific offensive and
needed to "hold the line" in the Pacific, was viewed as a
campaign of limited strategic value.
In hindsight, the long-range goals established for
the Solomons campaign were essential to subsiding the
inter-service bickering that threatened the operation. The
urgency of commencing Task I was reaffirmed on July 5 when
cryptanalysis revealed that the Japanese were building an
airstrip on Guadalcanal across from the main base at Tulagi.
This airfield was substituted for the Santa Cruz Islands
in Task I, a last minute decision that delayed the assault
one week and launched one of the most famous struggles
of the war [Ref . 8: p. 115] . Tasks II and III were never
completed as scheduled either. The march up the Solomons
chain was done largely by naval forces under Admiral
Halsey, Ghormley's successor, while MacArthur concentrated
on a land campaign against the Japanese in western New
Guinea. Rabaul, the Japanese stronghold in the southern
Pacific was never assaulted on land; in the end it was
choked and bombed into isolation.
With whatever bluster King conducted his outwards
dealings concerning WATCHTOWER, the impending landings made
him extremely uneasy. He considered the hurried operations
poorly planned and his last minute efforts to get additional
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Army and Army Air Force support clashed with Marshall's and
Air Chief Arnold's planning for the North African campaign
[Ref. 6: p. 221, 224]. The first move of the Solomon campaign
had truly become "Operation SHOESTRING," a risky Navy/Marine
Corps effort.
Ultimately this apprehension was both justified and
unfounded. The landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal on August 7
were virtually flawless although the fighting on the ground
soon became a deadly grind of attrition for the Marines who
seized and held the precious Guadalcanal airstrip. These
quick gains on the ground were not to reflect the true nature
of the campaign. On the night of August 9 the Battle of Savo
took place, handing the Navy a defeat unique in its history.
Moreover, this opening engagement was an indication that the
Navy did not absolutely control the waters of the Solomons.
They would remain highly contested throughout the struggle.
The efforts of both sides to secure the islands would depend
on and reflect this tenuous and shifting balance of seapower
in the Solomons area.
B. STRATEGIC LIMITATIONS AND THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN
The day following the Savo disaster, RADM Turner
completed what off-loading of supplies his forces could and
5Later named Henderson Field after the Marine Corps
major who died leading the Midway-based dive bombers at
the Battle of Midway.
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retired from the landing area with his amphibious transport
forces and what remained of his combatant escort. The
departure was not a panicky reaction to the previous night's
loss of four cruisers; the withdrawal had been planned
before the midnight Japanese cruiser strike. The attack
underscored the fundamental problems confronting the Americans
at the outset of the Solomons assault. The nature of the
campaign that emerged in succeeding months carried the im-
print of these problems and are reflected in the strategic
characteristics outlined in the previous chapter. The war
in the Solomons was carried. out much as it began: with
limited resources committed piecemeal, always in competition
with other campaigns of higher priority. The strategy that
evolved was one of improvision, measured ambition, and
tenacity.
1 . Naval Power-to Be Used Sparingly
The American Navy of mid-1942 was not equipped with
the forces it knew it needed to fight. While the United
States had emerged as a world power in the post-World War I
era, it lacked the naval forces to adequately defend its
interests abroad. The reasons behind this shortage are
complex and beyond the scope of the issues dealt with in
this work. However, the shortage of naval forces was a
pervasive limitation in the early Solomons campaign and the
force structure of both the American and Japanese fleets
was a key influence on the way both sides conducted the
campaign.
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Understanding the forces both sides had available
for the Solomons must begin with the prewar construction
plans of each fleet and the overall balance of naval power
these plans represented. Underlying the structure of the
world's naval forces between World Wars were the treaty
agreements of 1922 and 1930. Within the framework of these
agreements nations built their naval forces and these
treaties influenced the size of national fleets as well as
the capabilities of individual ship types. They also set
the stage for the clashing of these forces in the Pacific.
For Japan the treaties limitations were a two-edged sword.
The 1922 limitations were acceptable for economic reasons;
the Japanese realized their fragile economy could not sup-
port a naval arms race with the western nations. The 1922
treaty also flattered Japan to a certain extent, treating
her as a world power. By the time of the 193 treaty, the
flattery had taken a cynical turn in Japanese eyes: Japan
would be recognized as a world power, but a second class
one. Japanese leaders, who saw their domination of eastern
Asia as a destiny fulfilled, wanted naval parity with the
United States, their principal rival in Asia. By 1934 the
Japanese had decided to abrogate the treatires, leaving the
process of naval arms control a shambles although the pro-
cess had generated the basic force structures that would
square off against each other in World War II.
[Ref. 3: pp. 29-33]
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By any standards, the size of the Pacific Fleet at
the war's outset was inadequate for offensive action. As
described in the previous section, the strength of the fleet
was particularly weak in carriers although corresponding
shortnesses were evident in all categories of major
combatants. As American industry began its struggle to
catch up with mobilization plans, the strategy for the war
was forced to accommodate the reality of too few ships for
too many tasks. The upshot was that the United States would
conduct a strategic defense in the Pacific while the European
theatre received top priority for American and Allied
resources. The American Navy had considered the necessary
ratio of forces for a war with Japan to be 5:3. The order
of battle . in Table I presents the reality faced by the
Pacific theatre: the American fleet barely enjoyed parity
with the Japanese fleet and the Pacific was considered a
second priority in any event. In considering the ratio of
forces in the Pacific, the Japanese enjoyed a 1.5:1 advantage
in major combatants overall, with a decisive 7:3 ratio in
carriers.
The tally reflected in Table I drove each nation to
opposite strategies in regards to force employment. The
See the following chapter on the forces used in the
Solomons for a description of how the treaties influenced
specific ship construction programs and how ratios for ship
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final "RAINBOW" plan in effect at the time hostilities com-
menced (RAINBOW 5 of May 26, 1941) assumed that the first
Japanese strike would involve either the Philippines, Indo-
china, Malaysia, or the central Pacific islands under
American control (Guam, Wake, etc.). The maintenance of the
sea lanes to Australia was considered to be a principal
Pacific fleet mission and, upon the outbreak of hostilities,
American forces were to capture key Japanese positions in
the Marshalls and Carolines. [Ref. 10: p. 11-14] The forces
assumed needed for execution of the plan were 9 battleships,
3 carriers, 13 heavy cruisers, 20 light cruisers, and 63
7destroyers, reflecting the realities of Table I
[Ref. 10: Appendix II]. The official plans seem overly
ambitious in light of the force ratio that existed and,
although the RAINBOW 5 plan was the foundation of the Navy's
grand strategy throughout the war, its basic objectives
seem contradictory, calling for simultaneous defensive
actions and the undertaking of an early major offensive.
Understanding the failure of the plan requires a considera-
tion of how badly it underestimated Japanese strategic plans.
While RAINBOW 5 assumed that the Japanese would move against
7Among the destroyers considered were eighteen World
War I ships classified as "old" by the official standards
of the day. They were used during the war, however and
considered here, although their use underscores the shortage
that existed in this key category of vessel.
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one of the objectives cited, the marginal forces available
were not sufficient to deal with the single coordinated
sweep of all objectives. Japan trumped Allied war plans by
assaulting all of the expected "tripwires" at once, leaving
the Allied plans and forces in disarray. The British and
Dutch participation in the war ended quickly leaving the
Pacific to the United States [Ref. 10: JCS Addend, of
April 20, 1942] and with little hope of an early thrust
into the defensive perimeter that the Japanese had enlarged
so rapidly. Led by King, the United States Navy clung to
the first objective, maintaining lines of communication
open to Australia, and reconsidered the other strategic
options left open in the Pacific.
It was clear that these options would be conserva-
tive and the overextended American naval forces would have
to be preserved. While Yamamoto craved a single decisive
clash with what remained of the Americna fleet, King and
Nimitz settled on a policy of Nimitz ' forces only meeting
the Japanese in the battles that needed to be fought. The
Japanese fleet would be attrited, not devastated, and the
official policy of King and Nimitz on the eve of Midway was
to avoid action with the Japanese fleet that would further
reduce American carrier and cruiser forces
[Ref. 11: pp. 162, 176]. The American forces, with superior
intelligence afforded through cryptoanalysis , were able to
pick the correct occasions for the commitment of forces
prior to WATCHTOWER, Coral Sea and Midway. Similarly, the
Solomons campaign was conceived with a conservative view of
the RAINBOW philosophy of taking the war to the Japanese.
The campaign was, after all, primarily a defensive move to
prevent the isolation of Australia. The sparse forces
allocated to WATCHTOWER were not so much committed as loaned;
Turner's hasty evacuation of the naval elements of the task
force on August 9 was caused by the withdrawal of the carrier
forces ( Saratoga , Enterprise , and Wasp ) covering the WATCH-
TOWER landings [Ref . 12: pp. 27-28] . This controversial
move by Fletcher foreshadowed the nature of naval actions in
the Solomons: only those major forces necessary would be
risked in this campaign and only for as long as necessary.
Japanese strategy in the Solomons reached a parallel
conclusion for opposite reasons. Yamamoto, realizing that
his decisive battle with the American fleet would not occur
in the Solomons, seems to have been ambivalent about the
Japanese campaign there and reluctant to commit resources
to its prosecution [Ref. 3: p. 328] . In view of the dis-
jointed nature of Japanese planning and the fact that
Yamamoto agreed to the original Japanese offensive in the
Solomons only under the terms of a compromise, his truculence
seems expected. Yamamoto committed Combined Fleet assets,
including the post-Midway depleted Japanese carrier force,
to the Solomons for only three major engagements, the
Battle of the Eastern Solomons on August 24, 1942, the Battle
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of the Santa Cruz Islands, October 26-27, 1942, and Operation
"I" in April, 1943. The first two were full scale efforts
to dislodge the Marine forces at Henderson Field and the
final a desperate attempt to slow the American advance in
the central Solomons [Ref. 12: Chapt. IV, XI] [Ref. 2:
p. 273]-. Except for these isolated instances, the burden of
naval actions in the Solomons fell on the cruiser-destroyer
forces of the Eighth Fleet based at Rabaul. The American
commanders mirrored this force employment, with the land
campaign in the Solomons command under the protection of
United States Navy cruiser-destroyers task forces for
routine control of waters contiguous to the islands and a
combination of land-based and sparsely allocated carrier-
based air cover attempting to maintain control of the air.
American carrier forces were deployed in the Battles of the
Eastern Solomons and the Santa Cruz Islands. However, the
risking of carrier task groups was frowned upon by both
navies in the routine prosecution of the war in the Solomons.
The reliance on surface combatants as principal
naval forces was not in keeping with either Japanese or
American official naval doctrine but the concept was not
foreign to Japanese tactical thought. During the first
World War the Japanese deployed a destroyer squadron to the
Mediterranean, a token force, expendable and willingly
spared [Ref. 13, p. 27]. The sacrifice of the
Japanese surface forces in the Solomons protected the
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Combined Fleet, perhaps saving it for its final defeat in
the closing months of the war some three years later. The
Japanese could scarcely afford to loose even these forces.
Wartime American cruiser production outstripped that of the
Japanese by almost 4 to 1 and American destoyer production
surpassed that of the Japanese by a margin over 11 to 1.
While the Japanese started the war with a numerical supe-
riority over the Americans, the advantage evaporated under
the slow but steady hand of American attrition and production
The conservative employment of major naval forces was a
strategy shared by both sides but, it served each unequally.
In the Solomons this strategy allowed the United States
time to build its forces for the determined thrust its naval
leaders had long envisioned while it squandered Japanese
naval assets that could never be replaced.
C. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE: TWO VIEWS
The Solomons campaign marked the beginning of the United
States 1 amphibious drive in the Pacific, although it was in
many respects distinct from later central Pacific amphibious
assaults and remains unique in light of current naval doc-
trine as well. Underlying this uniqueness are the strategic
limitations that drove the campaign itself. Paramount among
the prerequisities for a successful amphibious operation,
according to World War II doctrine, was secure lines of
communication to the objective area and control of the air
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and seas around the area [Ref. 14: p. 208]. The United
States Navy of August 1942 could insure neither absolutely.
The ability to maintain firm control of air and sea
shaped the nature of the struggle for the Solomons on the
ground. Initially Henderson Field was seized to keep it
from the Japanese; it was held because as an "unsinkable
aircraft carrier" [Ref. 2: p. 194] it was needed to maintain
air superiority over the area and help thwart Japanese
efforts to resupply the battle. In terms of sea control,
the American surface combatants which attempted to protect
the waters adjacent to the Solomons were based at Tulagi
where the comforts and necessary support of larger bases and
at sea logistics were duplicated: fuel, stores, repairs,
and even limited rest and recreation were all provided
locally for the cruiser-destroyer forces employed in the
Solomons. These services became indispensable because of
the intensity of the at sea clashes in support of the
efforts to secure the islands themselves.
While amphibious warfare doctrine assumes a naval force
attacking a land-based force entrenched ashore, the strategic
anomaly of the Solomons campaign was that both sides
engaged in simultaneous seaborne assaults in an effort to
control the same territory. The Japanese and Americans
faced the same problems of air and sea control in attempting
to wage the battle for the Solomons and it is necessary to
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evaluate each navy's abilities at this complex type of
naval operation.
1. American Amphibious Operations Within the Solomons
Context
As has been pointed out, the United States Navy of
1941 had devoted over twenty years of thought to the problems
of fighting a war in the Western Pacific. The solidly laid
plans for the central Pacific prior to the war had foreseen
assaults on the islands of the Marshalls, Carolines, and
Marianas and with these plans had come an appreciation of
the problems involved in landing and supporting troops in
such remote areas. During the interwar period the Gallipoli
disaster was studied extensively by the Naval War College at
Newport and the theoretical aspects of amphibious warfare
became regular parts of the College curriculum [Ref. 14:
p. 207] . By 1938 formal tactical doctrine had been estab-
lished by FTP-167 [Ref. 14: p. 226].
As was observed in the above discussion of major
combatant force levels, the budget did not always follow
doctrine and the amphibious forces were no exception. In
landing craft, the Navy had procured or contracted for
sufficient assault boating for three Marine Corps or Army
divisions. Missing, however, was the required shipping
needed to move amphibious forces to overseas objectives.
At the time of Pearl Harbor the Navy had less than half of
the troop transports required by existing war plans and all
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but two of these ships were stationed in the Atlantic Fleet.
As in the case of the combatants, the number of vessels "on
order" made up for existing deficiciencies and the procurement
process was simplified for amphibious ships by the ease with
which civilian-built merchant ships could be converted to
q
amphibious "grey bottoms." Nonetheless Admiral Turner, who
was instrumental in designing the amphibious navy as war
plans officer, commanded a mixed force that lived up to the
SHOESTRING sobriquet on August 7; virtually all of his
amphibious task force was converted merchant hulls, some
obtained by the Navy as recently as four months earlier.
[Ref. 14: Chapter VI] [Ref. 15]
A final factor that must be considered in evaluating
the American ability at amphibious warfare in the Solomons
was the strength of the command structure the American
amphibious forces enjoyed. The potential of interservice
squabbling and confusion is obvious in such a combined
operation. Admiral Turner's forceful personality and
gAt the time, the principal types of amphibious ships
were troop transports (AP) , amphibious cargo ship (AK) , and
destroyer transport (APD) . The LSD (Landing Ship, Dock) and
LST (Landing Ship, Tank) would soon follow with their
respective abilities to launch waterborne landing craft and
disembark vehicles directly on the beach. The APD was a
workhorse of the Solomons with its ability to efficiently
move small contingents of troops around the islands at night
on specific missions. It is interesting to note that Fleet
Commander King's letter on major ship construction did not
even address the construction of amphibious forces.
44
understanding of the nature of the problems facing the
execution of an amphibious assault did much to establish
the effective command and control procedures for amphibious
task forces. After WATCHTOWER, Turner recommended all
amphibious forces be under the direction of a strengthened
chain of command that would allow the amphibious task force
commander--a naval officer—control of the various elements
of the landing force until the tactical situation in the
landing area was secure [Ref. 14: pp. 221-223].
2 . Japanese Amphibious Operations
The Japanese efforts to hold the Solomons sparked
their own efforts at amphibious reinforcements. The Japan-
ese style of amphibious warfare was markedly different from
that of American forces and, on the whole, the Japanese
have an uneven record in the conduct of such operations
during World War II. The Japanese Navy had an amphibious
assault element known as the Special Naval Landing Forces
(SNLF) yet little dedicated amphibious shipping. The Japan-
ese Navy constructed only a few "AP" type ships of about
8000 tons, [Ref. 16] relying on civilian marus and destroyers
for the bulk of their amphibious assault shipping. The SNLF
paid dearly for this narrow concept of operations. Placed
in crowded ships, Japanese landing forces remained vulnerable
to attack with disasterous results impacting on the success
of an entire operation. At Wake, half of the first SNLF
landing force was wiped out in a single hit on a
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troop-carrying destroyer, presaging the difficult time the
Japanese would face in the Solomons [Ref. 2: pp. 24-25].
For its part, the Japanese Army preferred its own barges
( daihatsu ) for transport. However these Army-owned assets
had a limited range of about 100 miles and were primarily
for carrying troops, not cargo [Ref. 11: p. 67]. The opera-
tion of these and the five or six similar classes of small
landing craft operated by the SNLF [Ref. 16] was restricted
to island waterways and, although these short-haul methods
of landing troops saw extensive use in the Solomons, the
Japanese lack of dedicated open ocean amphibious shipping
limited their amphibious efforts in the Solomons and other
campaigns.
Japanese amphibious tactics seemed to reflect the
same split between the Army and Navy evident in the larger
strategic issues. The Army apparently had little under-
standing of the American Marine Corps and its capability to
conduct large scale operations after an amphibious landing
[Ref. 3: p. 324]. Japanese amphibious tactics in the
Solomons were the reverse of the American practice of using
a massive assault to build up troop strength ashore as
rapidly as possible. After it became apparent that dis-
lodging the Americans at Guadalcanal would not be easy, the
Japanese consolidated their position in the Solomons by
landing at Munda Point, New Georgia, and Kolombangara in
November 1942 and began building airfields. Eventually the
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Japanese built uf a force of 4000 SNLF and 6500 Army troops
in central Solomcns [Ref. 14: pp. 433, 492]. The difficulty
with which Japanese reinforcement operations and efforts to
resupply their troops on Guadalcanal is a reflection of
how limited the scope of Japanese amphibious operations were.
Troops and supples were inserted at night via the "Tokyo
Express," a makeshift task group usually composed of a group
of combatants potecting a contingent of troops embarked on
destroyers and small landing craft. American efforts to
stop these attaipts sparked most of the naval battles around
the Solomors
.
Alhouh Japanese attempts at reinforcement of the
Solomons ws ii sharp contrast to the efficient, large scale
American s>h:oious landings, the effectiveness of the
"Tokyo Exass" cannot be discounted. After initially mis-
judging t scope of the American assault at Guadalcanal,
the Japas began a gradual effort to build up its own
forces oiat hotly contested island [Ref. 2: pp. 195, 204].
The camp for control of the island (and the attainment
of WATCER goals) was a race between the "Tokyo Express"
and therican shuttle of forces from Noumea, New Caledonia
(SOPAC quarters) to the embattled island. Table II
shows tenacity of Japanese efforts at amphibious re-
supply 211 as the American problem of operating at the
end of tig logistics chain without firm control of the
air an. In light of these figures Japanese amphibious
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techniques cannot be discounted easily despite their rela-
tive unsophistication. By October the Japanese land forces
engaged in the Solomons had reached parity with American
forces, sparking a crisis in the campaign. This crisis
resulted in a final Japanese attempt to retake Henderson
Field from the Americans, an effort that the Combined Fleet
committed what remained of the Kido Butai in support of and
led to the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. The Combined
Fleet effort failed and, after the Naval Battle of Guadal-
canal two weeks later, it became apparent that the Japanese
would have to abandon Guadalcanal [Ref. 12: Chapter XI,
p. 333] .
The contrast in American and Japanese amphibious
tactics is highlighted by the method in which the Japanese
approached the reinforcement of Guadalcanal, a method they
repeated throughout the American advance up the Solomons
chain. The American strategy saw amphibious warfare as a
shock assault using a combination of close air support and
naval gunfire support to augment as well as protect landing
forces. The concept saw the amphibious assault as a just
that, an attempt to seize territory from an entrenched enemy
The Japanese approach seems to have been to consider amphib-
ious operations merely a method of placing troops ashore.
As Dull points out, after the Battle of the Eastern Solomons
the Japanese had two options in maintaining the campaign
ashore in the Solomons--either attempt another full scale
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amphibious assault backed by the Combined Fleet or a piece-
meal reinforcement via the Tokyo Express. Given the lack of
Japanese success at large amphibious operations in the face
of stiff opposition, the Express option made sense: The
Americans controlled the airspace over the Solomons by day
and Midway had deprived them of carrier forces to challenge
this control over the battlefield. Moreover, the Japanese
effort was far from pedantric. As Table II indicates, it
surpassed American efforts to bolster the land campaign for
several months. In the end it failed because the Japanese
fleet could not control the seas well enough to capitalize
on the hard earned success of the Tokyo Express. Yamamoto
had fought and lost his decisive fleet engagement in the
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands and the Naval Battle of
Guadalcanal; the result was the first contraction of the
Japanese defensive perimeter.
D. FORWARD BASING AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE SOLOMONS
To the American naval strategists considering a war in
the western Pacific, the sheer size of the ocean was a
primary problem. The Washington Treaty limited American base
construction west of Hawaii, [Ref. 17: p. 271] a limitation
that probably did not significantly impact on war efforts,
but did underscore Japanese nervousness about the United
States* ability to conduct a campaign on Japan's doorstep.
The United States Navy was keenly aware that the ability
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to successfully prosecute a war against Japan would depend
upon the ability of its forces to operate at extended ranges
from logistic support bases.
In practical terms this realization translated into a
question of operating ranges for American warships. Of
particular concern were the operational ranges of cruisers.
As has been noted the world's cruisers were heavily influenced
by treaty limitations and, for the United States, the need
to squeeze as much operating range out of the already con-
strained hull was of a prime consideration. The solution to
the problem of maintaining such forces in a strategic posi-
tion where they could effectively operate against the Japan-
ese was a mixture of three variables: force size, individual
warship design, and forward basing available for logistic
support. In regards to the first element, a 1930 study by
General Board concluded that for the United States to main-
tain a sufficient cruiser force on station to counter Japan-
ese cruiser strength in that region, the American fleet
would need to have 4.4 7 cruisers to every one of Japan's
[Ref. 18]. This figure, far more demanding than the treaty's
5:3 ratio accepted but not met, illustrates the Navy's
appreciation of the problems faced in attempting to maintain
a deterrent naval posture in the western Pacific. The
expense of the forces involved ensured that the strategic
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The impact of the long distances of the Pacific on war-
ship design is perhaps best illustrated by an examination of
how the two navies prioritized range in their respective
ship designs. Table III overviews the heavy and light
cruisers of each nation that would fight the naval engage-
ments of the Solomons. The Japanese clearly saw less need
for "long legs" on their ships while the Americans built
larger ships with significantly longer operating ranges.
The ratios give some sense of the compromises each navy found
best suited to its situation: except for the light cruiser,
the American design clearly favored range and even in this
ship type, the American design held a considerable overall
9
advantage in average range. American designs also seem to
have packed more gun power on each ship with each gun the-
oretically supported by proportionately less tonnage. In
summary, Table III shows the American cruiser to be geared
9 It should also be noted that the average for the
American light cruisers is skewed by the Omaha-class
,
designed at the conclusion of World War I before the matur-
ing of United States Pacific strategy during the twenties
and thirties.
The issue of the gun as main armament will be more
thoroughly discussed in the next chapter. It will be argued
that the Japanese sought to make up for their lower gun
density by the addition of torpedoes to their cruisers, a
trade-off that had deadly implications in the Solomons.
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towards the projection of maximum firepower at longer dis-
tances from logistic support, a scheme consistent with the
American problem of fighting a Pacific war.
Because of the limitations on force structure and plat-
form characteristics the United States Navy's emphasis on
logistic support takes on a unique importance. The American
Navy of the interwar period had developed two principal
responses to the strategic problem of fighting the war in
Japanese territory. The first was a series of bases and
agreements necessary to support the American fleet in the
western Pacific. Bases such as those in the Philippines and
Guam were critical to the American strategy for fighting a
war with Japan, an implication not lost on the Japanese at
the treaty conferences. The vital nature of these bases
was understood by American planners who realized that main-
taining these forward bases in the western Pacific would be
critical prior to the outbreak of hostilities as well as
after a war had started [Ref . 18] . Complementing this
overseas basing was a sea-based logistics force, well inte-
grated into the fleet and capable of sustaining the fleet
at sea for extended periods of operating.
The first leg of this dual logistics base did not survive
the initial days of the war. The first Japanese strike in
the Pacific was a well placed blow that eliminated planned
American support facilities. As the General Board study of
a decade earlier had predicted, the Asiatic Fleet was
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stranded and sacrificed [Ref. 18] and the American fleet
would have to fight its way back into Japanese waters,
and rebuilding its logistics base as it went along. The
Solomons was both a first step in this process and a
laboratory to test plans for later moves towards the Japan-
ese homeland.
1. Contrasting Attitudes and Effectiveness
From the onset of the Solomons campaign the Americans
had displayed a strong sense of localized integral support
for forces engaged. Part of this was born of necessity: the
tenuous control of the seas in the SOPAC area made regular
resupply impossible and it became necessary for forces in
the Solomons to provide much of their own support as well
as defense. The airstrip at Henderson Field was augmented
by another by the end of 1942 and Tulagi rapidly became a
"miniature naval base" [Ref. 12: p. 317] for the support of
the surface task groups providing the backbone of the naval
defense of the operation. The efforts at establishing local
logistic support and as much self sufficiency as possible
became a model for other operations. Despite an injunction
from Nimitz against "permanent" facilities on Guadalcanal,
[Ref. 8: p. 217] by the spring of 1943 the island had lived
up to its codename of "MAINBASE" for the forces struggling
their way up the Solomons chain. [Ref. 19: P- 100] With-
in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi complex, the American forces
established emergency ship repair facilities, fuel storage
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areas, headquarters facilities, a hospital, administrative
support, and even limited recreational facilities [Ref. 19:
pp. 100-106]
.
The American use of forward basing in the Solomons
dwarfed similar Japanese efforts and the disparity in the
efforts cannot be underestimated in its impact on the entire
campaign. At first glance the Japanese would have seemed to
hold a distinct advantage: not only were they operating
close to their homeland and within their defensive perimeter,
but they occupied a series of airfields and two anchorages
along the Solomons chain. As late as June, 1943 the Japanese
still maintained five airfields, two seaplane bases and two
anchorages along the Solomon chain in contrast to the single
naval facility at Tulagi and the airfields at Henderson
and Russell Island [Ref. 19: p. 91]. Despite this advantage,
Japanese logistic support for the forces in the Solomons was
almost non existent beyond Rabaul, some 170 miles from their
closest intermediate base in the Solomons at Buka [Ref. 19:
p. 91] . A difference in philosophy permeated the Japanese
concept of integrating logistics and tactics. The Japanese
saw their Solomons bases as either refueling stops or emer-
gency havens. Although American efforts to neutralize these
intermediate waypoints with air power were frustrated, the
failure of the Japanese to develop them into staging points




Japanese insistence on conducting long range opera-
tions made a significant contribution to the eventual failure
of the Japanese Solomons campaign. The basing of previously
described amphibious reinforcement efforts so remote to the
objective area allowed American intelligence efforts time
to locate Tokyo Express runs and the opportunity for American
cruiser-destroyer task groups to position themselves for
interception. While American ships damaged in the violent
night encounters with the Tokyo Express had only to return
to Tulagi for emergency repairs, the distance from the lower
Solomons to Rabaul by sea was over 58 miles. Running this
gauntlet under American aircraft based locally took its toll
on damaged Japanese ships caught with no safe harbor. One
Japanese light cruiser and seven destroyers were sacrificed
to American forces after being damaged in battle [Ref. 2:
Appendix A] . The anchorages in the Shortlands offered no
refuge: there were no repair facilities available and the
lack of permanent air cover in the area left the anchorages
vulnerable to American air strikes.
Perhaps it is one of the great ironies of the Solomons
campaign that the Japanese did so poorly at supporting their
forces while operating far closer to their home bases than
Based on the usual track followed by the Japanese up
the "slot" through the New Georgia group.
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the intruding American forces. In retrospect, the answer
seems to coincide with a focus long central to each side's
planning for the war. The Japanese saw the Pacific war as
their chance to control the areas of the world destiny had
told them were theirs; they possessed the internal lines of
communication and the supposed advantages they held. The
Americans, on the other hand realized that logistics would
be the first problem in fighting the Japanese. The American
Navy had thought long and hard about logistics and the need
to forward base forces in a Pacific war. For the Japanese,
the Solomons represented the farthest outpost of their own
territory and they coped poorly with the problems of operat-
ing at this edge. The American forces who brought the war
to this limit of Japanese expansion realized that the pro-
jection of power into Japanese territory made logistic support
as important an offensive weapon as any other in the arsenal.
E. SYNERGISM IN THE SOLOMONS
The integration of the land, sea and air forces committed
to the Solomons makes the campaign an interesting model for
study of the modern naval or maritime campaign. The inter-
action of the forces employed in the Solomons created a
sequence of individual combat actions that blended into a
pattern of success for American forces. In the Solomons,
land forces, embarked from and supported by naval forces,
were employed to seize airfields which in turn provided
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air superiority which extended over both land and sea. This
local superiority allowed the seizure of more islands as
the year and a half campaign was extended northward along the
Solomons chain. In its purest sense the Solomons campaign
was a naval campaign; the primary thrust of the campaign was
the control of the sea lanes to Australia. Beyond this
genesis, the campaign represented a multidimensional approach
to sea control. Actions at sea, in the air, and ashore sup-
ported each other, and were dependent upon the individual
tactical superiority each provided.
1 . The Air Campaign
For the Japanese, U.S. control of the airspace over
the Solomons remained the debilitating element that frustra-
ted their "attempts to hold the islands. The failure was
not one of omission; the Japanese fully realized the critical
nature of air control in the Solomons and how drastic its
loss would eventually be. By June 194 3, the Japanese had
established airfields at Buka, Kakilli, Ballale, Vila, and
Munda with seaplane anchorages at Rekata Bay and the
Sortlands. For their part, the Americans had bases for air-
craft at New Caledonia, Espiritu Santu, Fiji, Malaysia, and
Russell Island as well as on Guadalcanal. Raw numbers do
little to illuminate the different approach of each side in
the employment of these airfields: the main Japanese air
staging base at Rabaul held an average of about one hundred
planes, a figure at rough parity with the force at Henderson
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Field from late 1942 to spring 1943 [Ref. 12: pp. 290,
374-375] . However, the Japanese utilized their Solomons
fields primarily as fueling stops for their planes enroute
the southern Solomons from Rabaul [Ref. 19: p. 90]. In
their failure to establish locally controlled and self suf-
ficient air facilities, the Japanese denied their land and
sea commanders flexible and responsive air support. The
American basing of aircraft literally at the front was in
sharp contrast to this philosophy which concentrated on pre-
planned long range attacks of the battle area.
Key to the American success in the air over the
Solomons was the well integrated command structure that
supported the air elements committed to the campaign and
the way this structure responded to the total tactical
environment within the Solomons area. The air forces in the
Solomons were controlled by Commander, Air Forces Solomons
(COMAIRSOL) who reported directly to COMSOPAC. This high
level coordination of the assets on the fields listed above
allowed American air forces, both land and sea based, to
work in unison in response to the tactical situation. A
most striking example of this was the Battle of The Eastern
Solomons in. August 194 2. In this encounter, seaplanes based
in the Santa Cruz Islands sighted elements of the Japanese
Combined Fleet and the information formed the basis of an
unsuccessful attack by the carrier Saratoga. Although
"Sara's" planes were unable to locate their target, they
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extended their search to a range of 350 miles by recovering
at Henderson Field instead of returning to their home flight
deck [Ref. 12: pp. 81-84], After returning to the Saratoga
the next day, the planes were eventually able to engage
elements of the Japanese task force which found itself with
no air support other than its own carrier forces.
The ability of American forces to rely on inter-
changeable land and carrier based air support allowed the
sparse American forces control of the seas surrounding the
Solomons during daylight. This range of control spanned
the normal operational range of the American SBD dive
bomber—about 250 miles—and enveloped most of the central
Solomons from Bouganville to Guadalcanal [Ref. 2: p. 209].
The SBD and the other planes flying out of the fields built
by the advancing Americans represented a unique type of naval
power. Coming from Marine air squadrons, Army Air Forces,
some Allied forces, and carrier airwings temporarily "loaned"
to the fields, this constantly fluctuating air force inflicted
serious losses on the Japanese, accounting for one Japanese
battleship and eleven destroyers during the campaign [Ref. 2:
Appendix A] . American air power in the Solomons was the
essence of naval power in 1942-43, giving United States'
12forces not only superiority in the air but at sea as well.
12This observation is made after a consideration of
the thoughtful insights of LGEN Philip Shutler, USMC , (Ret.)
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It seems that the Japanese realized the significance
of American air power over the Solomons too late. Their
Operation "I" in April 1943 was a last attempt by the
Japanese to use their own integrated force of land based
and Combined Fleet air asset to wrest control of the air
from the United States. The plan called for massive strikes
on American air bases at Guadalcanal, Port Moresby, Ara Bay,
and Milne Bay in an effort to thwart Allied advances in New
Guinea and the corresponding central Solomons thrust.
("Task II" of the original Solomons strategy.) "I" was a
failure, its only accomplishment the further attrition of
Japan's carrier air forces, which had been in a steady
decline since Midway. This final failure of the Japanese
to gain air superiority over the United States underscores
their larger failure to challenge American naval air power
13throughout the Solomons campaign. [Ref. 2: p. 273]
2 . The, Campaign Afloat
The commission of naval vessels to the Solomons was
driven by constraints. The scarcity of carriers relegated
12
who has observed that "naval" aviators come in two
varieties, blue and green and that successful employment
of both from both sea and land bases requires viewing
both with a degree of colorblindness.
In yet another irony of the Solomons campaign, it
was during "I" that Yamamoto lost his life to American
fighters based at Guadalcanal. Yamamoto had little
enthusiasm for the Solomons campaign and committed too
little too late to the effort. In a sense he died for




the seaward defense of the campaign to surface combatant
forces. These forces relied on the air power based on the
Solomons for their support in both reconnaissance and as
protection against raids from enemy air attacks. In terms
of tactical prowess, the American surface forces made a
spotty showing until the final months of the campaign;
Japanese night tactics for surface combatants were better,
yet the American cruiser-destroyer groups doggedly performed
a vital task. As the backbone of the "Tokyo Express" inter-
diction, American combatants were called upon to break up
Japanese night reinforcement efforts and deal with the
cruiser-destroyer forces the enemy sent down the "Slot" to
bombard American forces ashore. On balance the American
14 . . .
effort was successful and, despite heavy attrition on both
sides, the Japanese never forced a significant withdrawal of
American forces from positions ashore.
The concept of sea control in the Solomons was far
different from the traditional paradigm. Without large
forces of powerful ships available, the Americans had to
settle for a more flexible notion of sea control. The use
of land based air power was vital to isolating the waters
around the Solomons during the day, providing American surface
forces with a narrower window to operate in for the night
14 The following chapters will examine the specific
tactical problems American naval forces encountered in this
effort.
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defense of the islands. Geography was also a limitation
exploitable by American naval forces: the Tokyo Express was
constrained to a narrow track from Rabaul (or, occasionally,
the Shortlands anchorage) making the prediction of Japanese
movements simpler. The blend of geography, air power, and
surface forces was also effectively utilized in a mining
campaign in the spring of 1943 that cost the Japanese five
destroyers in the waters around Bouganville [Ref . 2: p. 214]
.
The same integration of command evident in the use of
airpower in the Solomons was essential to this combined use
of assets for control of the local seas. SOPAC provided
intelligence, air support, fuel, and a place to repair the
damage of battle for the surface task groups of the Solomons.
This integration made up for the shortage of naval forces
in the campaign by insuring that the commission of these
forces to battle was done as economically as possible.
3 . The Campaign Ashore
While the original goals of the campaign were
seizure of territory ashore--specifically Henderson Field
—
the land actions of the Solomons should be treated within
the context of the total campaign. After securing Guadal-
canal, the next objective for American forces was the
Russell Islands, occupied on February 21, 1943. The Russells
gave the Americans another precious airfield and all the
benefits that ensued: better control of the seas around
the Solomons, a base for further operations up the Solomons
64
chain, dispersion of forces for more flexibility. It was
also a vital first step in the realization of the original
strategic plans called for in the initial Solomons planning.
The realization of "Task II" was somewhat different in
execution than had been originally planned. In June 1943
Operation TOENAILS commenced, a move forward into New
Georgia, timed to coincide with MacArthur's thrust towards
northward in New Guinea. This attempt at a "pincer" move-
ment around the Japanese main base at Rabaul represented a
significant expansion of the American offensive inside the
Japanese perimeter.
From the campaign's standpoint, the move into the
Russells and beyond gave the Americans additional bases to
extend their control of the air and seas. From these bases
American air power was eventually able to effectively isolate
Rabaul and Japanese positions in New Britain and New Ireland,
neutralizing Japanese air and sea power in the region. The
land battles in the Solomons were battles for additional
bases which provided the support—logistic and tactical--
to allow the envelopment of Rabaul to continue. The campaign
became both tactically and strategically self-sustaining with
the gains ashore resulting in bases for the extension of
American air and sea power.
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F. THE SOLOMONS: WORTH THE EFFORT?
It may be argued that the Solomons campaign resulted in
no vital strategic gains by either side. In addressing this
challenge from the American point of view, a host of other
issues are raised which must be placed in the perspectives
of the campaign's strategic goals and their validity within
the context of the war effort. The strategic decisions that
led to the Solomons were a mixture of prewar planning,
political compromise, and the need to conserve forces. As
the attrition-oriented campaign wore on, its relative value
does seem to have changed: in late 194 2, the Solomons repre-
sented the sole American drive in the Pacific; a year later
the campaign hardly looked as promising despite its success.
Rabaul had been bypassed, MacArthur was on his way to the
Philippines, and the Navy was impatiently preparing for the
long planned central Pacific thrust.
Assessing the ultimate value of the Solomons campaign
must be done within the context of its undertaking as des-
cribed above. The limited value of the campaign was admitted
from the start; the Solomons campaign was largely reactive
and meant to unhinge an enemy war machine that was moving
forward unchecked. The Solomons offensive was meant to
widen the war for the Japanese in a way they did not envision
This it did, as the Japanese reluctance to fight in the
Solomons was gradually replaced with the steady commitment
of irreplaceable forces as the campaign wore on. As Wilmott
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frames the strategic question facing the Japanese in the
spring of 1942, either the "barrier" or the "javelin" had
to be embraced. The American thrust into the Solomons
answered the dilemma: the javelin would have to be taken
up, stretching Japanese forces to their limit. Defending
the Solomons committed the Japanese to a war of attrition
they could neither win nor abandon.
The advantage of forcing the Japanese into this choice
remains debatable. Morrison, never shy at voicing criticism,
contends that the actions undertaken in the Solomons after
Guadalcanal were poor from a strategic standpoint because
the advance up the Solomons chain touched neither the Japan-
ese Army nor the Combined Fleet [Ref. 19: p. 252]. Consider-
ing the merits of this argument from a purely naval aspect,
the criticism does not seem valid. The ships and aircraft
Japan lost were never replaced and the final decimation of
the Imperial Japanese Navy was in large measure due to the
attrition suffered in the Solomons. As Dull points out,
the tactical successes of the Japanese in the Solomons were
at the expense of the Japanese destroyer force without which
the remainder of the Japense fleet was largely unprotected
[Ref. 2: p. 295]. Moreover, the first crack in the Japanese
defensive perimeter was a serious one that signaled a dramatic
shift in the war. "Victory fever" was cured in the Solomons;
the bright prospects of spring were dimmed by fall of 1942.
The Emperor's New Year's message of 1943 was far different
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in tone from that of the previous year and the evacuation
of Guadalcanal during the next month underscored the pessimism
the Emperor expressed [Ref. 12: p. 317].
The Solomons meant more to both sides than simply the
value of the losses and gains. The bureaucratic juggling
that marked the campaign's inception was a lesson for all
participants; the war would be won through such strategic
bargaining. As a holding action, the Solomons allowed the
United States time to build its forces for the major drives
of the Pacific war, time that was needed to build up a fleet.
The lessons of the Solomons were also utilized in the cam-
paigns that followed, particularly amphibious warfare tactics.
The strategic lessons of the Solomons lie in the expe-
rience gained in the conduct of lesser important, "off
axis" offensive campaigns to disrupt an enemy's planning.
A first lesson is that such "less important" efforts are
costly. The entire campaign was one of mutual attrition in
all phases of the campaign. Concurrent with this observa-
tion is that efforts to horizontally escalate a conflict,
as was done in the Solomons, may be at odds with the strategy
recognized as most effective for winning the conflict. This
was the case in the Solomons as the islands were never seen
as the "stepping off" point for the decisive thrust at the
Japanese homeland. Territory in the Solomons was gained for
the purpose of denying it to the enemy and to support sea
control in a specific region. The traditional strategic
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rationale for amplis campaigns is the establishment of
bases for further asion into enemy territory [Ref. 14:
p. 224]. The Sol<was a twist on this classic paradigm:
instead of utilizsa power to gain leverage in a land
theatre, gains asfrere made to support sea control where
naval forces were.
This applicatf land and sea power in the Solomons
cuts directly to tart of the campaign's uniqueness as
a naval campaign. American intrusion into the Solomons
was based on a tei control of the sea and air by forces
not designed to pi more than the support of sea control
efforts. The relion surface combatants and land-based
air to secure a mae theatre was unique to the plans of
the American Navy >rld War II. Accordingly, the tactics
of the Fleet were :ly inappropriate to the campaign and
were only refined- a string of serious losses. The
integration of th<3, sea and, air tactics was a hallmark
of the Solomons can, and a critical factor that must
be considered wherations of such limited strategic scope
are undertaken.
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III. THE PEDIGREE OF THE NAVAL FORCES USED IN THE SOLOMONS
Naval strategy and the tactics a navy employs are
inseparably linked in the exercise of naval power. The
surface forces the United States Navy put to sea in 1942
were a compromise of many factors, the result of a continual
process of self evaluation the Navy undertook during the
twenty years preceding the war. Thus planning was done in a
constrained environment not unlike today: fiscal considera-
tions were paramount and the need to make justifiable deci-
sions in procurement programs made the leaders of the Navy
sensitive to outside criticism. Political pressures were
great in those days as well, with the service operating
under a president whose personal interest in naval affairs
was a mixed blessing. The introspection Navy planners gave
the problems of fleet construction was thorough and, giving
those involved the benefit of the doubt, largely honest. It
was naturally based on preconceived concepts of what naval
combat should be like but the analysis undertaken to vali-
date these concepts failed to isolate the factors that would
prove critical to the actions in the Solomons.
A. NAVAL TACTICS AND THE FLEET THAT NEVER WAS
The tactical doctrine the United States Navy took to
war in 1941 was founded on the principle of an integrated,
balanced fleet designed to fight in a coordinated action.
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Naturally, construction programs had been geared towards
building ships to fit specific tasks within this doctrine;
understanding the effectiveness of the forces engaged in
the Solomons must be done with the existing doctrine in mind
In the previous chapter it was argued that the strategic
background of the Solomons campaign was foreign to the
anticipated strategy of the American and Japanese fleets.
A parallel observation applies in regards to the tactics
employed by the naval forces in the Solomons. Both sides
had prepared themselves to fight large scale decisive engage-
ments with fleets of relatively specialized units integrated
for mutual support. However, the strategic concerns of the
campaign precluded the employment of these large "battle
fleets" for the overwhelming burden of the fighting in the
Solomons. The foundations of the tactical doctrine for both
sides were undermined by the paucity of forces available,
leaving each side dependent on its ability to improvise new
techniques for employment of its surface task groups. The
foundations of this improvisation were the notions each had
come to accept concerning the nature of combat between sur-
face warships. The tactical successes of the Japanese and
the corresponding failures of the United States forces
becomes understandable in light of the tactics each side had
prepared for, preconceptions each side held in regards to
weapon effectiveness, favorable conditions for battle, and
command and control during an engagement.
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B. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE
The genesis of World War II tactical doctrine for the
United States Navy was formed in the early 1920s as the
Navy began the task of building its post World War I fleet
The influence of the "Great War" was evident in the first
formulation of tactical doctrine for this new force and
the results of that struggle led to the concept of a
"battle fleet" whose employment hinged on three distinct
elements:
1. Surface Combatant Tactics - Jutland was refought
in American post war tactics with the idea that
the "battle line" of powerful battleships would
be supported in its offense role by a contingent
of smaller forces.
2. Submarine Warfare - The emergence of the sub-
marine in World War I led naval strategists to
include the submarine in tactical planning as
both a scouting asset and offensive platform
in support of the battle line. Such employment,
planned for both the United States and Japanese
navies, made anti submarine warfare a major
concern for battle fleet tactics.
3. The Airplane - By the early twenties it became
apparent that the airplane would be a vital
element of the battle fleet. However, its
actual employment was not anticipated by the
tactical doctrine of the period. The need for
carrier and seaplane tenders was considered
obvious, yet the principal use of the airplane
would evolve in time and the carrier would
gradually assume a larger role in the engage-
ment plans for the fleet.
The United States naval doctrine that had been
developed in the mid twenties concentrated on the employ-
ment of a combined battle fleet composed of all of these
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elements, bound by a mature system of command and control.
This doctrine was officially promulgated in a series of
Fleet Tactical Publications (FTPs) which by 1924 included
specific platform doctrines as well as fleet operating
instructions. These doctrines were largely the result
of recommendations of type commanders and training com-
mands, with an attempt to codify and standardize opera-
tional procedures. By 1924 the doctrinal approach of the
United States Navy called for the battle fleet to maintain
itself in a large formation with the heavier elements
screened by cruisers and destroyers. Successive layers
of this formation were stationed at a distance deemed
optimal for both mutual support and communications
[Ref . 20: pp. 26-29 (C) ] .
Figure 3.1 outlines the envisioned employment of the
battle fleet as it emerged in post World War I doctrine.
The concepts set forth in the 1924 FTPs were left largely
intact when the series was revised in the mid thirties.
The next major revision of tactical doctrine would come






» » M l I I l i I I ASW ScreeningDestroyers
I I 1 I I








Figure 3.1. Standard Disposition of American Battle Fleet
An immediate observation concerning the paradigm of
Figure 3.1 is that the model called for is an expensive one
This is essential to understanding the uniqueness of the
Solomons battles. Putting a battle fleet at sea would have
required a wealth of resources, more ships than the peace-
time Navy of the time would have been capable of furnishing
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The mustering of sufficient assets for a full battle fleet
15
was done only annually in peacetime making this tactical
foundation of the American fleet rarely practiced. More
significantly, the assets were not there in wartime as so
optimistically predicted. While FTP 45 almost wistfully
observed that in "... wartime there will be sufficient
numbers ...." [Ref. 21: p. 26], in fact there were not.
The Solomons campaign was fought with a mixture of forces
envisioned by prewar planners to be merely supporting ele-
ments of the larger main battle fleet.
1 . The Gun as King of Battle
Underlying the tactical doctrine of the United States
Navy up to World War II was an absolute faith in the naval
gun. As a static, single indicator of naval power, the gun
was as close a measure as any. The size of gun batteries
determined the status of navies and nations, particularly in
American eyes. Battle fleet tactics were predicated on
the ability of the battle line's guns to bring decisiveness
to any engagement. The airplane and submarine were for
scouting and the torpedo merely a distraction; "... in the
last analysis it is the gun which will decide the fate of
navies on the high seas." [Ref. 22: p. 3]
15 See chapter on Fleet Exercises and Wargames
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This confidence in the capability of gunfire drove
American naval tactics towards a specific, optimal engage-
ment pattern. The ideal scenario would allow American war-
ships to open fire at maximum effective gun range using
superior fire control and high rates of fire to neutralize
opposing forces. By doctrine, the "close in" engagement
of the United States battle fleet was within 17,000 yards with
a "moderate" range for engagement around 20,0 00 yards
[Ref. 21: p. 6]. Such doctrine reasoned away the threat
posed by the other principal naval surface weapon, the
torpedo. Proper use of guns, American naval planners felt,
would make torpedo attack almost suicidal by forcing the
torpedo firer to come too close to its gunfiring target in
the battle line [Ref. 22: p. 12].
The "bigger is better" attitude towards gunpower was
not isolated to the battle line. The same logic was applied
to the cruiser force supporting the battle fleet as well.
In 1928 the Chief of Naval Operations pointed out to the
leaders of the Senate that the Japanese had led the post war
cruiser development with the Furataka-class and its eight
inch guns [Ref. 24: p. A-7-2] . Although the CNO was arguing
that the United States could not afford to allow the Japanese
cruiser force to surpass that of the American fleet in
quality, the value of the torpedoes mounted on Japanese
cruisers went unmentioned. It would take the Navy almost a
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year of serious losses in the Solomons to realize that the
Japanese Navy considered the torpedo, not the gun the prin-
cipal weapon for non-battleship surface combatants.
The obsession with the gun and the battleship led
American surface ship tactical doctrine to a foundation
that was never justified in battle. In the case of the
cruiser, this fixation led to a doctrine that was proved
inefficient and costly during the Solomons campaign. The
focus of naval construction on the gun was decried by naval
strategists well before the Second World War and the con-
struction of big gun ships was done amid controversy. In
1910, no less an authority on fleet development than Alfred
Thayer Mahan observed that the gun had reached its zenith
as a naval weapon and basing the fighting strength of a
warship on the gun alone reflected a narrow approach to
naval tactics. [Ref. 25] Such warnings went unheeded; the
major naval powers of the world, the United States and Japan
among them, continued to see naval tactical doctrine in
terms of capital ships with large guns. The American
decision to continue this rationalization for cruiser forces
as well represents a key factor in the eventual conduct of
the Solomons campaign.
C. CRUISER AND DESTROYER TACTICS: COMPROMISED SUPPORT
While the battle line concept made the battleship the
principal offensive weapon of naval power prior to World War
II, the role of its supporting surface combatants was a
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confusing compromise. The cruisers and destroyers of the
battle fleet were meant to scout for and screen the battle
line as well as be prepared to conduct offensive attacks on
the enemy, also assumed to be in a disposition similar to
that of Figure 3.1. The tactical doctrine for the cruiser
and destroyer forces of the United States Navy at the onset
of World War II was hallmarked by the need to provide these
very different elements of support and, although the con-
cept of the battle fleet was never employed in the Solomons,
the tactical concepts of the cruiser-destroyer forces utilized
in the Solomons reflected the doctrine of the "fighting
column" developed for the battle fleet.
The following sections will examine the tactical pre-
conceptions both the cruiser and destroyer forces of the
United States held prior to the Solomons by examining the
doctrine developed for each platform type prior to the war.
1 . Destroyers
In dealing with the complexities of destroyer battle
fleet tactics the Pacific Fleet Destroyer Commander attempted
to prioritize destroyer missions. Heading his list was
scouting and anti submarine screening while the offensive
role was relegated to last priority. In establishing the
tactical doctrine for these offensive operations, the Pacific
Fleet destroyer type commander succinctly outlined the pro-
cedures that would form the basis for offensive destroyer









Figure 3.2. Destroyer Attack in Support of the Battle Fleet
DDs would detach from their battle fleet and mount a torpedo
assault on the opposing battle fleet's van from a position
10 nautical miles ahead of its own main body and 30 degrees
off the line of advance of the enemy main body. (Figure 3.2
illustrates this planned employment.) [Ref. 26]
FTP 38, Destroyer War Instructions, clarified the
offensive battle fleet employment of the destroyer in 1923
by specifying the use of smoke for self screening or the
conduct of night attacks, hopefully within 1000 yards of the
target battle line. By this formal doctrine, DD commanders
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were urged to use torpedoes sparingly and withdraw to rejoin
their own battle fleet upon launching their attack [Ref. 20:
passim]
.
In retrospect, the tasking outlined for the battle
fleet destroyer seems mutually exclusive: the DD was supposed
to screen the battle line while taking the battle to the
enemy side. The dichotomy was not unrecognized at the time.
However, the destroyer was caught in the middle of two of
the three critical influences mentioned earlier. The ad-
vantage of throwing the opposing battle line into disarray,
which is what the destroyer's torpedo attack was intended
to do, was clear. Conversely, the threat posed by the sub-
marine grew throughout the interwar period. As will be shown
later, holding the destroyer to the defensive screening role
weakened the offensive potential of the American task groups
in the Solomons, a regrettable loss in light of the absence
of a Japanese submarine threat during the campaign. In the
initial battles of the campaign, the destroyer was tied to
the cruiser column, a formation that offered no real protec-
tion for the cruisers but restricted the destroyer's poten-
tial for offensive torpedo action.
2
. Cruisers: Neither Thrust nor Pary
If the United States destroyer of the pre World War
II Navy faced a problem of split personality, then the
cruiser of the same era was struck with a severe case of
schizophrenia. The cruiser of the battle fleet was assigned
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the roles of supporting destroyer attacks, fending off
similar attacks from enemy forces, scouting for the battle
fleet, and assisting the battle line in engaging its op-
posite number. The interwar period was marked by an almost
unending effort to define the proper role of the cruiser
and this analysis takes on a particularly important light in
regards to the Solomons campaign. With the construction
programs of the period and the Washington/London Treaty
limitations as a backdrop, the Navy's leadership attempted
to establish tactical priorities for cruiser employment so
that technical priorities for construction could be
established. Principal participants in the attempt were the
Navy's General Board and the Naval War College with some
input from fleet commanders.
During the twenties the use of new cruisers was seen
as essential for the fire support of destroyer attacks, a
function necessary to the battle fleet tactics that had
emerged during the early part of the decade [Ref . 27] . By
the early thirties the Navy found it necessary to reexamine
the tactical role of the cruiser prior to embarking on a
new construction program. While much attention was given
such technical aspects as gun size and armor protection, the
essence of the dialogue was the tactical role the cruiser
would fill. By this time annual Fleet Exercises had estab-
lished the cruiser as a weapon fleet commanders felt
indispensable. Translating this operational enthusiasm
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into solid reasoning became a primary task of the War College,
at the time the Navy's principal analysis group. By 1931 the
question of cruiser employment and construction had become
the subject of several exchanges between the General Board,
the Chief of Naval Operations, and the President of the War
College. Through gaming, the War College had concluded that
cruisers were particularly adept at holding opposing destroyer
attacks on the battle fleet at bay while supporting similar
efforts by own forces [Ref. 28: p. 3]. This mission was
viewed as particularly important against Japanese forces,
where the gaming analysis assumed American gun superiority
would be decisive if cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft
succeeded in thwarting Japanese attempts to employ "other
weapons." [Ref. 28: p. 5]
The gradual shift in cruiser tactics during the
twenties and thirties was toward the notion of the cruiser
as a supporting unit for both the detached destroyer element
and the battle line itself. Cruiser doctrine still spoke of
offensive operations, including the conduct of torpedo
attacks [Ref. 29] . However, by the mid thirties the United
States had begun the construction of light cruisers with
multiple six inch guns and removal of torpedo tubes from
all American cruisers. A trend towards the defensive in
cruisers was evident in the construction of the five inch gun,
air defense cruisers of the Atlanta-class in 1937, a pro-
gram that the General Board even recommended as the
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prototype of all light cruiser construction after 194
[Ref. 30], As the generation of cruisers which would form
the backbone of the cruiser forces of World War II were
being built, a final attempt to specify the amorphous nature
of the American cruiser was made at the War College. The
primary functions of the cruiser, a 1934 lecture outlined,
were:
1. exercise control of the sea in areas where battle
ships had already established local superiority;
2
.
conduct raids into areas where own forces lacked
positive control of the sea;
3. act as "eyes" of the battle line;
4. screen own battle line from enemy scouting efforts;
5. protect the battle line from enemy destroyer attacks;
6. support own destroyers in attacks on enemy battle
line. [Ref. 31]
The problem of the cruiser being all things to all
elements of the battle fleet led to what has been termed the
cruiser "debate" of the interwar period. As will be sub-
sequently argued, there was little real debate; the value of
the cruiser was amply demonstrated by its overburdening. The
designs of the cruisers of the United States Navy were compro-
mises in response to the seemingly mutually exclusive tacti-
cal doctrines for these warships. Cruisers needed to be
heavily armed but fast, with endurance and sustainability
as well. Figuratively and literally, Figure 3.1 accurately
depicts the plight of the cruiser prior to World War II
—
caught between the capital ship and the support needed for
the capital ship. Although the cruiser itself would be
forced to assume the role of "capital ship" in the Solomons,
the tactical doctrine of the battle fleet drove both the
design of the World War II cruiser and the tactical founda-
tions for its employment. In reviewing the above list of
intended cruiser employments, none proved applicable to the
Solomons.
D. CRUISER CONSTRUCTION AND THE GREAT NON-DEBATE
As was previously mentioned, there was little actual
debate in regards to the basic value of, and need for
cruisers during the interwar period. To be sure, there was
a lively discussion among the "Navy's elite as to how the
United States should build cruisers, yet there was little
disagreement concerning the cruiser's value to the fleet or
as to what its weapons system should be.
Understanding the failure of American surface combatant
tactics in the Solomons must begin with an understanding of
the central position the modern naval gun held in contemporary
tactical thought. Because of this attitude, American weapon
technology had been focused on the gun and the previously
described tactics were formulated accordingly. Since naval
power was essentially measured by gun size and number, other
offensive weapons, such as the torpedo and aircraft, were
considered secondary by leaders of the United States Navy.
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While American naval planners, principally the General
Board, debated the type of cruisers to be built during
the twenties and thirties, the position of the gun as the
main battery remained secure. The installation of other
systems on the "treaty cruisers" was an ancillary question
with the airplane and anti-aircraft batteries and the tor-
pedo as candidates for rounding out the cruiser's weapons
suite. The "flying deck" cruiser, with a mixed battery of
six or eight inch guns and aircraft, was occasionally studied
by the General Board, although its acceptance was apparently
never seriously considered; its sacrificing of flight deck
for gunpower was toyed with up to the eve of World War II,
but more conventionally armed cruisers of all-gun design
received a higher priority for construction programs [Ref.
32]. 16
The use of torpedoes on American cruisers was a topic
more seriously addressed by the General Board and the opera-
tional elements of the fleet as well. The issue of the
torpedo as a primary weapon for the American cruiser first
arose immediately after World War I as the General Board
began deliberations aimed at replacing the aging wartime
fleet. Board records of the early twenties exhibit an
The United States, in signing the London Treaty of
1930 also agreed that any ship carrying aircraft as its
primary purpose was an aircraft carrier, making designs
such as the "flying deck" cruiser sensitive from the
diplomatic point of view.
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ambivalence born of economy and disagreement over what
tactical missions the next generation of cruiser would be
required to accomplish. During these years the Board was
preoccupied with the "scout cruiser/ 1 a light, fast cruiser
that would be a relatively inexpensive scouting asset for
the battle fleet. First proposals in 1920 called for the
ship to be armed with six eight inch guns and six torpedo
tubes. Later that year the Board recommended to the Secretary
of the Navy that an additional triple tube mount be installed
on the centerline of the proposed class to upgrade the ship's
torpedo battery. This enthusiasm for the torpedo was ap-
parently short lived: the following year the Board settled
on a recommendation of three tubes per side for the "scout
cruiser," leaving it with a torpedo broadside of only three
torpedos, a number admittedly small in light of the day's
tactics for torpedoes. By the time the Pensacola and Chester
classes were authorized in 1924 the gun battery had grown to
either nine or ten eight inch guns yet the torpedo battery
remained the two triple tubes mounted on opposite sides of
the ship. [Ref. 33]
During the twenties the Pensacola , Chester , Portland ,
and Astoria cruiser classes were designed, all equipped with
nine or ten eight inch guns and two triple torpedo tube mounts,
one on each side of the ship. During the same period, the
Japanese completed the Atago, Nachi, and Kako classes, all
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with eight inch guns and either eight or twelve torpedo
tubes, plus reloads.
As both navies looked towards the development of smaller
cruisers in the early thirties the American naval hierarchy
was again forced to deal with the issue of torpedo armament.
The starting point for this renewed discussion was the in-
herent faith in gunpower as the baseline for construction
of this next generation of cruiser. The torpedo, most
American naval leaders reasoned, was an inappropriate weapon
for the cruiser, whose anticipated role in battle fleet
tactics would give it limited opportunity to employ
torpedoes [Ref . 34] . Supporting this rationale was the
accepted belief among the Navy's theoriticians that the tor-
pedo was a destroyer weapon and that the offensive capability
it represented was more appropriately based on the DD vice
the cruiser. The rigid structure of the battle fleet held
the cruiser a supporting element for the destroyer attack
making the torpedo an unnecessary addition to the cruiser's
armament. [Ref. 35]
This restriction of the cruiser to a less offensive
supporting role was not restricted to those elements of the
service with a more theoretical slant. As pointed out in a
previous section, the operating forces of the late thirties
and first two years of the forties had come to accept the
role of the cruiser as being more of an escort than an
offensive platform and operational commanders were more
than willing to let the torpedo slip from the cruiser's
armament
.
The fleet had come to see the cruiser as the foundation
of the carrier-centered battle fleet's protection against
air and surface attacks, making the contemporary generation
of cruisers with gun batteries of either eight, six, or five
inch guns seem entirely appropriate [Ref. 36]. The offensive
potential of the torpedo was considered unneeded by cruiser
commanders and as late as one month prior to the commence-
ment of the Solomons campaign, the Commanding Officer of the
U.S.S. Marblehead , one of the last old six inch gun cruisers
with torpedo tubes remaining, was petitioning Admiral King
for permission to remove his torpedo battery [Ref. 37].
Apparently even the enthusiasm of the president could not
generate an interest in a cruiser-type platform with tor-
pedoes as its primary armament. Roosevelt personally pro-
posed such a ship in 1940, citing several European navies
as having constructed similar "cruiser/destroyers" for
offensive operations. Such a design was close to the
Japanese Sendai , and Natori classes, all constructed in the
early twenties and extensively employed against American
17
cruiser forces in the Solomons [Ref. 38]
.
17The request from the President was passed to the
General Board by his naval aide, Captain (at the time)
Daniel Callaghan. Rear Admiral Callaghan was killed in the
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on November 13, 19 42, while com-
manding Task Group 67.4 from the flag bridge of the cruiser
San Francisco .
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E. UNSOUND ANALYSIS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INTERWAR FLEET
The establishment of modern tactical doctrine and the
construction of new forces is the subject of intense scrutiny
and quantitative analysis. While such study is largely an
offshoot of modern technology, the Navy of the thirties was
not lacking in state-of-the-art techniques for describing
and testing hypothetical forces or scenarios. The leaders
of the United States Navy had few illusions about the pros-
pects for their plans seeing the test of combat: the war
with Japan was openly predicted and, as was pointed out in
the first chapter, the strategic predictions were largely
correct. An obvious question, then, is why did the Navy
fail to foresee the type of tactical situations that would
emerge in the Solomons campaign? It is apparent that at
some level, the analysis of our surface combatant posture
failed even though it represented the best contemporary
effort possible.
In addressing this crucial question, it is necessary to
recognize the relationships between those elements of the
Navy responsible for the service's long range planning during
the interwar period. During this timeframe, the strategic
planning for the service rested principally in the hands of
the General Board, a group of around a half dozen senior
officers whose task it was to study the Navy's potential
roles and the forces needed to fill these roles. The pur-
pose of the Board was to think and recommend in an ostensibly
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autonomous manner and, as advisors to the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, the Board wielded
tremendous influence on future naval plans, ship designs, and
construction programs. The Navy of World War II was a
reflection of the Board's ability and an evaluation of the
Board's performance would be beyond the scope of this work.
However, in the case of the Solomons, it is important to
realize how the Board influenced the tactics as outlined in
the preceding pages and note that the perceptions of the
fleet's tactical doctrine were largely those of the General
Board.
During this period the War College was the primary source
for the development of tactical and strategic thought in the
Navy and it was to the War College that- the General Board
turned for validation of tactical and strategic concepts.
The War College was drawn into a role that it was ill-suited
for. The theoretical approach followed in Newport was not
responsive to technical engineering specifics and game models
only reflected notional capabilities with an aggregate level
of weapons effect modeling. The War College realized its
own limitations in this area and the evidence suggests that
the War College was reluctant, if not resentful, of the
General Board's efforts to solicit specific tactical
recommendations. In communicating with the Board in late
19 30, the President of the War College, Admiral Laning,
pointed out to the Board that "... trying out new and
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improved (ship) types in our games is dependent on learning
what types of improvements are being considered by the
Board . . . . " Despite the protests from Newport the General
Board used the results of War College gaming and academic
research as justification for force procurement. In his
reply to ADM Laning, Board President Admiral Bristol stated
that "... the College should suggest new and improved types
by utilizing them in your games." [Ref. 39]
This exchange ended a month long battle between the two
admirals on the War College's role in the building of new
ships and, against its wishes, the War College found itself
in the business of developing and analyzing the technical
aspects of ship construction. The inappropriateness of this
utilization of the gaming floor at Newport was readily
appreciated by those conducting the games. However, the
following year saw an increasing reliance on game results
for substantiation of program recommendations by the General
Board. The protests of the War College went unheeded by the
bureaucracy in Washington, but they do succinctly point out
the flaws in the game-based analysis. In responding to the
General Board's hurried request for an analysis of cruiser
capabilities, the War College report of January 10, 1931
contained the caveats that should have made its own recom-
mendations suspect: the gaming done on the problem was
accomplished over a short two week timespan, with a limited
number of scenarios played, and the gamers felt that their
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technical data on gunpower was largely unproven and further
diluted by aggregate modeling. An examination of this key
report reveals that the gunfire models, so essential in
terms of the assumed importance of the gun in American
tactics, were based on aggregate, force-on-force fire effect
tables assuming ideal conditions (high rates of fire, good
visibility, and precise spotting) . Significantly, the
damage assessment tables used in the games generated
effectiveness curves for American cruisers armed with eight
inch guns that displayed pronounced "knees" between 15,000
and 20,000 yards in comparison to similar curves for Japanese
cruisers. At shorter ranges the relative power of both
Japanese and American cruisers in the games were virtually
identical. [Ref. 40]
The importance of these conclusions and the hesitancy
with which their authors arrived at them cannot be over-
emphasized in light of the subsequent development of American
surface combatant tactics and the failure of these tactics
some eleven years later in the Solomons. Within the game
results of this period lie the genesis of the cruiser
doctrine that was practiced and accepted by American com-
manders as they prepared for the war with Japan. The
results of the games at Newport during the early thirties
reflect American gun tactics with all its assumptions:
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1. engage at maximum range under favorable conditions
of visibility;
2. maintain high rates of fire to destroy the target
outside torpedo range;
3. concentrate on the arming of treaty-limited cruisers
with guns capable of utilizing these tactics.
Subsequent games supported these results, adding additional
insights that would be relearned in the bitter experiences
of the Solomons; the effectiveness of the cruiser at screen-
ing attacking destroyers was noted, as was the damage the
destroyers 1 torpedoes could do if the cruiser failed at
this task. American superiority in gunpower appeared
decisive against Orange game forces (the Japanese) , but it
was assumed that the Japanese attack would mirror American
doctrine with the torpedo threat coming from destroyers
1
8
employed as in figure 3.1. [Ref. 28]
In light of the specifics of the Solomon actions, it is
easy to fault the War College for its analysis and find some
fundamental errors in the conclusions presented. The games
at Newport assumed that the Japanese would employ their
cruisers and destroyers as the United States would, while
in reality, each side had approached the same mission
—
support of the battle fleet—from different perspectives.
The Japanese believed the torpedo could be decisive and was
18The interwar gaming efforts in relation to the Solomons
campaign are discussed more extensively in Chapter IV.
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worth mounting on cruisers. The American belief was that
the torpedo, as potentially devastating as it was, offered
such a poor chance of a hit in a long range duel that gun-
power would render it ineffective [Ref . 28: p. 5] . In
essence, the War College data was correct: cruiser-mounted
torpedo could be potentially devastating in a barrage of
large numbers and it would be necessary to engage Japanese
forces with guns at maximum range to offset this danger.
Missing from the analysis was the technical data on the
Japanese torpedoes necessary for the realization of how
dangerous these weapons were. In assuming that Japanese
torpedoes were identical to American, the naval planners of
the day engaged in a fatal case of mirror imaging. It was
not realized until the Solomons campaign was almost over
that the Japanese "Long Lance" surface launched torpedo was
bigger than its western counterpart with a range of 25,000
19yards, rivaling the effective range of a cruiser's guns.
The evidence of Japanese intentions to make massive torpedo
attacks was before our eyes, but we failed to see it as a
result of preconceived notions and want of an objective
examination of the technical data available.
19 The underestimation of the Japanese torpedo was an
almost classic case of poor technical intelligence supple-
mented by nonchalant assumption. Both classified and un-
classified contemporary data refer to the Japanese weapons as
"21 inch" while in reality the Long Lance was a 24 inch
weapon. All sources at the time simply assumed that the
Japanese used the same size torpedo as the United States and
Royal Navies. See Chapter V.
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F. AMERICAN NIGHT TACTICS AND RADAR: LOST OPPORTUNITIES
As indicated in the previous discussion of gunnery
tactics, American tactical doctrine was predicated on good
visibility for the accurate employment of long range gunfire.
This naturally made American tacticians consider the optimal
setting for battle as daylight, however, the impression that
American doctrine was to avoid night tactics is false. In
fact, the problem of night operations was realized and
20
worried about a good deal by operational commanders.
Unfortunately, the translation of this concern into doctrine
produced a set of operating norms that were of marginal value
in the Solomons
.
Central to the breakdown of American tactical doctrine
at night was the battle fleet paradigm for naval engagements.
Within the context of the firmly established tactical assign-
ments for each ship assumed by this paradigm, American night
tactics take on a particular nature. As the cruiser became
the major combatant of the Solomons, it assumed the role of
a "capital" ship. It replaced the battleship in the center
of a smaller version of the "battle fleet" with attending
destroyers covering its van and rear. The cruiser's guns
would provide the critical firepower of the surface task
force and the destroyer would act as the scout and defending
screen of the cruiser. Events proved this condensation of
20 See Chapter IV on prewar games and exercises.
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the battle line concept false: the confusion of night made
control of the screening destroyers difficult and mutual
interference a major problem. Moreover, the destroyer was
tied to the cruiser main body and unable to effectively
utilize its torpedo battery. It would take almost a year for
American cruiser commanders to realize that night tactics
demanded all units fill an offensive role.
While American gunnery tactics favored the engagement
in broad daylight, the opposite was assumed for the torpedo.
The torpedo, American commanders realized, could be partic-
ularly effective at night when the cover of darkness would
allow torpedo firing surface units to close the battle line
to within torpedo range [Ref. 41: p. 1] . The first priority
of American night tactics was the protection of the battle
fleet, not the employment of offensive tactics against the
enemy's force. Detailed tactical plans stressed the specific
formations, conditions of readiness, and gun employment for
protection of the battleship from night torpedo attack.
Such tactics emphasized mutual support and the stationing
of units so as to simplify identification and reduce the
chances of engaging own forces in the confusion of night
battles [Ref. 41: pp. 4-6] .
This cautious approach was the realization that the
potential of the battle line's guns was substantially reduced
at night. In its official language, the war instructions
of the thirties emphasized that in committing his forces
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to night engagements, the commander must consider that a
naval force "... risks forfeiture of the superiority of
its most valuable asset, its coordinated firepower ...." and
that his force's proficiency in night gunnery may be lacking
[Ref. 42: p. 37]. These instructions go on to stress that
the provisions made for night encounters are predicated on
"chance" night actions [Ref. 42: p. 38]. In other words,
American tactical commanders were discouraged from actively
seeking battle at night.
The introduction of radar failed to generate a fresh
look at night tactics. Instead, American surface task force
commanders saw radar as the chance to turn night into day
for the gun, a capability beyond the embryonic state of
early radar sets. American attempts to utilize radar for
long range night engagements resulted in the concentration
of fire on one or two targets, allowing the remaining
Japanese forces the opportunity to conduct their torpedo
strikes. Additionally, the still developing command and
control procedures for coordinating radar surveillance and
fire control were so inefficient as to allow any advantage
gained in initial detection to be whittled away before
opening fire.
The defensive emphasis of American pre war night tactics
was a tacit admission of the potential danger of night
battles. It was openly recognized that the enemy cruiser
with torpedoes and employed in an anti battle line offensive
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role at night represented a challenge to the American model
of daylight gunnery at maximum range. It was realized that
"... the torpedo . . . might enable a heavy cruiser to engage
, a battleship under favorable circumstances. But such cir-
cumstances would be only at night or in a surprise engage-
ment in low visibility." [Ref. 22: p. 10]
By basing its doctrine on gunnery the United States Navy
tied itself to a doctrine where picking the time and setting
for battle was a prerequisite and the choice would not be
under those tactical conditions that characterized the
Solomons actions. American commanders showed a lack of
flexibility in the Solomons that was in large measure bred
from a prewar mindset. The cruiser-destroyer commanders of
the American fleet mistook doctrine, which must allow for
exceptions, for dogma.
G. ARMS CONTROL AND THE CRUISER FORCES
A study of the American naval forces available in the
early days of World War II must consider the influence of
the interwar naval treaties. This is particularly true
of cruiser forces, which were directly shaped by the limita-
tions of these treaties.
Table IV summarizes the limitations the Washington Treaty
of 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930 placed on the construc-
tion of cruisers by signatories. (Table IV is adopted from
Ref. 43: pp. 37-40.) Underlying the influence these
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limitations actually had on cruiser construction were the
treaty provisions dealing with other ship types and total
force ratios. The original treaty agreements of 1922 placed
limitations on the construction and modification of battle-
ships and aircraft carriers, yet cruiser construction, was
left relatively unchecked except for the modest restrictions
of Table IV. The next eight years saw the United States
build eight new heavy cruisers of two classes while the
Japanese completed three classes of heavy cruisers totaling
21twelve ships. Both sides abandoned the construction of
six and five inch gun cruisers after the completion of
those more lightly armed vessels on the ways at the time
of the treaty's ratification. The attempt to limit the
world's naval power had created a new capital ship, the
cruiser, and launched a race in the construction of this
new weapons system.
Table V summarizes the details of this competition as it
affected the United States and Japan and offers some in-
sights as to the technical details of the cruiser forces
that would face each other in the Solomons.
21The technical data concerning specific classes cited
in this section is, as is similar data throughout this work,
taken principally from Jane's Fighting Ships for appropriate
years and compared with the then-classified United States
Navy's intelligence. Both agree surprisingly well. However
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By 1930 the Japanese had built up to what that year's
conference would limit them to in heavy cruisers. The
United States, on the other hand, found itself with just
4 0% of allowed tonnage for eight inch cruisers. Inasmuch
as current authorizations programmed the remainder of the
treaty allocations for construction prior to the end of the
decade, the Japanese must have seen time and the treaties
as conspirators against them. A similar situation existed
in the light cruiser category, with Japan virtually at its
1930 limits upon signing the London Treaty while the United
States had utilized slightly less than half of its allot-
ment of tonnage. Japan saw itself at the limit of naval
power while the American potential to expand its naval
forces was unexploited. For the moment, the Japanese had
achieved relative superiority, a balance that could not be
overlooked in considering their advances in the Pacific
22basin over the next ten years. American footdragging had
delayed building a fleet commensurate with international
interests and presented the Japanese a window of opportunity.
Japanese popular sentiment was largely against the
treaties but the criticism was not uniform among the Japanese
leadership. Many Japanese naval officers, familiar with
American industrial power, felt that abrogation of the
22 See Chapter on Strategy,
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treaty would unleash an arms race that Japan could not win
[Ref. 3: p. 34]. These fears were realized. The expansion
of the American light cruiser force illustrated in Table V
illustrates this expansion. Moreover, the evidence suggests
that by the onset of the war in the Pacific the Japanese had
exhausted their capability to build cruisers. Between the
abrogation of the treaty in 1935 and Pearl Harbor, the
Japanese completed six heavy cruisers and three light cruisers
In the meantime, the United States built one heavy cruiser
(the last allowed for by the treaties) and thirteen light
cruisers. Furthermore, the Japanese had plans for only
three more heavy cruisers at the war's commencement while
the American Navy had eight heavy and twenty-three light
23
cruisers on the building ways.
This situation ultimately resulted in a Strang dichot-
omy in the attitudes of naval leaders from both sides
towards the interwar treaties. Despite its abrogation of
the treaties, it has been argued that the Japanese wanted
and expected another treaty to stave off American fleet
expansion [Ref. 3: p. 34]. In contrast, the United States
Navy appeared eager to see treaty limitations fall away and
by 1935 the discussion of what the post treaty fleet should
2 3 Ironically, several of these new cruisers being built
at the start of World War II were renamed after some of
those lost in the opening battles of the Solomons.
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look like was flourishing. In regards to cruisers, the
General Board and the War College had anxious eyes pointed
westward at Japan with the disturbing parity of Table V
seen as a most unsatisfactory posture. In a generally
accepted War College recommendation, it was planned that
the United States aim for a 5:3 ratio of total cruisers over
the Japanese, [Ref. 44: p. 7] a force structure not achieved
until well after the Solomons struggle had begun.
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IV. FLAWED ORACLES: THE INTERWAR GAMES, AND FLEET EXERCISES
As noted in Chapter II, the Pacific war was keenly
studied by American naval leaders throughout the interwar
period. The tactical planning for the war and, indeed for
any possible exigencies assumed by the Navy during this
period, was centered around regular at sea fleet exercises
and war games at the Naval War College. The failure of
these critical planning vehicles to presage the types of
actions the Solomons campaign would entail deprived
American commanders of their best opportunity to prepare
for the Solomons campaign. Both the games and the exercises
were constructed so that the essential factors of the naval
combat in the Solomons were either ignored or missed in the
conduct of these simulations.
A. THE NAVAL WAR GAMES OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD
The Naval War College games take on a special significance
because of the American Navy's system for strategic planning
during the interwar period. The influence of the games was
two-fold. During the twenties and thirties the games formed
the backbone of the College's campaign analysis and the
results were utilized to support the naval construction
24plans of the day. Secondly, attendance at the War College
24 See Chapter III
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had become a routine part of every senior American naval
officer's experience by the late 1930s, and the game floor
with its clashes between "Blue" and "Orange" had become a
common feature of every high ranking officer's professional
training. Within the flag officer community of the 1941
United States Navy, 99 percent of the nation's admirals
had attended the War College and participated in the Newport
games [Ref. 48: p. 67],
In their ever empty sea theatre . . . officers rehearsed
the parts they would in future combat, perform. These
men, the actors of a yet unwritten war, prepared their
scenes on a black stage, with only colored chalk and
cast lead tokens as props. "Prologue-like," they
prepared, and made "imaginary forces work," to ready
themselves for harder tasking. [Ref. 48: p. 131]
The United States Navy got its first chance at the
Japanese Imperial Navy on the game floor at Newport. The
games became the foundation of the strategy, forces, and
tactics that would be employed in the Pacific war. In the
case of the Solomons campaign, the ability of the games
to provide this three-fold foundation was uneven at best and
most share the blame for some of the campaign's most dismal
failures at worst.
The failure of the games to adequately support the type
of tactical development that would have been meaningful to
the campaign hinges on three key elements. The first is
that the games themselves lacked the structure that would
have allowed the tactical aspects of the campaign to be
adequately modeled. The second flaw lies in the specific
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assumptions concerning the weapon system performance made
by the game play. The final reason for the games' failure
to support the type of tactics employed in the Solomons was
the inertia of the service that insisted upon interpreting
game results in a manner that was inconsistent with the
first two reasons cited. This third aspect of the games'
dysfunctional effect on planning for the Solomons was dis-
cussed in Chapter III. The first two deal specifically with
the way the Newport games were structured, and are closely
related. Understanding how the Solomons slipped through the
otherwise exhaustive gaming efforts at Newport between the
wars requires a close examination of how the games were
played and upon what assumptions hinged the outcome of
battles on the game floor.
1 . The Rules of the Game Floor
The official rules of the game floor at Newport
during the interwar period were divided into sections for
maneuvers and the evaluation of fire control solutions
subsequent to these maneuvers. These rules, published in
a variety of formats for both students at the War College
and gaming efforts elsewhere, remained relatively stable
throughout the interwar period, although an increasing
sophistication is evident through the thirties. This study
25
will concentrate on the rules as they stood in 1941 since
25
Ref. 49, and Ref. 50.
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these represent the most sophisticated level attained by the
War College and provide a glimpse of the game as close to
the beginning of the war as possible.
Three elements emerge as having been critical to
the naval engagements of the Solomons yet not properly
addressed -by the game rules at Newport. These elements,
2
the command and control of game units (referred to as "C
hereafter), the simulation of environmental conditions, and
the maneuver of units on the game floor, cannot be considered
as separately; their interrelationship was a key factor in
the failure of the games to simulate conditions as they
developed in the Solomons. Keeping this interrelationship
in mind, we will start with a survey of how the game rules
saw each of these elements:
a. Command and Control
A detailed effort was undertaken by the game
rules to simulate the problems unit commanders had with
communicating with the other commanders of other game units.
Similarly, the games made an extensive effort to limit the
information available to the individual commander to that
which he would reasonably be exposed to on the bridge of
his ship or while strapped in his cockpit. Screens on the
game floor were used to limit the view of other players'
units and the restriction of inter-player communications.
Particular attention was paid to isolating those commanders
in charge of submarine or air units. Small game boards
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for making moves to be transferred to a main game plot were
used to effect this isolation. [Ref. 50: p. 32]
These restrictions did not begin to emulate the
actual C* problems encountered by naval forces in the
Solomons at the tactical level. At the larger level of
planning and preparation, the thorough Estimates of the
Situation and operation plans required by students are in
sharp contrast to the piecemeal tactical planning with
ad hoc forces forced upon both sides during the Solomons.
Ship-to-ship tactics on communications under time pressure
was a major problem in the Solomons that could not be
simulated by the methodical approach to making moves taken
by the game rules. Finally, the games' pattern of allowing
movement, search, and communications in discrete steps
separate from the exchange of weapon fire was in sharp
contrast to the rapidly developing situations actually
encountered during the campaign. The assimilation of
information and the issuing of orders during battle is a
fluid, interactive process, as the Solomons graphically
showed. The measured approach taken by the games badly
prepared the commanders engaged in the Solomons for the
pressure of actual combat
.
b. Environment
Efforts to simulate environmental conditions
—
visibility, weather, sea state by the game rules—were
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extensive and paralleled those taken to impose the C
limitations indicated above. The use of screens during
periods of restricted visibility was a prime example of how
the umpires of the games at Newport sought to impose condi-
tions similar to actual operations. Considering how impor-
tant visibility, or the lack of it, was to the night actions
of the Solomons, an unforgiving eye must be cast at the
simulation of low visibility on the game floor. The method
of reduction visibility in the games amounted to a "cookie
cutter" model where the chance of detection was ambiguous
and assured at a specific range while impossible beyond
this range. During the night actions in the Solomons, how-
ever, the sighting of opposing units occurred at various
ranges under circumstances that varied. In effect detections
emerged, sometimes with startling abruptness, sometimes as
through a fog.
Detection range was influenced by a variety of
factors, prominent among which were night training at which
the Japanese excelled and radar which was of course not
modeled at all in the games. The effect of the "cookie
cutter" range simulation was to cause simultaneous disclosures
to both sides masking the profound advantage or potential
influence of first detection on the outcome of the lightening-
fast engagements in the Solomons. Just as communications
was a problem of unforeseen dimensions during the Solomons
battles, the detection of enemy units was confused by passing
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rain squals, the proximity of land, and the misidentifica-
tion of friendly units. Under such circumstances the detec-
tion of enemy units was a highly variable occurrence, rarely
conforming to the standard model followed at Newport. Also
missing from the war game was the relative advantage the
Japanese possessed at night visual detection due to their
superior night vision optics and training of lookouts. The
same observation applies to American radar, which allowed
an advantage in initial detections in the Solomons although
this advantage was rarely capitalized on. The absence of
radar from the game rules as late as 1941 can be attributed
to the classification of the system at the time. Regardless
of this need for secrecy, some modeling of radar in the
later games would have allowed future operational commanders
the opportunity to appreciate the significance of this
system. Early failure to exploit radar in the Solomons
made it clear its use in countering the problems of night
and poor weather would require extensive integration into
task force command and control procedures.
The games attempted the integration of environ-
mental conditions into the fire control problem. Visibility,
sea state, wind, and the relative position of the sun were
all considered in the evaluation of gunfire between ships.
The players at Newport were kept constantly mindful of the
environmental conditions which optimized gunfire effectiveness
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The thoroughness of this modeling of environmental conditions
was not complemented by a similarly rigorous simulation of
these conditions as they applied to detection, and it is
evident that the relationship between first detection and
firepower effectiveness was underestimated. [Ref. 51:
pp. f-30-f-31]
c . Maneuver
The maneuvering of forces on the game floor was
based on a move of three minutes with both unit movement and
weapon engagement geared towards this increment. Elaborate
procedures attempted to simulate the actual conditions at
sea. Units were located by a grid system with blocks of
2000 yards on each side of a square [Ref. 50: p. 26] . Speed
and direction took units from block-to-block within the
three minute time period. The game rules for maneuvering
forces were extensive, and integrated with the restrictions
on visibility and communications described above. Maneuver-
ing rules were particularly complex in the case of the
"Chart Maneuver" games which were designed to "... express
the restrictions imposed upon actual naval operations by
material limitations." [Ref. 50: p. 40] The importance of
these "limitations" was' critical to the employment of
weapons in the game: fire power effectiveness tables were
entered with the relative position of the engaged units
112
26
as well as range. While the three minute period seemed
a sufficiently small slice of time to reflect a significant
level of detail, it was not sufficient to model the tactical
problems facing the opposing commanders in the Solomons. At
high speed— for example, 20 knots—a ship covered the 2000
yard block in the space of a single turn. In the case of
the Solomons, the protagonists were usually approaching on
roughly reciprocal courses, approximately doubling the
closing speed. The dark nights of the Solomons, poorly
2
modeled .in the terms of the C and environmental aspects,
allowed little time for decision and effective maneuvering.
The games, based on long range gunnery duels of gradual
attrition, were fought at a pace that was leisurely relative
to the way the actual engagements developed in the Solomons.
As indicated in Appendix A, a finer cut of both of these
elements would have been necessary to foreshadow the rapidly
developing situations of the Solomons and the violent, high
speed maneuvering employed and the close quarters of the
battles. [Ref. 50]
2
The interaction of the environmental, C , and
maneuvering rules in the interwar games combined in a manner
that was the antithesis of the naval actions in the Solomons
Despite their complexity, the rules failed to create a
situation similar to the Solomons. The maneuvering of
C\
The use of these tables will be discussed in the
following pages.
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ships at close quarters and with little time for elaborate
communications was in sharp contrast to the deliberate rules
of the game floor. Added to this was the problem of conduct-
ing night actions when visibility conditions confused friend
from foe and hampered communications. As shown in the
realistic time-damage relationships in Appendix A, three
minutes was a long time in a night battle at point blank range;
information about opposing forces was scant and often
confusing. The games at Newport, which stressed thorough
planning and the measured engagement of the enemy in gradual
attrition at long range, was poor preparation for the mayhem
of the close-in clashes of the Solomons where forces rapidly
approached each other to point blank ranges, and ships'
combat lives were measured in minutes.
A final element in the games which cannot be
adequately addressed in hindsight is the extent to which
both players and umpires predispositions may have prejudiced
the application of the rules and game outcomes. As has been
pointed out, the games at Newport were umpired by the staff
under a detailed scheme. These officers were among the
most experienced in the Navy and included officers of such
caliber as Raymond Spruance. These men were not blind to
the shortcomings of their own rules or those of gaming in
general. As the rules indicated:
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Many of the rules may seem to be arbitrary or only
approximate truths. So long, however, as the rules
furnish substantially correct premises upon which to
base strategic decision , and function so as to produce
approximately the same effect as would result in an
actual war, they fulfill their purpose. (Emphasis added.)
[Ref. 50: p. 4]
In general the rules, did a superb job of mapping the strategy
of the war in the Pacific. They failed to teach the tactical
situation of the Solomons, yet the blame cannot be laid
entirely upon the game and its rules; they merely reflected
the predilections of the American Navy at the time and sought
to frame these inclinations into a tangible form for re-
duplication on the game floor. Undoubtedly, if the focus
of prewar gaming had been on night engagements between
cruiser-destroyer task groups, the games would have been
played with a high degree of competence and yielded far
better lessons in relation to the Solomons. Gaming ' s failure
in the case of the Solomons was more the failure of tactical
conceptualization than of the gaming system.
2 . How the Game Saw the Engagement
Although the games at Newport centered on the employ-
27
ment of the battleline in combat, the play of the games
did indicate the possibility of cruiser versus cruiser
action [Ref. 52] . Understanding game results in such
actions is critical to evaluating how well the games
27
See Appendix B for a breakdown of game scenarios.
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prepared the American Navy for the Solomons. While the
previous discussion focused on the general rules of the
games, evaluating the games must address the detailed
assumptions concerning relative fighting strengths of oppos-
ing ships and the ability of shipboard weapons systems to
inflict damage during combat. These assumptions represented
the American cruiser as a tough, highly effective opponent
for its Japanese counterpart in the specific engagement
favored by the American Navy, the long range gunnery battle,
a. Game Assumptions Concerning Ship Durability
Essential to evaluating combat results in the
Newport games was correct estimation of the ability of a ship
in the game to sustain damage. For the purposes of the game,
ships were assumed to have "lives" which were equated with
the number of 14-inch gun hits that the ship could survive
2 8[Ref. 53: p. 1] . This concept reduced the durability of
the world's warships to a standard that made comparison
simple and allowed the gradual attrition of a ship's capa-
bilities due to damage. The lifespans also indicate what
the American Navy thought about its ships in relation to
those of other navies.
Table VI summarizes the Fire Effect Diagrams from
the Newport wargames for American and Japanese cruisers for
28 The fire effect tables and diagrams to be discussed
come from several years as will be indicated. Their rules
for employment, however, remained virtually unchanged
throughout the thirties and into the forties.
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TABLE VI







Blue CL 4.2 4.0
Orange CL 3.06 3.45
(Note: Expressed in terms of 14 inch
gun hits capable of being sustained
before total destruction. Numbers
given are averages considering all
classes listed in game tables.)
the years 1934 and 1941. The game treated American vessels
as more robust than comparable Japanese classes. The
revision of the heavy cruiser rating" is interesting in that
the 1934 tables only considered the Japanese cruiser classes
of the Nachi and Atago classes while the 1941 game also
dealt with the newer, larger, and better protected Mogami
and Aoba classes, yet still gave Japanese heavy cruisers
less credit for their ability to withstand damage. (Although
American cruisers were reevaluated in the later game tables
the 1934 and 1941 rules considered the same Blue classes,
relying on projections for later classes in the 1934 rules.)
The trend in light cruisers is somewhat the reverse: the
game planners were impressed with the newer light cruisers
built by the Japanese during the late thirties, as they
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should have been. However, the same trend remains. Japan-
ese ships are considered less able to sustain damage than
29American counterparts.
As the game evolved during the interwar period, the
.
expression of damage on the game floor increased in
sophistication. By 1941, the damage to a ship in the game
was in terms of percentage of the "lifetime" established by
the tables [Ref. 50; p. 48]. As the allotted "life" of a
ship was lost, damage was further divided into two categories,
above water and underwater damage. Above water damage was
caused by bombs and gunfire hits while underwater damage
was the result of torpedoes, mines, some bomb hits, rammings,
and groundings. Consistent with the "14 inch rule," all
damage percentages were based on equivalent hits in the vital
areas of the ship from a 14 inch gun. In terms of damage
effect, however, separate standards for above and underwater
damage were established with the details for the former more
extensive. For example, at 50% above water damage, a
cruiser-size ship would have lost 20% of its speed, the
ability to launch seaplanes, its secondary and anti aircraft
batteries and its low frequency communications equipment.
29The game tables considered the American Wichita
,
Brooklyn
, and Baltimore -classes all equal in regards to




A corresponding 50% underwater damage would only cost the
same ship its underwater torpedo tubes which were not
mounted on American cruisers. Underwater damage gradually
wore away a ship's speed through the water, but it was not
until the damage reached 80% that the ship's offensive fire-
power was affected. [Ref. 50: Section F]
These damage effect rules reflect American tactical
thinking that was a key factor in the naval battles of the
Solomons campaign. It is obvious now that the games at
Newport underemphasized the power of the torpedo, partic-
ularly the Japanese "Long Lance." In the games, the average
surface launched torpedo had a damage causing equivalent of
2.7 14 inch hits, roughly half the potential to destroy the
average cruiser [Ref. 51: p. 6-1]. Added to this damage was
a "shock effect" that restricted the target with the in-
ability to use its weapons for three minutes, or one game
turn [Ref. 49: p. F-7] . Such restrictions do not reflect
the devastation caused by a single hit, for a torpedo gen-
erally sank an American cruiser or at least caused a "fire-
power kill" which excluded it from the remainder of the
battle. Adding to this underestimate of what the Japanese
considered their primary offensive surface weapon was the
understatement of the range capabilities of the torpedo.
The game rules considered the effective range of the surface
launched torpedo as just under 5 nautical miles [Ref. 51:
p. g-1] . In reality, the Japanese weapon in salvo was
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effective at over twice that range. The overall impression
of the torpedo, as shown in the games, was that of a short
range weapon that, while causing significant damage, generally
conformed to the attrition rules assumed for the gun. The
ability of the torpedo to deal an instantaneous blow that
would destroy a cruiser offensive potential in an instant
was not seen in the game's imperfect crystal ball,
b. Comparative Offensive Firepower
In their assumption that the gun was the premier
naval weapon, the games imitated the attitude of the American
Navy as described in the previous chapters. As might be
expected, the rules for the employment of gunfire were exten-
sive in the games, accounting for virtually every phase of
the fire control problem: range, target size, target rela-
tive position, the number of guns used, the spot applied
to the gun for correction, and a host of environmental
factors. The final output of the game's fire control solu-
tion was an equivalent number of 14 inch hits on the enemy
per three minute move. In arriving at this value, the basic
firepower effectiveness value from the tables was modified
by over thirty special rules which combined into three
general coefficients. In evaluating the essential elements
30Japanese night torpedo tactics are discussed in
Chapter V.
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of this detail as they pertain to the Solomons battles, it is
necessary to know the rules concerning the relative effective-
ness of Japanese gun systems. Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, and
Figure 4.3 display the ability of both American and Japanese
heavy cruisers to inflict damage on each other in battle.
(On these graphs, the target "lifespan" as described above
was considered as unity to present the effectiveness of the
firing platforms in relative terms. One (1) on the vertical
axis represents the maximum effective damage the firing
platform can inflict on an opposing heavy cruiser at the
range indicated.) As the first two figures indicate, the
effectiveness of American and Japanese heavy cruisers was
at rough parity at ranges less than fifteen thousand yards.
However, within the band of sixteen to twenty thousand
yards, the American ships had a distinctly greater ability
to inflict damage on an opposing number. Figure 4.3 presents
an expanded view of this relative strength for both editions
of the Fire Effectiveness Tables. Although these figures
are aggregates based on standard table values from the game,
they display an evident trend towards the assumptions already
noted concerning the American Navy's faith in long range
gunnery. The game favored the American cruiser commander
within the 22,000 to 16,000 yard area in a contest of equals.
This key feature of the game is also evident in Figure 4.4.
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at 22 , 000 yards gained little advantage in closing to 19,000
or 18/000 yards. Conversely, the Japanese player would see
a need to rapidly close range to match relative firepower
effectiveness. Furthermore, the narrow band around twenty
thousand yards offered a single glimmer of hope for the
American player, as it represented the only ranges in the
game where the American cruiser held such a relative
advantage. At all other ranges, the Japanese guns were
assumed to have a roughly equal relative effectiveness and,
in terms of the 14 inch standard, an absolute advantage in
firepower. These rules relate directly to the American
doctrine which called for the optimal cruiser engagement to
occur at twenty thousand yards. [Ref. 21]
Supporting the game's bias towards the long
range gunnery duel were technical assumptions that had a
significant affect on the firepower values used in the game.
These factors included a multiple for penetration of the
targets deck and hull sides based on range. Damage was
significantly different for American and Japanese cruisers.
Thus in the 1934 games, the American cruiser was more effec-
tive at 17,000 yards than at 15,000 and at 18,000 yards
was 30% more effective in raw firepower than its Japanese
counterpart, due to simultaneous deck and hull side pene-
tration from its 8 inch 55 caliber guns. While Japanese
8 inch guns were considered capable of causing more damage
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overall, the games did not credit them with the ballistic
qualities necessary to achieve this simultaneous penetration
The practical effect on the game floor was to make the
American commander see the long range engagement as
preferable. This inclination remained despite a consider-
able upgrade of game rule estimates of Japanese gun effec-
tiveness between 1934 and 1941. Nonetheless, the American
heavy cruiser of the 1941 wargame still outgunned the
Japanese heavy cruiser by 14% in terms of raw effectiveness
at 18,000 yards, a factor made more significant by the
game's faith in the American ship to withstand greater
punishment discussed above.
Until the spring of 1943, American commanders in
the Solomons sought to engage the enemy with tactics that
seem a direct outgrowth of the rules of the wargames at
Newport. Formations were massed along a line to concentrate
gunpower and every effort was made to open fire at the
approaching Japanese at as long a range as possible. The
torpedo was considered a secondary weapon, limited in range
and difficult to employ. While the games may have led to or
reinforced these unsuccessful tactics, they also seem to
offer an explanation for Japanese tactics. If, as the game
rules suggest, the Japanese held a firepower advantage at
closer range, it would only seem natural that Japanese
commanders bore in as close as possible before opening fire.
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Their torpedo, clearly not well modeled in the Newport
games, limited the distance they needed to close, making
the decision to surreptiously approach and open fire a
viable counter to the American tactics indicated in the
games
.
Ultimately, the great flaw in the games rela-
tive to the Solomons was the false hope they gave to already
established doctrine. Those instances in the game where
large scale surface encounters occurred at night usually
resulted in disasterous results: in 1931 an Orange night
destroyer torpedo attack against a Blue light cruiser force
cost five cruisers to twenty attacking destroyers. The
conclusion at the time was that such an Orange sacrifice
was not worth the cost. The same conclusion was reached
again under similar circumstances after a Blue destroyer
attack in a 1935 game. Although those most responsible
for the conduct of the games fully realized the limitations
of the game, to those playing and the bureaucracy reading
game results, the games confirmed already well ingrained
tactical preconceptions: night actions were risky and the
promise of superior American gunpower in the daylight
engagement was the optimal scheme for American surface
combatant tactics.
In the American Navy's resolution of how its
forces should be built between the World Wars, the game
floor seems to have taken priority over the lessons of the
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at sea exercises discussed below. In the resolution of the
"cruiser debate/ 1 the War College analysis was based on
the gaming rules used during these games and the same advan-
tages ascribed the American naval gun in game play became
the foundation of American surface force tactical plans.
B. THE AT SEA EXERCISES OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Complementing the gaming effort described above were
the at sea exercises conducted by the United States Navy
during the interwar period. Major fleet exercises were
designed to be held annually to conduct underway training
for fleet units, and to explore the practical problems
presented by scenarios considered most likely in case of
war. Although the annual "Fleet Problems" and the games
held at Newport were not directly linked on a regular basis,
the anticipated campaigns explored in each were based on
similar situations. For the most part, the annual Fleet
Problems focused on the defense of the Panama Canal, protec-
tion of the Caribbean bases, and the sea lanes of communica-
tion needed for a large scale offensive into the western
Pacific [Ref. 45: p. 2]. Operationally, the fleet problems
addressed situations which were analogous to the Solomons:
actions undertaken in island waters with the goal of defend-
ing the islands with sea control. Moreover, the use of air
bases in Central America was particularly important in
the exercises since the integration of carrier air power
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into the fleet was not completed until the late thirties.
Carrying out offensive operations in such an environment
would seem to have been proper preparation for the Solomons
campaign as well as the entire Pacific theatre. Upon closer
examination, however, the foundations of the exercises in
the Caribbean and off the Central American Coast were
fundamentally different from the Solomons in a strategic
sense. The usual enemy was Germany ("Black" in the lexicon
of the "Rainbow"), in a situation where American forces
held the defensive position against an opponent attempting
to sustain an offensive drive at the end of a long logistics
chain. In the Solomons the situation was reversed and "Blue"
found itself the far-reaching aggressor.
During the interwar exercises, the Battle Force of the
Atlantic Fleet usually simulated the "Blue" force while the
opponent's role usually fell on the Pacific-based Scouting
Force [Ref. 45: p. 2]. The Scouting Force as an opponent
could have possibly given an insight into Japanese tactics
in the Solomons. In the interwar Navy the Battle Force was
mainly compromised of battleships, destroyers, and what
cruisers were available. The Scouting Force, on the other
hand, was made up of a higher proportion of cruisers
[Ref. 45: p. 2]. A frequent comment from exercise partic-
ipants was the value of the cruiser as demonstrated in
offensive missions, particularly the cruisers' ability to
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disrupt destroyers attempting to lead the Battle Fleet's
thrust. The tactical doctrine of employing the light
cruiser's firepower to counter destroyer assaults on the
battle line was practiced often and commented upon frequently.
Similar comments were also frequently made as regards the
cruiser's ability to screen the battle line and provide
anti air protection. In large measure the cruiser's trans-
formation into a "capital" ship grew from the enthusiasm
for the cruiser shown by tactical commanders during fleet
exercises. These observations did not lead the fleet exer-
cises to a precise foretelling of the naval campaign in
the Solomons; employment during the exercises still emphasized
the supporting role of the cruiser in fleet engagements.
However, it is interesting to note the respect tactical com-
manders in the fleet exercises gained for the cruiser,
particularly the light cruiser, and its potential for the
offensive mission of the battle fleet. As the official
report from Fleet Problem VII noted in 1927, the American
Fleet "sorely" needed light cruisers to put it on a par
with "any of the First Class Naval Powers." [Ref. 46: p. 4]
Missing from this enthusiastic endorsement is a more focused
reasoning of why the operational commander needed more
cruisers. The "jack of all trades" syndrome so evident in
the contemporary doctrine described in Chapter III influenced
the employment of the cruiser in the Fleet Problems as well;
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the cruiser was utilized for duties as varied as battleship
or carrier escort and cover for destroyer torpedo attacks.
The cruiser's versatility made it the first to be called on
and the last to be categorized. The argument over torpedo
tubes and gun size was merely a reflection of how the
operating forces wanted the cruiser to fill a variety of
roles.
This appreciation of the cruiser's worth did not lead to
an immediate concept of the cruiser in the primary role it
would assume in the Solomons, but rather paralleled the
established notion of the battle fleet instead. As in
American tactical doctrine, the offensive role for cruisers
opposing the Blue fleet was one of scouting for subsequent
attack by the battle line. In Problem VI of 1926 American
cruiser forces attempted to conjure up a night offensive
against the opposing battle fleet developed a battle plan
that came close to duplicating Japanese tactics in the
Solomons. In this exercise, the forces playing Black were
tasked with interdicting a Blue force attempting to conduct
amphibious operations in Black territory. The Black commander,
realizing that he faced a numerical disadvantage, saw sur-
prise night attacks as his best chance to slow Blue. His
plan was to utilize his cruisers for scouting and to cover
the torpedo attacks conducted by his destroyers and
submarines [Ref. 47: p. 66]. The exercise's chronology
reveals that ensuing actions were conducted at close range
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with Black's destroyers unleashing salvoes of four torpedoes
each while opposing Blue battleships attempted to counter
with searchlight guided gunfire. The night action would
have been devastating for Blue, according to chief umpire
William F. Halsey, who would witness strikingly similar
attrition to his command while leading the Solomons campaign
[Ref. 47: Umpire's Report].
The difficulty with night operations experienced in
Problem VI was a perennial observation of exercise
participants. It is evident that Blue forces dealt with
this difficulty by emphasizing daylight action in their plans
Whether the difficulty of night "ops" was a function of
exercise play or tactical doctrine is a question of the
chicken and egg variety. Just as the games slanted results
towards a doctrine of superiority through gunfire, the inter-
war fleet exercises suggested that such tactics could be
only effectively employed during daylight. Although American
commanders' experience in the Fleet Problems should have told
them differently, they continued to see the long range gun-
nery duel in daylight as the best application of American
gunpower. The official records of the Fleet Problems bear
this out: the engagements included in the official records
tend to show the longer range maneuvers of the main fleets
during daylight hours. Lost in these perfectly kept records
was the mayhem of the night encounters. Accordingly, the
Navy's leadership ignored the most troublesome encounters
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of the exercises, although it was battles such as these
which were to prove such tactical setbacks to the United
States Navy in the Solomons.
The tactics the Scouting force applied in many of the
Fleet Problems anticipated Japanese tactics in the Solomons.
The potential of cruisers as offensive weapons was demon-
strated frequently. While Scouting Force commanders relied
on cruisers to work in consonance with torpedo-equipped
destroyers, the Japanese carried the technique one step
further by including torpedoes as part of the cruiser's
armament as well. This, of course, was no secret to American
operational commanders who were well aware of the discussions
on cruiser batteries outlined in Chapter III. The advantages
such a cruiser-torpedo combination held in a scenario such
as the Solomons should have been recognized.
In a broader sense the exercises of the twenties and
thirties provided a base of experience that served the Navy
well in the conduct of the Solomons campaign in several
respects. The experience of conducting fleet operations
on a large scale is the most significant example of this.
While the exercises of the twenties tended to be in waters
relatively close to the United States, the trend in fleet
exercises was to conduct operations at increasingly longer
distances. The vital logistic support cited previously
was an outgrowth of exercise experience. By 1941, the
United States Navy had refined its capabilities to refuel
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at sea and the "train", the prewar name for the integral
logistics force of the battle fleet, was an established
part of every major fleet movement. Only the practical
experience of the fleet exercises could have led to the
well established logistic lines that served the American
Navy so well in the Solomons.
The integration of air support into fleet tactics was
another vital contribution of the exercises to the World
War II fleet. From their start the interwar exercises
showed a flexible and innovative approach to the employment
of the fledgling fleet air arm. Carrier tactics were
developed during the exercises by future leaders such as
King, who, as a carrier skipper in several exercises, pi-
oneered the use of carrier-based air strikes. More directly
applicable to the daily fighting in the Solomons was the
ability to integrate land based air forces in support of
the fleet, a frequently practiced aspect of the exercises
prior to the war. The air fields and seaplane bases built
throughout the SOPAC area were precursored many times in
the Caribbean and Central America during the Fleet Problems
of the twenties and thirties.
Perhaps more importantly, the fleet exercises prior to
the war gave the American Navy the experience of conducting
large scale operations and the fleet organization necessary
to conduct these operations. The value of this experience
showed itself in the planning for the Solomons
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campaign as well as the execution of the campaign. While
the onset of the Solomons campaign saw the American forces
resource poor, those available were wisely utilized. The
task organizations of the Solomons were reflections of
similar organizations rehearsed many times during fleet
exercises and the commitment of American naval leaders to
a standard scheme for such organization avoided many of the
problems evident in the Japanese conduct of the campaign.
The American forces developed a command structure that
avoided interservice rivalry at higher levels and provided
actions coordinated to a degree the Japanese never achieved.
Recognition that such planning and organization was necessary
in large maritime campaigns was a direct result of the Fleet
Problems which had routinely included land based naval air
forces, Fleet Marine Forces, and logistic forces as well as
occasional participation by Army and Army Air Corps forces.
The lessons in command organization and planning learned in
such ambitious exercises were largely responsible for the
American success at managing the campaign despite the lack
of assets allotted to the initial effort.
C. IN SUMMARY
If the interwar games were false prophets of the Solomons
campaign, then the fleet exercises of the same period must
be considered unheeded Cassandras. While the exercises
showed the dangers of close in night actions, the combat
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results tables used on the gaming floor at Newport seductively
drew American naval leadership into a sense that gunfire could
win anticipated battles at long range. Few of the Solomons
battles were conducted in this manner. The Japanese were
forced to conduct night operations because American island
based airpower dominated the daytime operations. Moreover,
the night surface engagement was most in keeping with well
31
rehearsed Japanese night surface tactics. The Japanese
decision to fight in the Solomons at night forced the United
States Navy into a situation that it had avoided on the
game floor and in peacetime operations. The American Navy
paid a high cost for rationalizing away the problems evident
from the Fleet Problems during the interwar years.
In perspective, the interwar simulation of the Pacific
theatre provided a reasonable foundation for the conduct
of the war. The relentless practice at Newport illuminated
the key strategic elements that American naval strategy
needed to incorporate in fighting such a war: long range
logistics, amphibious forces, sufficient numbers of naval
vessels. On the other hand, the misuses of game results
contributed to American losses in the Solomons by validating
tactics that were inadequate. The blame for this misguided
influence should not be laid squarely on the shoulders of
31 See Chapter V
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the War College and its coterie of gamers. Over their
protestations, the General Board utilized game results in
the design of new cruisers, using these results to prove
how effective cruiser gun tactics were. Perhaps of greater
impact was the faith operational commanders placed in the
results of the games they played at Newport. Attempts to
duplicate victories on the game floor in the dark waters
of the Solomons resulted in a pattern of defeats sanctioned
by official doctrine. The dogged refusal of American surface
combatant commanders to abandon these tactics was incongruous
with the caveats applied to the games by their originators
and the experiences of at sea exercises.
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V. DECISIVE ELEMENTS OF THE SOLOMONS NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS
This study has thus far concentrated on the strategic
roots Solomons campaign and the background of the naval
forces which bore the brunt of the campaign. Just as
critical to understanding the uniqueness of the campaign's
use of naval power is a consideration of the specific tacti-
cal aspects of the campaign. In doing this, it is most
important to evaluate the elements in individual engagements
which contributed most to the successes or failures of the
campaign.
Appendix A summarizes eleven major engagements of the
Solomons campaign. This data base is not all inclusive but
representative of the naval clashes that marked the campaign.
All of these engagements bear the four characteristics
identified as typical to the tactics of the Solomons: night




Grasping the nature of the naval combat in the Solomons
is difficult. The battles were often violent yet indecisive
and the aggregate results suggest almost equal damage
inflicted by each side on the other. Lost in an attempt to
distill the naval actions of the campaign into succinct facts
is a sense of what happened on a larger scale. Despite a
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relatively even balance of losses, the Americans success-
fully achieved campaign goals while the Japanese were in
virtual retreat from the first day of the campaign. In
considering the campaign's naval battles, neither side
achieved absolute control of the seas through destruction of
the other side's naval forces. Table VII lists pertinent
data from the naval engagements of the Solomons campaign.
Victory was not obvious in these battles in either a stra-
tegic or tactical sense; both sides often claimed victory
in individual engagements yet each side accomplished its
primary mission only about half of the time. In damage done,
the Japanese outscored American forces, although the tally
must be viewed a phyrric victory. Japanese industry could
not offet losses sustained and successes in battle were at
a high cost of attrition. The wearing away of the Imperial
Japanese Navy was tantamount to defeat, as its leaders well
realized.
Several factors emerge from the battles analyzed in
Appendix A which clearly define the tactical characteristics
of the campaign. The remainder of this chapter will focus
on these elements and examine their role in the naval battles
of the campaign.
B. AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
The ability of American forces to detect and predict










































































































































advantage in the campaign. Supporting American surface
task group commanders in the Solomons was an intelligence
system that allowed American forces to position themselves
to intercept Japanese forces attempting operations on a
regular basis. Beyond the proficiency of the American
intelligence effort at providing timely tactical data was
the view this effort had of the Japanese Navy and its tactics
The quality of this effort is questionable since it is ap-
parent the American commander had a poor understanding of
how his Japanese counterpart thought and how he saw the
conduct of a successful engagement.
Three key factors contributed to American tactical naval
intelligence. First, the American control of the air and
the ability to integrate air reconnaissance into the cruiser-
destroyer task group. The "real time" information provided
by land based patrol aircraft in the later battles of the
campaign allowed American commanders the opportunity to
position forces for engagement. A second key input to the
American intelligence system supporting the American Solomons
task groups was a network of "coastwatchers," usually
Australian or New Zealand civilians who had lived in the
Solomons prior to the war and stubbornly remained on the
islands to assist the Allies in monitoring Japanese move-
ments [Ref. 12: p. 11]. Often surrounded by Japanese troops
and dependent on natives for aid in the face of extreme
danger, coastwatchers helped track the "Tokyo Express" well
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with vital air support. The Japanese realized their dis-
advantage and structured the campaign accordingly. Support
of air cover would be weakened. Making this decision viable
was the proficiency the Japanese had developed in night
operations and surface torpedo attacks.
Japanese night tactics, conceived well before the war
and rooted in a tradition that had started with the modern
Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese War, were seen by
the Japanese as a counter to the inferiority they saw im-
posed upon them by the interwar treaties [Ref. 59: p. 61].
The Japanese had prepared well for the employment of this
offset. They had developed a torpedo with over three times
the range of those on American ships, had developed superior
optics which allowed visual detection at ranges rivaling
radar in the Solomons, and they had disciplined their forces
to strike in a coordinated attack that employed massed
torpedoes before gunfire [Ref. 2: p. 60]. Such tactics
trumped the American concept of long range
gunnery duel. American employment of cruiser-destroyer
groups in the Solomons remained based on gunnery tactics.
Units were deployed in single columns with destroyers in the
van and rear of the cruisers in the formation
This formation, though optimal for massive gunfire from the
cruisers and maintaining positive control of this miniature
"battle line" of pick-up forces, was a target tailor-made
for the Japanese who were well aware of the American emphasis
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enough to ensure interception at the end of their run down
32the slot. The final key element in American intelligence
in the Solomons was cryptanalysis, the American ability to
break operation Japanese naval messages via the MAGIC system.
MAGIC has become a recent source for historians and the
declassification of MAGIC has done much to place American
and Japanese actions in the Pacific war into perspective.
In the Solomons, MAGIC performance was not consistent
and merits closer examination for the shortcomings it reveals
in American intelligence support for the Solomons naval
forces. A similar examination is needed for American knowl-
edge of Japanese weapons and tactics, the sort of background
data that falls into the category of technical intelligence.
1 . MAGIC in the Solomons Engagements
Recent accounts of the war have emphasized the
influence of MAGIC in predicting Japanese moves in the
Pacific and several key battles, particularly the Battle of
Midway. As pointed out in Chapter II, MAGIC information
made American naval leaders aware of the Japanese airfield
on Guadalcanal, setting the Solomons campaign in motion.
In seeing MAGIC within the framework of individual engage-
ments, a different perspective emerges. In the days
32The "Slot" was the narrow straight that divided the
Solomons chain and had to be navigated in passage from the
northern to southern Solomons. See the chart of the area
in Appendix A.
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following the initial assaults, MAGIC provided little
specific data for the Americans although general movements
of Japanese cruiser-destroyer forces were evident within
the Japanese Eighth Fleet area after the WATCHTOWER landings.
For example, the messages that would have foretold the attack
at Savo on August 9 were not deciphered until August 23
[Ref . 54: p. 121] . The spottiness of official records
indicates that similar problems continued to plague American
efforts throughout the campaign, although MAGIC information
predicted five "Tokyo Express" runs in January and early
February [Ref. 55] [Ref. 56].
The noticeably better intelligence efforts of the
spring and summer of 194 3 are evidenced by American inter-
ception of the Japanese task groups as outlined in Appendix
A. It is not evident that MAGIC was solely responsible for
these successes since Halsey's SOPAC headquarters aggregated
all intelligence reports- MAGIC from Nimitz, plus air and
coastwatcher reports- and simply alerted American task group
commanders in the Solomons. The overall integration of
MAGIC cryptanalysis into the American surface task group
tactical picture seems to have been a clumsy process. The
majority of the pertinent analysis was concentrated on
Japanese communications at Rabaul which gave CINCPAC a
reasonable idea of "Tokyo Express" runs [Ref. 57: p. 135]
.
The handling of the information beyond this point was not
uniformly efficient. The security level of the MAGIC
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information was such that only a few select officers were
allowed to handle it and these officers were posted only
to major staffs [Ref . 58] . Moreover, the filtering of the
evaluated information to surface combatant task group com-
manders at a lower level was the result of a process that
was not done uniformly well [Ref. 57]
•
The disjoint application of MAGIC data seems to have
been a particular problem for the cruiser-destroyer forces
operating in the Solomons. It is evident that the air and
torpedo boat ("PT") forces in the Solomons made better use
of the MAGIC data on Japanese movements [Ref. 55] as did
American submarine forces which were centrally controlled
from Pearl Harbor [Ref. 57: passim ] . The reasons for the
failure of similar support in the case of the surface task
groups may lie in the nature of the command structure of
the groups themselves. The staffs of the cruiser-destroyer
task groups were small and required outside assistance in
areas such as intelligence. While most American cruisers
of the time were capable of performing duties as a flagship,
2they lacked the communications equipment and C resources of
ships that usually embarked larger staffs such as battle-
ships and carriers. These constraints made American
cruiser-destroyer commanders dependent upon intelligence
support from outside sources. The fused information passed
to the commander of the task group would be a mixture of
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synthesized data of varied quality which the commander had
little recourse but to believe, since he was unable to
evaluate raw inputs such as MAGIC.
2 . Technical Intelligence
Failure of American technical intelligence relative
to the Solomons was most damaging in two areas. First was
the American failure to understand the Japanese night tactics
or predict how the Japanese would approach surface combatant
battles at night. A closely related but more specific short-
coming in American intelligence was the absence of technical
data on the Japanese "Long Lance" torpedo.
The failure of the American Navy to understand Japan-
ese tactics was part of a larger underestimation of the
Japanese Navy. Although war with Japan was generally
expected, the American Navy did not make itself aware of how
the Japanese naval hierarchy thought or operated. At the
beginning of the war, the United States Navy had fewer than
forty officers who understood the Japanese language well
enough to read original Japanese Navy publications [Ref. 57:
p. 23] . This ignorance led to misperceptions that were
largely underestimations of Japanese ability and intentions.
The Japanese were able to enhance these misperceptions to a
certain extent. Under the guise of wartime security due to
its involvement in China, the Japanese Navy conducted a
successful campaign to mask the technical details concerning
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its ship construction and exercises that might have provided
a clue to their tactics [Ref . 57: p. 23]
.
The most glaring failure of American technical
intelligence on the Japanese Navy involved the "Long Lance."
According to the data available to American commanders at
the time of the Solomons campaign, the weapon did not exist.
Contemporary American intelligence publications assumed
that the Japanese surface launched torpedo was a 21 inch
diameter weapon similar to the American torpedo [Ref. 16]
.
With such an assumption came a belief on the part of American
commanders that the Japanese torpedo was similar to their
own. The cruiser-destroyer commanders during the later
stages of the Solomons campaign remained skeptical of the
Japanese torpedo capability even after one had been recovered
in 1943. In particular RADM Ainsworth regarded reports of
the "Long Lance's" potential as unproven rumor. In a triumph
of security the Japanese had developed the large torpedo
ten years earlier [Ref. 19: pp. 195-196].
Although the Japanese attempted to mask their order
of battle and ship construction details during the prewar
years, the small effort at resolving these uncertainties is
strange in light of the otherwise thorough plans to fight
a war in the Pacific; unheeded by the American Navy was
Sun Tzu's ancient dictum concerning knowledge of the enemy.
The Japanese seem to have done somewhat better at this, with
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many of their senior officers having visited the United
States, although it is apparent that the Japanese naval
officer had some similar misconceptions about the American
Navy and the American nation in general [Ref. 3: p. 282].
The roots of Japanese naval strategy and tactics
were well established in the history of the Japanese Navy,
particularly during the Russo-Japanese war. The concepts of
surprise attack and reliance on the torpedo were developed
by the Japanese in this conflict and did not change during
World War II. Central to the American failure to understand
how the Japanese would fight in the Solomons was a tendency
for the American Navy to cast the Japanese Navy in its own
image.
C. THE SUPERIORITY OF JAPANESE TACTICS
The unquestionable superiority of Japanese night torpedo
tactics employed in the Solomons dominated the campaign,
influencing far more than the outcomes of warship engagements
alone. As has been pointed out, the campaign forced both
sides to fight on something of a "least cost" basis; only
the bare minimum of naval assets could be spared for the
Solomons, a constraint that limited the naval forces involved
on both sides to cruiser-destroyer task forces. The
Americans with strong logistic support and local air supe-
riority, held a significant advantage by maintaining task
groups within the Solomon area and covering these forces
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on gunnery. Approaching in loose lines abreast, Japanese
task groups approached American groups, fired their "Long
Lance" Torpedoes in a coordinated salvo and were free to
withdraw rapidly. The Japanese attack was the antithesis of
the American concept of engagement; gunfire was to be
avoided in order to cover the firing of torpedoes and the
duel was to be fought well within the envelope of effective
gunfire instead of at its maximum effective range. The
Japanese would not have been surprised at the fire effect
tables of the Newport games for they apparently held similar
beliefs. The close-in night attack was the perfect response
to American tactical doctrine.
Most accounts of the Solomons disparage not only American
tactics in the Solomons but the slowness with which these
tactics were altered in response to Japanese success. This
criticism overlooks the difficulty with which American
tactical doctrine could have been changed. The American
naval commanders 1 tactical focus on the gun was an ingrained
notion that was only gradually changed by the Solomons
experience. Frequent shifts of commanders and the virtual
parade of new ships into the SOPAC task groups was a neces-
sity of war that slowed the development of a solid base of
experience in the Solomons.
American tactical doctrine, as the descriptions of
Appendix A indicate, for surface combatants, did shift
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between the fall of 1942 and the following spring. By the
next major update of American formal doctrine in 1944, the
experience of the Solomons was reflected, as was the success
both the American and Japanese forces had enjoyed in the
Solomons. Radar was singled out as a primary means for
long range detection, and the value of surprise was emphasized
So too was the desirability of utilizing torpedoes before
opening fire with guns. The danger of such attacks and
the resulting confusion from close surface engagements were
emphasized, obvious lessons from the Solomons. Moreover, it
can be argued that Japanese tactics showed an even greater
inertia and demonstrated their shortcomings in those situa-
tions where battle was joined on American terms [Ref. 60:
Chapter 8]
.
By the final battles of the campaign, American surface
combatant tactics had matured. The use of shore based
logistics allowed forces to remain in the vicinity they would
be needed while these shore facilities offered the type of
intelligence support that was unavailable on the flagships
of the task groups. Shore based air power had been integrated
with the cruiser-destroyer task groups, offering them protec-
tion during the day, timely intelligence on the approach to
battle, and offensive support through spotting and bombing.
The use of PTs had been also proven feasible adding another
asset to the surface task group. Interestingly, the notice-
able shift in American tactics was not a radical departure
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from the prewar doctrines and their theory. The correct
use of long range gunnery was finally developed by Merrill.
Most of the successful American destroyer attacks resulted
from the use of a destroyer attack element not unlike the
schema of Figure 3.2. Most important to the eventual success
of American surface combatants was the freedom each ship
type was allowed in employing its offensive potential
against the enemy and the. ability to execute the complex
maneuvers this freedom dictated before closing Japanese
33formations. Radar and voice radio (the "TBS") combined
with better signaling made this possible after a painful
learning process in the first half of the campaign.
D. THE TORPEDO VERSUS THE GUN
Representing the different approach each navy took
towards tactics in the Solomons was the opposite emphasis
put on the gun and the torpedo. The theoretical nature of
the gun versus torpedo question was the subject of extensive
prewar simulation, deliberation, and debate. As previous
chapters have pointed out, the test of theory in the
Solomons yielded results that were not consistent with
American predictions.
33 . .
"Talk Between Ships," The American tactical voice
radio system.
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Overall, the Japanese lost or had 29 ships severely
damaged in the Solomons battles looked at in Appendix A
while the American tally was 3 2 ships. The data from the
Solomons battles reveals that 62.5% of the significant damage
to American ships was done by Japanese torpedoes while a
corresponding 72.5% of the damage inflicted on the Japanese
was done by American guns. Paralleling these facts are the
respective performance figures for the gun and torpedo as
used by each side. The American gun seems to have outshot
34the Japanese with gun PHs 0.785 and 0.384, respectively.
The complement of these numbers, the PH of each side's
torpedoes, emphasizes the Japanese reliance on the torpedo
and the American faith in gunfire. Evaluating the overall
effectiveness of each weapon requires a selective examina-
tion of how each was employed and how successful each was.
1 . Range and Its Importance
Comparison of the tactics of the Solomons must begin
with the range of engagement for each battle. Range was
important in American doctrine since engagement at sufficiently
long range with gunfire would ideally thwart torpedo attacks.
Virtually all of the Solomons clashes were done within the
effective range of both the torpedo and the gun since both
34Probability of Hit, the chance of either sinking a
target or damaging it badly enough to influence its
performance in the battle.
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sides were forced to coiranit themselves to battle at rela-
tively close ranges. The average range American commanders
opened gunfire was 4.2 nm; that for the Japanese 4.5. This
range, less than half of what prewar American doctrine
35
considered a "moderate" range, robbed American commanders
of what they considered their primary tactical advantage.
American tactical plans for the torpedo were also subverted.
The Japanese undertook attacks with their torpedoes at a
range of 4.3 nm, the American at a range of 3.5. The
Japanese were equipped with a much longer ranged torpedo,
the "Long Lance." The American attacks at such long range
are surprising since the American doctrine had considered
the optimal range for torpedo attack to be around 4000 yards
Effective range for Japanese gunfire and torpedoes was
5.8 and 3.6 nm, respectively those for American guns and
torpedoes 4.6 and 2.8, respectively.
These averages can only be utilized for broad anal-
ysis since the battles in the Solomons were marked by wide
variances from the mean. However, there are some observa-
tions consistent with these data points that are surprising
in light of the doctrine of both sides at the time. The
most significant is that even with radar control the gun
35 See Chapter III.
3 6
Here defined as the range at which damage was actually
inflicted on opposing ships.
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did not enjoy a clear range advantage over the torpedo in
battle. The engagements of the Solomons were fought within
an envelope where both weapons were effective. This fact
alone was a tactical disadvantage to the American forces
who based their tactics on a fight at much longer range.
The data also suggests that American torpedo fire was effec-
tive at longer ranges than prewar doctrine would have led
American commanders to believe. Overshadowing this is the
obvious superiority of Japanese torpedo range, a capability
that allowed the Japanese to conduct torpedo attacks at
approximately the same effective range as American gunfire.
Data from the Solomons battles neither vindicates
nor condemns the American doctrine of long range gunnery.
There is a sense that American forces did better when allowed
to utilize their gunnery tactics at long range and before
the Japanese opened fire. The battleship action of the Naval
Battle of Guadalcanal and the second phase of the Battle of
Kula Gulf are examples of this. In these clashes, American
gunfire was effective at relatively long range, as it was
at Horaniu and Cape St. George. American gunnery tactics
were dependent upon good visibility and "visibility" good
enough to successfully employ these tactics only became
available as radar was refined and better integrated into
the C structure of the American task groups. As to the
central question of whether prewar plans for long range
gunnery were feasible, apparently not. In only 14% of the
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of the gun engagements were ranges over 15,000 yards
employed. In these, the gun did little damage even with
radar control. At Empress August Bay, where the cruisers
stood off and fired at 16,000 yards, four ships achieved an
estimated 20 hits for over 4,600 rounds expended [Ref. 19:
p. 321]
.
2. The Torpedo: THE Decisive Weapon?
The previous discussion indicates that the Japanese
tactical concept for night surface engagements was a well
conceived counter to American tactical plans for surface
engagements. In measuring the effectiveness of the opposing
tactical concepts, a review of actual damage data both sup-
ports and criticizes the tactics of each side.
A basic question in considering the tactics of the
Solomons and the outcomes of battles is which weapon— the
gun or the torpedo--did the most damage. On an aggregate
level, the total damage among both sides is about evenly
split; 46% of the total damage to ships from both sides was
caused by torpedo hits, the remainder by gunfire. The gun,
with a slight majority of damage to its credit seems to have
held its place as the traditional instrument of tactical
naval power. Considering the damage from each side's point
of view, the particular emphasis of each navy is evident.
On the American side, 62.5% of the damage to American ships
was caused by Japanese torpedoes. Conversely, only 27.5% of
the damage caused by the Americans to Japanese ships was
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done by torpedoes and most of this was in the battles of
19 43 when American tactics took a decided turn towards the
more aggressive use of destroyers.
Americans, once committed to a torpedo attack,
were surprisingly slightly superior to the Japanese. The
37
overall American PH of American attacks was .076 while
that of the Japanese forces in the Solomons was .063.
3 8Additionally, American torpedoes had a 100% PK against
the Japanese as opposed to a Japanese PK of 54%. American
torpedo attacks were perhaps individually better than Japan-
ese, but they were more sparsely employed. The aggregate
data suggests that the Japanese chance of sinking an
opponent with a torpedo attack was about the same as the
chance of doing the same with gunfire-- . 52 . American radar
supported gunnery should have provided a more conclusive
advantage but American tactical success is obvious in those
cases where torpedo fire was used to augment gunfire. This
combination was only gradually adopted in 1943. Conversely,
the Japanese consistently employed two weapons with a fifty
percent chance of killing an opponent.
37Probability of Hit.
38Probability of Kill--the chance of actually sinking
a target hit.
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Indicated by the data is an apparent superiority of
American forces to survive a Japanese torpedo attack. Per-
haps American shipboard damage control was better, a difficult
hypothesis to test. As the games suggested, American ships
were assumed more survivable than Japanese and this belief
is consistent with data from the Solomons. It appears that
the Japanese crews were more willing to abandon a severely
damaged ship while American crews were tenacious in their
efforts to keep ships afloat. The American advantage in
daylight aircover and advance basing may have contributed to
this. Japanese commanders realized that daylight would
bring American air attacks with Japanese bases at a con-
siderable distance to coax a severely damaged ship. As
pointed out in Chapter II, wounded American ships enjoyed
the opposite of this situation with well protected support
at Tulagi.
A final appraisal of whether guns or torpedoes were
more decisive in the Solomons naval engagements should probe
the immediate effects each weapon had on the actual course
of the battles. While the gun did more damage overall, the
introduction of the torpedo into a battle stopped whatever
target it hit in a single blow instead of gradually wearing
away firepower. Therefore the torpedo was a dominant factor
in individual engagements. Supporting this observation is
the spectacular results that timely torpedo attacks gained
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for both sides in battles where they were most effectively
used. Successes such as the Japanese experienced at Savo
and the Americans enjoyed at Vella Gulf proved the torpedo's
potential to dominate naval battles in proportions greater
than the gun.
E. THE INFLUENCE OF TIME AND EXPERIENCE
Several factors were essential to this improved perform-
ance of American cruiser-destroyer forces in the later
Solomons battles. American commanders had finally learned
to employ radar effectively, not simply understanding the
technical limitations and capabilities of their systems,
but just as importantly integrating radar data into the
tactical picture and reacting swiftly to this data. With
the advantages of early radar detection and the flexibility
it offered, American surface commanders developed bold new
tactical plans that enhanced their offensive capabilities.
In 1943, American destroyers were allowed to operate inde-
pendently as offensive consorts for cruiser groups, a scheme
made possible by the time and accurate tactical picture
radar furnished.
The data clearly indicates that the later battles were
longer. The engagements of 1942 averaged 54 minutes while
those of 1943 were 106 minutes in length. That each side
managed to accomplish less in this additional time is
perhaps the clearest indicator of how the battles shifted
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in character. In the 1942 battles, American forces averaged
4.8 destructive acts as defined in Appendix A. In the 1943
battles this average was 4.25, essentially the same. In
contrast, the Japanese forces fighting the 1942 battles
averaged 6.5 destructive or damage causing acts per battle
but this average was virtually halved to 3.5 in the 1943
battles. As the battles got longer, the Japanese were able
to less damage to American forces while the Americans, with
better tactics and use of radar, seemed to have maintained
their same relative effectiveness. Part of this shift is
attributable to the strategic missions each force found
itself doing in the later battles. While the Japanese task
groups were almost always tied to a mission of either land-
ing or evacuating troops, the American task groups had no
other mission than the interdiction of Japanese efforts.
This single purpose allowed American commanders unimpeded
offensive action while the Japanese were constrained to
courses of action that exposed their forces to attack while
limiting their ability to counterattack.
F. FIRST MOVES AND THEIR IMPORTANCE
Naval engagements during the Solomons campaign were often
characterized by abrupt, almost simultaneous action on the
part of both sides. A general sense emerges that the side
which acted first gained the tactical advantage. This was
particularly true in the American case where tactical
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doctrine was based on long range gun engagement, and radar
should have provided an advantage in detection. However as
the previous paragraphs have indicated, American attempts
at long range engagements were frustrated by inadequate
command and control. In several battles, such as Cape
Esperance and the cruiser action at the Naval Battle of
Guadalcanal, commanders on both sides were startled by the
pace of events and forced to open fire on short notice.
Judging which side benefited most from the initiative in
the Solomons begins with -an evaluation of initial actions
taken by commanders. Four factors are considered here.
These factors--range at opening of the engagement, ratio of
opposing forces, which side held contact with the enemy
first, and which side opened fire first—are fairly evenly
distributed among the fourteen cases examined by this work.
The effects of range on damage caused and suffered are dis-
cussed above and it is sufficient to reemphasize that the
gunfire ranges typical of the Solomons engagements were far
short of what the Americans had considered optimal in pre-
war doctrine, but were well suited to the Japanese. The
Japanese relied on a barrage of torpedoes launched at as
close a range as possible and coupled with less sophisticated
gunfire control in the form of simple optical gun laying.
It was obviously in Japanese interests to hold fire with
guns until at the closest range possible. Complementing
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this tactic was the need for quick action once contact was
made. Surprisingly, the Japanese held first contact with
the enemy in exactly fifty percent of the battles studied
and opened fire first with both guns and torpedoes in 43%
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of these engagements. In terms of strength, the American
forces held the advantage in gunpower in 8 of the fourteen
engagements
.
In viewing how these basic details influenced the tacti-
cal performance of opposing surface combatant task groups in
the Solomons, it is necessary to evaluate the engagements in
terms of these factors most associated with either damage
done or received.
1. The Influence of First Contact in an Engagement
Despite the advantage of radar, American task group
commanders only managed to track opposing Japanese forces
earlier in half of the engagements considered. No firm
correlation can be made with first sighting an enemy and
conducting a successful battle. The Japanese did both at
Savo and scored an impressive tactical victory, yet failed
to capitalize on early detection during the battleship
engagement at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. On the
39As specified in Appendix A, "contact" with the enemy
in the data base examined means that the commander of the
task group held his opponent's force with shipboard sensors
(radar, eyes, direction finding equipment) and was able to
both positively identify the opponents force and utilize
the information in making a tactical decision.
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American side, first detection did not help the Americans
avert the embarrassment of Tassafaronga nor did it seriously
influence the prosecution of Japanese forces at Kula Gulf.
Rough statistics add insight to what initial detec-
tion did mean in the Solomons. In term of ships sunk or
damaged, the Japanese suffered an average loss of 2.14 ships
per battle where the American force had an early detection.
In those battles where the Japanese held first contact,
they had an average of 1.8 ships sunk or damaged. Since
the overwhelming majority of missions assigned to Japanese
task groups in the Solomons did not directly call for the
engagement of American combatant forces, the Japanese often
used their initial detection to avoid damage. This was
particularly true in the battles of 1943 when attrition of
ships was a serious concern for the Japanese. Balancing
out the Japanese losses was the damage Americans suffered
when the Japanese held first contact. In such instances,
the Americans averaged 3.16 ships sunk or damaged per battle.
When holding first contact the Americans lost substantially
the same number of ships, 3.25 per battle; American naval
forces in the Solomons suffered approximately the same losses
at the hands of the Japanese regardless of who saw the
opposing side first. Again the mission may account for the
damage: in contrast to the Japanese, American forces were
almost always assigned the task of engaging the enemy.
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However, American commanders failed to take full advantage
of early detection on several occasions such as Vella Gulf
and Cape St. George.
It is apparent that early detection can be most
associated with inflicting damage. The Japanese clearly
lost more ships in those battles where they were seen first,
but first contact did little to protect American forces.
Throughout the Solomons, American task groups sustained
relatively constant losses per battle regardless of first
contact. For the Americans initial contact with the Japan-
ese resulted in more damage done, but with the prospects
for receiving the same.
2 . The Effect of Opening the Engagement on Its Outcome
It is natural to assume that the timely opening of
fire would have had a significant effect on the battles
fought during the Solomons. A key question is whether or
not opening fire first could offset the effects of being
"out gunned" in an engagement. In eight of the fourteen
cases studied the side having the advantage in gun ratio
caused more damage with guns regardless of which side opened
fire first. However, when outgunned and shooting first,
the American side caused more gun damage in two out of three
cases while the Japanese were never able to do more damage
by shooting first when out gunned. Patterns beyond these
general results are not consistent when total battle results
164
are considered. In those battles where the Japanese opened
fire with guns first, the Americans suffered 1.83 ships hit
or seriously damaged while 2.2 Japanese ships received
similar damage in these same battles. When the Americans
opened fire first, they suffered 2.8 ships sunk or damaged
per battle while the Japanese only had .75 ships sunk or
damaged. No positive correlation can be made, but it is
evident that opening fire with guns first in the Solomons
did little to minimize losses nor did it clearly lead to
larger gains against the enemy force. We know from the
narratives of the battles that opening gunfire in column
formation invited a devastating torpedo counterattack, yet
failed to deter the launch of torpedoes in great numbers.
The effectiveness of opening fire with torpedoes
first, shooting first and causing damage seem to be directly
related and reflect the Japanese doctrine of utilizing the
torpedo as the centerpiece of a sharp initial blow. When
Japanese forces opened fire with torpedoes first, the result-
ing damage to American ships from torpedoes was an average
of 2.0 ships per battle sunk or damaged. When the American
forces took the initiative with the torpedo attack, Japanese
losses were 1.14 ships per battle. Perhaps more illuminat-
ing are the actual PHs represented by these figures. The
Japanese scored an overall PH on American forces of 9.8
percent when firing torpedoes first. American forces in
similar circumstances averaged a slightly higher 11.5%
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chance of hitting a Japanese ship with an opening torpedo
salvo. When the advantage of the first salvo was lost, the
corresponding performance for the Americans was a dismal
zero while the Japanese managed to attain a 5% PH when firing
second in a battle. In those battles where the Americans
took the initiative in firing torpedoes, the Japanese still
managed to sink or damage an average of two American ships.
American task groups scored no hits on Japanese forces in
those battles where they did not fire torpedoes first.
Aggregate battle results parallel these specific
cases. In those battles where they took the initiative of
first torpedo launch, the Japanese damaged or sank an average
of 2.4 American ships while accepting similar damage of
1.2 ships per battle. American forces firing" torpedoes first
sank or damaged an average of 1.37 Japanese ships per battle
and lost only 0.6 ships per engagement. The first firing of
torpedoes in the naval actions of the Solomons was relatively
more decisive in terms of the battle's outcome.
In summarizing the effectiveness of both gun and
torpedo, the ratio of gun power overshadowed first use; the
gun battle went to the side with the heavier fire power.
Conversely, the torpedo was most effective when employed
first, and yielded greater damage in the ratio of 2:1.
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G. PATTERNS OF DEFEAT: WHO WON THE BATTLES?
A final question in any analysis of combat is that of
who won. While establishing the victor in any engagement
can be difficult, this is particularly true of the naval
actions in the Solomons. On the tactical level, both sides
suffered almost identical losses in the campaign, however
it seems clear that the American naval forces accomplished
their mission while the Japanese failed; American forces
enjoyed the sea control necessary to support the campaign
ashore while the Japanese Navy failed its assigned mission
of supporting Japanese troops.
In considering how individual naval engagements served
the strategic objectives of the Solomons campaign, a pre-
liminary categorization of naval missions is necessary. For
both navies and their surface task groups in the Solomons,
two general missions were possible. The first was interdic-
tion or opposition of landing operations or other operations
ashore. The second was the inverse of this tasking, the
support of own forces in their attempts to either land or
conduct operations "on the beach." Assignment to either one
of these tasks was indicative of the progress of the
campaign; American forces at Guadalcanal began by supporting
operations ashore while the initial Japanese attack at Savo
was clearly in support of the interdiction mission. As the
American forces on the ground made advances, the Japanese
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Eighth Fleet found itself resupplying Japanese forces while
attempting to bombard American troops. This pattern con-
tinued throughout the campaign.
Aggregating assignment to these two strategic missions
across the data field of the eleven battles looked at in
40 .this work, it can be seen that the American surface forces
in the Solomons were assigned a total of eleven missions,
one per battle. The Japanese forces were assigned a total
of twelve separate missions in the same battles. Japanese
task groups were assigned concurrent missions of both support
and interdiction of operations ashore at Cape Esperance
and the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. In overall results,
the American task groups were successful in six cases, or
54.5% of the time. The Japanese, in reaching their objectives
in five instances, had a success rate of 41.6%. Intuitively
these averages seem low, particularly for the Americans who
were successful in the campaign. Resolving this apparent
paradox requires a further breakdown of which of the two
general missions were assigned at what times and how well
the opposing task groups did.
In interdicting enemy landings or operations ashore,
American naval forces in the Solomons were successful in 3
of 8 cases. The Japanese were successful in none of their
40Although the automated data base dealt with 14 cases,
the base represents only 11 separate battles.
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four attempts. American task groups were assigned the
mission of supporting landings or operations ashore 3 times
in the eleven battles examined and were successful in each
attempt. Similar Japanese efforts were successful 5 out of
9 times.
The significance of the tactical actions of each battle
emerges when considered in light of the importance of the
more general missions each force was supporting. In no
instance were the Japanese successful at interdicting
American forces ashore while American efforts at supporting
land operations were successful in all three attempts. In
terms of actual battles, the battles of Savo and Empress
August Bay both reflect mission success despite the dramat-
ically opposite American tactical performance. The Solomons
campaign was an American offensive and although the three
successful instances of American surface task groups support-
ing operations ashore seems a small sample to base conclusions
upon, it is representative of how the campaign went for the
American side: the advance up the Solomons succeeded as
planned, with American naval forces providing the support
for the advance when needed. Japanese naval efforts at
supporting their own forces ashore were successful only 55%
of the time, committting the Japanese Army to gradual retreat
before the American forces.
The Japanese Navy was burdened by the need to both inter-
dict American operations ashore as well as conduct its own
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landings. It was forced to do both without air support,
under the cover of night and with combatant forces that were
expected to both fight American naval forces and land supplies
and men. Despite any tactical successes in battle against
opposing American task groups, the Japanese success rate
at the primary mission was not good enough to win the campaign
ashore. Just as important was the Japanese inability to
stop American landings and movements ashore. In the final
analysis, the American task groups were able to perform their
primary strategic mission at the critical times while the
Japanese were frustrated in similar efforts. The tactical
record indicates this as well. Cape Esperance, the Naval
Battle of Guadalcanal, Vella Gulf, and Empress August Bay
were tactical victories for American forces that prevented
the Japanese from accomplishing their primary mission when
such accomplishment was essential to the Japanese effort.
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VI. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE SOLOMONS TODAY :
PARADIGMS AND WARNINGS
A. THE SOLOMONS AND MODERN STRATEGY
Because of the reliance the United States still has on
the world's oceans, it can be argued that maritime theaters
and littoral strategy cannot be allowed to take a second
place to a continental strategy. Today's focus for a war-
fighting strategy is on Europe much as it was during the
opening months of World War II. Just as the United States
found it necessary to follow a strategy in the Pacific that
was distinct from the major European effort, so should
modern strategic plans recognize the potential for conflict
in other areas of the world. The Solomons was a struggle
for a maritime theater and reflects a capability that must
be accounted for in contemporary American strategy, making
the Solomons campaign relevant today to today's strategic
paradigms
.
1 . Conflict Escalation and the Solomons: A Viable
Concept?
The most obvious of today's strategic models sug-
gested by the Solomons campaign is that of the off-axis
escalation. This concept, more commonly referred to as
"horizontal escalation," theorizes that the ability to
intensify a conflict on a front outside the primary theater
can widen a conflict to the point that it is too costly
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for the enemy to pursue. Horizontal escalation remains a
principal role for the American Navy with today's emphasis
on action against the Soviet Union in areas off the European
Central Front. Much as in the Solomons in 194 2, the Navy
has decided to utilize surface combatant task groups as a
primary vehicle for such strategy. The rationale is strik-
ingly similar to that of 1942. Just as then, the use of
surface combatant forces is considered an alternative to
employment of scarcer and more valuable carrier forces.
Today's commitment to such a strategy should be done
with the Solomons in mind. The most significant lesson is
that the "low priced" campaign is relatively expensive in
terms of forces committed. The Solomons was a campaign of
naval attrition which the United States was able to win on
the basis of sheer numbers. The cost in surface combatants
was high, yet the expenditure of these forces was seen as
preferable to risking the more valuable carrier forces.
Utilizing similar forces in any modern off-axis campaign
should be done with the recognition that today's surface
combatant forces are as vulnerable as their predecessors of
the last war. In a limited conflict this is a questionable
assumption since the American industrial base will not be
committed to the levels of warship production it was in
1942.
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Within the context of the war, the most valuable
gain by Americans was the destruction of Japanese naval air
and surface forces, and the campaign aided the war effort most
by attriting the Imperial Japanese Navy. In terms of
strategic maneuver, the campaign did little for the American
position in the Pacific. A glance at a map of the Pacific
at the campaign's conclusion in November 1943 reveals that
the American position in the Solomons was exposed on the
northern flank, an advantage that an enemy stronger than
Japan could have taken advantage of. The original Pacific
strategy of seizing the central Pacific island was still
necessary despite the taking of the Solomons.
These considerations lead to several observations
about the strategy of horizontal or off-axis escalation.
First, regardless of what tactical success such operations
achieve, they must be eventually consolidated. "Follow-up
actions" may be costly in themselves and must be considered
as part of the price for attempting to employ a horizontal
escalation strategy.
Horizontal escalation is an expensive strategy
even though it may be relegated to forces of less relative
worth. Some current military thinking has utilized the
categories of "maneuver" and "attrition" to classify two
styles of warfare: the dichotomy of "inexpensive" off-axis
campaigns, as exemplified by the Solomons, is that the use
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of what appears to be maneuver on the enemy's flank is only
productive if it can significantly attrite his forces.
American success in the Solomons came from the "attrition"
aspect of the campaign. The Japanese forces engaged in the
Solomons were gradually whittled away in pursuit of strategic
goals that many Japanese strategists realized were dubious.
2 . The Solomons as A Naval Campaign
The Solomon Islands represented a maritime theater
where naval power was utilized to project land power which
in turn furnished the air power necessary to extend control
of the sea. Necessity, as described in Chapter II, dictated
this symbiotic strategy: sea power was needed to sustain the
land campaign, air power was needed to control the seas by
the Americans, the only avenue open for air power was land
based air that required projection of force ashore. The
interactive strategy worked, and a consideration of present
amphibious forces, surface combatant forces, and the strategy
to utilize both in situations similar to the Solomons sug-
gests that the lessons of the campaign are applicable today.
Many of the same general characteristics of our
naval forces remain today as they were in 194 2 despite
advances in technology. Surface combatant forces will find
air support as necessary as those of World War II did.
The ability to place troops ashore and establish air
power is seldom considered by the American Navy of today
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which presupposes that air power for naval actions must be
carrier based. The capability to forward base air power has
whithered in today's United States Navy, as has the ability
to set up support bases as utilized in the Solomons. The
erosion of these concepts limits the American ability to
exert influence in remote littoral regions of the world.
B. ON THE STRUCTURING OF NAVAL FORCES
1. Matching Forces and Operational Concept
A lesson the American Navy learned at great expense
in the Solomons was that naval forces must be designed
around a sound concept of operations and then employed in a
consistent manner within this concept. Initial American
naval operations in the Solomons attempted to imitate the
battle fleet of the interwar period. The first cruiser-
destroyer task groups engaged in the campaign seemed to be
microcosims of the battle line with the cruiser taking the
battleship's central role and destroyers acting as escorts
and pickets. The orderly paradigm did not work: the cruiser's
guns were unable to deliver the destructive power expected
of them, the destroyer was hampered in the employment of its
weapons, and the control needed to execute the coordination
of the two ship types was rarely achieved. The Japanese
concept of operations was markedly different. The Japanese
surface combatant force was seen as a holisticly offensive
unit. Each ship had the primary weapon, the torpedo, and
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was expected to contribute to the single purpose of deliver-
ing lethal doses of it to the enemy.
Sir Walter Scott tells of the meeting of Richard the
Lionhearted and the Moslem leader Saladin. As the two rivals
discussed their respective weapons, Richard displayed the
brute strength of the English broadsword by crushing a log
with a single stroke. Saladin admitted that he was a weak
man by comparison and his weapon was a smaller scimitar-type
sword that had no chance of duplicating Richard's feat. But,
he asked, could the broadsword destroy a satin pillow? Of
course not, scoffed the English: no sword could damage
such a soft target. At that Saladin drew his sword and split
the pillow with a single stroke of the smaller but sharper
blade. The legend seems a fitting parable for the Solomons
and today. The Japanese admitted that their overall naval
strength was inferior to the United States Navy and they
sought to effectively organize what assets they had into
an effective fighting force. Their solution was the torpedo
employed at close range, by a surface combatant force that,
like Saladin, realized that the deep cut was as damaging
as the pounding blow. The smaller navies of today possess
similar tactical capabilities in modern anti ship missiles
which seem to parallel the Japanese torpedo's ability to
deliver damage in high proportions.
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2 . Combined Operations and Force Structure
The Japanese Navy lacked a significant "blue water"
amphibious capability and their experience shows that
dedicated shipping designed to conduct landing operations
under hostile conditions has no substitute. The inability
to support the campaign ashore in the face of similar
American efforts eventually cost the Japanese the entire
campaign.
The specific reason for Japanese failure at rein-
forcement of the Solomons was the lack of sufficient forces
to complete the task. Underlying this lack was a more
general failing of strategy. It is apparent that the lack
of unity within the Japanese military hierarchy left amphib-
ious operations in a strategic "no man's land," the concern
of neither the Navy, whose support was needed, nor the Army
who did not appreciate the interrelation of sea control and
success in a campaign such as the Solomons. The failure to
integrate forces and strategy on the highest level led to
poor management of those forces that were available. Over-
burdened Japanese cruiser/destroyer task groups became
ineffective at both interdicting American forces and they
were concurrently unsuccessful at protecting and supporting
their own forces ashore. Lack of strategic priorities for
the employment of Japanese forces was compounded by the
assignment of forces to roles they were unsuited for.
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3 . Arms Control on the Building of Weapons Systems
Prewar efforts to limit international naval strength
through arms control efforts may hold several modern lessons.
The irony of these efforts is that the prewar naval treaties
did not control the intended armament programs, but instead
redirected them. The Americans saw the naval treaties as
an opportunity to minimize the construction of naval arms;
the Japanese saw the limitations as the motivation to build
a new generation of warships, a generation that, like
Saladin's sword, compensated for brute strength with the
ability to do incisive damage.
The failure of the treaties has been the subject of
extensive research and discussion and is not the principal
issue here. What is germane is the impact the treaties had
on the forces that were employed in the Solomons. The treaty
influences in this area were largely technical: what size
the ships were, what armament they carried, how many were
available at the commencement of the campaign. However,
the most significant impact of the treaties, was in the
direction it gave the naval weapons building programs of
each nation. For the Japanese, the treaties were both
the motivation and the opportunity to redesign their sur-
face combatant forces with new and powerful systems. It
can be inferred that arms control treaties are as likely
to generate new weapons as limit older ones.
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C. THEORIES OF NAVAL COMBAT AND THE SOLOMONS
1. The Influence of Tactical Tradition
The naval battles of the Solomons were marked by
two contrasting approaches to naval tactics which are not
apparent from aggregate statistics. Both the experience of
previous wars and the interwar treaties led the American
Navy to rely on gunpower as the centerpiece of tactical
thought. The Japanese considered the limitations on their
fleet and, remembering their former successes in the Russo-
Japanese War, concluded that the torpedo could offset American
superiority in gunpower. In its approach to tactics the
American Navy was confident of the gun, dubious of the tor-
pedo, and determined to fight on its own terms. These terms
included the gradual destruction of the enemy at long range
with coordinated gunfire. The opposing Japanese view saw
the engagement as the sudden delivery of fire power,
delivered with precise timing. A consideration of the
results from individual battles in the Solomons indicates
that the side able to impress its unique concept of battle
on the other fared better in the engagement.
It seems apparent that the Japanese understood the
American concept far better than the Americans understood
Japanese tactics. At the center of the misunderstanding
was the failure of American tactical thought to realize
that decisiveness in combat rests in the weapon that most
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effectively eliminates an opposing ship's ability to return
damage. The gun gradually wore away the opponent's ability
to fight, the torpedo destroyed his ability at a stroke.
The tactics of both the Americans and Japanese were
strongly influenced by previous trends and modern tactics
reflect this same reliance on tradition. The United States
surface fleet remains centered around the carrier, a concept
that is frequently compared to the pre World War II focus
on the gun. However, the reliance on tradition as a founda-
tion for fleet employment should not be haphazardly criticized
As the Solomons data indicates, each side fought best when
able to fight according to its principal doctrines. The
lesson that must be taken from this realization is that the
introduction of newer systems like radar does not immediately
change the nature of a navy's capability until the tactics
to exploit them are put in hand. In a modern perspective,
the developments in the Soviet fleet must be considered in
light of previous systems. The evolution of Soviet naval
aviation is the most significant development that must be
evaluated with this in mind. For its modern history, the
Soviet Navy has relied on anti ship missile equipped surface
combatants for its primary at sea strike capability. It
is unlikely that the deployment of high performance carrier
airwings will immediately shift this tactical focus to one
mimicking that of the American Navy.
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2. The Role of Tactical Doctrine
American reliance on doctrine as a precept for
obedience rather than a tool for intelligent application
led to a mindset that is apparent from the similar mistakes
made repeatedly by successive commanders. American doctrine
was thorough yet stilted; it was explicit in its procedures
for conducting tactics in its own way but it failed to shape
concepts for the commander that would have allowed easy
modification for circumstances that were fundamentally
different from an accepted standard.
Attendant circumstances must be considered in the
discussion of doctrine and the Solomons. In the case of the
Americans, groups of ships were hastily assembled to fight
with no opportunity for commanders to either discuss tactical
variations or agree on any but simple operational procedures.
The throwing of forces together is easily criticized, but
the more pertinent issue is how doctrine failed to compen-
sate for this unfortunate necessity. Again the flaw can be
traced to what doctrine for the American forces did do
which was provide specific instructions for maneuvering
ships but no general framework for commanders to select as
schemes for battle. The planning process for American
forces of the day was taught at the War College as an orderly
series of steps that included a thorough examination of
mission and estimation of enemy strengths and intentions.
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General operational concepts were emphasized, but specific
41tactics were not considered in the planning process.
Tactics were taken for granted, perhaps because the doctrine
was so extensive as to make any discussion seem redundant.
When faced with the test of battle, the doctrine's emphasis
on "what" proved inadequate for the situation but failed
to provide any principles for alternatives.
3 . Alternative Tactics for Alternative Strategies
As argued above, the Solomons campaign was viewed
as a secondary theater, with an "offensive-defensive"
strategic purpose. The forces assigned to the campaign were
a mix designed to conserve more valuable naval assets and
represented, in a sense, a "low cost" alternative in the
use of naval forces. The use of today's new Surface Combat-
ant Task Groups (SCTGs) and Surface Action Groups (SAGs)
for deployment in Third World areas is a concept akin to
the strategy followed in the Solomons.
As the preceding pages have indicated, the formal
tactics of the day did not make allowance for the task groups
forced together for the Solomons and it may be inferred
that the need to deploy naval forces for unique strategic
41 ...See Sound Military Decision published by the War
College in several editions prior to and even after the war
This short text outlined planning for naval operations
along specific lines that emphasized a rational approach to
the integration of force and mission. Its influence is ob-
vious in the game records as well as the actual War Plans
of the era.
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purposes implies the need for alternate operational concepts
and tactics. Modification of existing tactics proved
unsuccessful in the Solomons and new tactics had to be
developed. Current plans for new strategic uses of American
naval forces must include the refinement of alternate
tactics, particularly those for our new generation of surface
forces
.
D. THE NEED FOR GOOD INTELLIGENCE
The surface combatant task forces of the Solomons campaign
required specific intelligence for the successful completion
of their mission. The modern surface task groups face the
2
same limitations in C facilities as their counterparts of
World War II. Technology makes this appear less of a prob-
lem today, but considering the state of the art in communica-
tion equipment, many of today's surface combatants lack
onboard intelligence terminals in the same relative proportions
as those of early World War II. The development of new
intelligence systems for today's surface combatant force must
acknowledge the unique requirements of such modern weapons
as land attack cruise missile and long range anti ship
missiles
.
The failure of American intelligence to predict the
technical aspects of Japanese tactics and weapons is a
lesson that remains valid today. No substitute for area
experts can be found in the evaluation of potential enemy
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systems and the concepts for their employment. The American
Navy had much in common with the Japanese Navy at the onset
of the war yet the average American commander was literally
tricked by Japanese weapons and tactics. The American Navy
of today has no shortage of potential enemies; its efforts
at understanding likely foes and educating American naval
officers as to the capabilities they may face in battle
should be geared to avoid the mistakes of 1942.
E. THE ROLE OF GAMING IN STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ANALYSIS
The reliance of the American Navy on war gaming as a tool
for training and conceptualization of operations remains as
strong today as it was in the 1930s. The failures of gaming
in relation to the Solomons campaign were of both a tacti-
cal and strategic nature. In regards to the former, gaming
did not lead to any tactics which would have made the American
surface forces any more effective in the performance of
their mission. As to the latter, the prewar games focused
on campaigns of a different scale; the Solomons was a hold-
ing action strategically but the Newport games were always
played with strategies meant to bring about a decisive battle
that would win the war.
Four reasons can be seen for games to fail as valid
indications of how a conflict might go:
1. Inadequate modeling of reality - All games assume
models which must have validity in their basic
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structure. Any of these models is an "abstraction"
of reality and "invalid" in some sense [Ref. 61:
p. 1] . This inherent limitation must be accepted
but, insofar as possible, it is necessary to see
that the models utilized in any simulation of con-
flict have all of the essential elements embedded
in them. If the reader believes, as he should,
that getting all essential elements built in for
all strategic and tactical variations is hard to
do, then he is attuned to the limits of war gaming.
Poor intelligence- The accurate modeling of a hypo-
thetical conflict with a real or potential enemy
must include accurate information on the enemy.
This will involve the knowledge of more than tech-
nical data; understanding an adversary's tactics,
motivations, and concepts of battle are essential
in wargaming. It is similarly important to have
a reasonable grasp of what enemy national goals
are and what the enemy considers the motivation
for war and its resolution. Since intelligence
is imperfect, the need for tactical adjustments
as against the "Long Lance" torpedo, will always
arise. Soviet military planning is especially
vulnerable to potential exploitation because it
is so coherent and structured. But without good
intelligence and assimilation of that intelligence
when we "play Red" we will forego an opportunity
to exploit Soviet proclivity toward orderliness
and doctrinal conformity.
Certain strategies become fixations - As games are
played repeatedly, certain strategies are naturally
found to be more successful and players tend to
repeat these strategies. In time the same patterns
emerge from games, creating something of a false
sense of security- of "the way things will be."
For obvious reasons, players in games tend to
ignore the moves that do not work and concentrate
on those that win the game for them. Missing from
such a pattern is the confrontation with the un-
expected and the disaster that may follow in an
actual conflict.
Good models must emulate the pace of battle -
Commanders in the Solomons were forced to make
critical decisions under severe time constraints.
The indecision of ten displayed by American commanders
suggests that they were not prepared to do this. The
games did little to sharpen a player's skill at rapid
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tactical decision making: information and the chance
to react to it were spaced in three minute increments
where the player had the opportunity to sift data
and ponder his reaction. Mechanical games such as
those played at Newport are further slowed by player/
umpire interaction, a problem somewhat alleviated
in today's computer monitored games. Nonetheless,
simulating the tempo of modern naval warfare remains
difficult in view of current weapons and increasingly
complex fleet operations. Time, information, and
mission still challenge efforts to predicting the
pressures commanders will face in naval combat.
In relation to the Solomons campaign, the United States
Navy was guilty of all four shortcomings in the prewar
games. However, the most costly error made by the gaming
effort in relation to the Solomons was the mistaking of
games for analysis on the tactical level. The experience of
World War II indicates that war gaming is a most appropriate
vehicle for the proposal and deliberation of strategy.
Today's efforts at war gaming must make sharp distinction
between tactical exercises and strategic gaming. The
development of tactics requires a more specific and detailed
treatment of weapons systems capabilities, realistic simula-
tion of command and control problems, and a flexible means
of varying the parameters which characterize the perform-
ance of forces in combat. Most importantly, tactical anal-
ysis must highlight problems discovered in the analysis in
such a manner that they can be studied in greater detail.
Games generate hypotheses, not empirically substantiated
facts. While the war games played by the American Navy prior
to World War II hinted at tactical problems, alternative
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hypotheses were rarely tried and apparently not desired.
The games were a poor source of analysis made even poorer
by a failure to seek alternate solutions for the problems
discovered and a sense among the American naval hierarchy
that the results of the games were adequate for the purpose
of tactical evaluation. Missing from the study of game
results was the realization that the analysis of the out-
comes is the beginning of wisdom, not the end product.
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APPENDIX A
ANALYSIS OF BATTLES CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY
A. OUTLINE OF ANALYSIS
As pointed out in Chapter I, the naval engagements of
the Solomons were violent, close range encounters of small
groups of ships at night. These clashes, marked by confus-
ion and rapid action, were unique to the major fleet en-
counters of the war. The Japanese had prepared themselves
for night torpedo battles at close range prior to the war,
while the American tactical doctrine was based on long
range gunnery. In order to illustrate and assess the dif-
ferences in both Japanese and American tactics in the
Solomons, eleven separate engagements have been selected
for analysis. These engagements are representative of the
naval actions of the Solomons campaign and span the length
of the campaign from August 1942 to November 1943. They
are:
1. The Battle of Savo Island- August 9, 1942, near
Guadalcanal
.
2. The Battle of Cape Esperance- October 12, 1942, off
Cape Esperance, northwestern tip of Guadalcanal.
3. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal- November 12-15,
1942, vicinity of Savo and Guadalcanal.
4. The Battle of Tassafaronga- November 30, 1942, off
the northern coast of Guadalcanal.
5. The Battle of Kula Gulf- July 5, 1943, off the north-
eastern coast of Kolombagara.
6. The Battle of Kolombagara- July 12, 1943, off the
northeastern coast of Kolombagara.
7. The Battle of Vella Gulf- August 6, 1943, between
Vella Lavella and Kolombagara.
8. The Destroyer Action off Horaniu- August 18, 1943,
off the northwest coast of Kolombagara.
9. The Battle of Vella Lavella- October 6, 1943, off
the northwestern coast of Vella Lavella.
10. The Battle of Empress August Bay- November 2, 1943,
at Empress Augusta Bay, off the western coast of
Bougainville
.
11. The Battle of Cape St. George- November 25, 1943,
off the northern tip of Bougainville.
The location of these battles is depicted in Figure A.l.
1 . Methodology
For automated analysis 130 separate data points
from each engagement were considered to be of significance
and required coding. Each of the engagements was chrono-
logically broken down into the significant events of the
engagement and these were individually coded. The elements
considered necessary for analysis included the number of
ships involved, the date of the engagement, the time during












































of damage inflicted and a count of the key events undertaken
by either side during the encounter. These actions were
considered of three types: a maneuver action, a damage
inflicting action, or an intelligence event.
In coding the data from each battle, the "zero" time
was when the commander of one task group had sufficient
information on his opponent to begin action for joining
battle. This presumes the first step in the fire control
solution, or tactical contact on the enemy with shipboard
sensors. This is a vital distinction since external sources
of information (such as aircraft or "coastwatcher" reports)
were in effect strategic warning but cannot mark the battles 1
start for the purposes of time-related analysis. The receipt
of such information is recorded in the overall summary of
key events for each side, however. The end of the engage-
ment was considered to be when one or the other force with-
drew and was not pursued.
For each battle, a brief narrative is given describing
the key aspects of the battle. The actual data summarizing
the specific details of each battle is given on a table
following this narrative. This table also includes results
of the engagement that might have been expected by American
commanders based on the contemporary standard for battle
simulation, the war game from the Naval War College. Since
timing was so critical to the battles fought during the
Solomons campaign, a time plot is also included which
191
displays and describes the key events for each battle as
defined above.
For the purposes of this analysis, the Battle of
Savo, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and the Battle of Kula
Gulf are divided into two phases. This division allows a
more refined analysis of the critical factors discussed in
the text.
2 . Sources
In preparing the coding of battle data and the follow-
ing commentary on each engagement, the primary source con-
sulted was Samuel Eliot Morison's history of the United
States Navy during World War II. A second source extensively
drawn on was Charles H. Dull ' s The Imperial Japanese Navy .
Other works consulted as a cross check on these sources or
to fill gaps in detail are listed in the bibliography or as
references. In several instances, battle reports from
official Pacific Fleet files were consulted to resolve
differences.
During the course of the past forty years, a variety
of sources have been made available publicly concerning the
war in the Pacific. There is an understandable tendency
for these sources to contradict each other, particularly
those later ones which reveal information that may have been
classified when earlier accounts were prepared. This is a
particular problem with Morison, who wrote immediately after
192
the end of the war. For this reason, other sources, partic-
ularly Dull, have been relied on when in conflict with
Morison. Despite the flaws in Morison's work, it remains
the most extensive overview of the Solomons campaign and
is notable for its attributes beyond simple facts. Morison
spent several months in the Solomons, witnessed several
battles from the bridges of the ships involved, and had a
remarkable ability to piece fact into the larger strategic
scheme. Official reports are valuable sources for specific
details on individual units, but they must be considered
with other evidence since initial damage estimates were
notoriously bad and almost always overestimated. Commanding
officer narratives also have gaps understandable considering
the pace of the battles of the Solomons.
B. COMMENTARY ON ENGAGEMENTS ANALYZED
1. The Battle of Savo - August 9, 1942
The volumes written on this first naval engagement
of the Solomons campaign underscore the shock this first
American defeat caused. This opening of the campaign was
a harbinger of the next fifteen months: four Allied of
five Allied cruisers sunk, the fifth out of action, with
only one Japanese ship receiving any damage. In a five
year war with no shortage of bad days, Admiral King con-
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Placing Savo into the larger context of the entire
campaign, the battle was unique and not representative of
the actions that followed. In its differences lie some
of the reasons for the enormity of the Japanese tactical
success. At Savo, Admiral M. Mikawa ' s cruiser striking
force was completely on the offensive. Contrary to later
battles, the Japanese force had no mission other than the
destruction of the opposing force's ships. In later en-
counters this would not be the case: the Japanese would
be seeking to protect their own forces attempting to land
or trying to conduct raids on American forces ashore.
Similarly, the Americans would never be as unprepared again
as they were at Savo. Admiral Turner, the American com-
mander on the scene, believed that Mikawa' s approaching
force was a seaplane tender contingent that would be
sending an air attack his way in the morning. This mis-
belief was fed by poor intelligence and a mindset that
expected similar tactics. The Americans did not foresee
a night cruiser attack and paid dearly for their
narrowmindedness
.
American assumptions on August 9 seem reasonable
and the preparations made in response do not seem negligent.
In fact the American cruiser force was stationed where it
should have been to accomplish its mission of protecting
the landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi. By his own admission,
196
Mikawa was forced to abandon his primary objective of attack-
ing the transports. Had he not, he would have still found
a formidable force awaiting him off the beachhead. More
importantly, he faced the same limitations that would dog
Japanese naval efforts throughout the Solomons campaign:
time was critical and lingering too long in the battle area
meant the risk of air attack during the morning hours.
The battle must be considered atypical of the
engagements of the campaign. Never again would the Americans
be so naive nor would the Japanese have such freedom for
offensive action. Although this uniqueness does not mitigate
the tactical disaster suffered by the American forces, the
battle's outcome had no impact on the strategy of the
campaign; Turner was withdrawing his amphibious task group
with the first landing of the war a success. The precedent
for the rest of the naval campaign had been set by Mikawa
who realized that the Japanese Eighth Fleet would be forced
to operate in a narrow window of time due to the threat of
American air power and a long logistics chain back to
support bases.
2. The Battle of Cape Esperance - October 12, 1942
The clash of American Task Force 64 with Japanese
elements attempting to reinforce Guadalcanal off Cape
Esperance in October was the first of what could be called
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by the Japanese running of the "Tokyo Express" in what was
to become a standard motif: a bombardment group and re-
inforcement group would jointly attempt to sneak past
American forces guarding the waters around Guadalcanal and
both land reinforcement troops and carry out gunfire attacks
on American troops ashore. As would normally be the case,
the American forces were alerted and Rear Admiral Norman
Scott had positioned his eight ship (four cruisers, four
destroyers) group in an optimal position for interception
of the Japanese.
Although victory can be claimed by the American
forces in this battle, the conduct of the battle was clumsy.
While radar gave American forces early detection, a delay
in reporting the contact whittled the advantage away; it
took over twenty minutes for the report to get forwarded
2
to the admiral. A further complication in the C area was
the reversal of the column undertaken just as the closing
Japanese force was detected. While this maneuver was in
progress, the American van destroyers became disoriented,
separated from the cruiser main body, intermingled with the
rapidly closing Japanese force, and finally initiated an
independent battle with the surrounding Japanese. In the
confusion, the American destroyers found themselves targets
of both sides and American advantages in radar and voice
radar failed to provide any evident pay off. The battle
200
was finally fought out at a range of under two miles even
though aircraft and radar had tracked the Japanese for over
an hour.
Despite the shortcomings in American performance at
Cape Esperance, several aspects of the battle were note-
worthy achievements for the American side. Scott's plan
for intercepting the Japanese was reasonably sound, leaving
his force in the correct position to thwart Japanese inten-
tions, which he did. American gunnery, particularly rapid
fire six inch batteries was shown to be a highly effective
weapon when utilized at close range. The Japanese, caught
unaware and unable to launch their torpedoes, were faced
with a gun battle with the Americans. Although the range
was far shorter than prewar doctrine had specified, the
battle seemed to vindicate the American reliance on the gun.
The bombardment group engaged was equal to the Americans in
heavy gunpower but was forced to withdraw.
Regrettably, American success in this battle (one
Japanese cruiser and one destroyer sunk, one Japanese
cruiser damaged) seems to have blinded the Americans to
their tactical deficiencies. The column formation and the
resulting confusion it caused in maneuvering was not changed
for some time. Radar information would be mishandled again,
and the use of a single voice radio circuit for both infor-
mation and tactical orders would continue. Above all, the
notion of "battle line" style engagements would continue, and
201
the American destroyers would not be allowed to independently
maneuver to deliver torpedo attacks until the following year.
3 . The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
In the appended computer analysis the Naval Battle
of Guadalcanal is considered as two separate engagements, a
cruiser action of November 13 and a battleship action on
the night of 14-15 November. This two engagement battle
occurred at a critical juncture in the campaign. The Japan-
ese had determined to retake Guadalcanal in November and
committed the Combined Fleet to the support of this effort.
The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in late October resulted
in the Combined Fleet's effort being stalled, and the Naval
Battle of Guadalcanal put a halt to their efforts to mount
an offensive at Guadalcanal with surface combatant support
alone.
a. The Cruiser Action- November 13, 1942
The clash between Rear Admiral Callaghan's six
cruiser, eight destroyer force and Vice Admiral Abe's raid-
ing group of two battleships, a cruiser and six destroyers
was among the most violent of the Solomon's clashes. A
simple expression of victory in this engagement is elusive.
The American loss of two cruisers, one destroyer, and both
American admirals in the task group seems more serious than
the Japanese loss of one destroyer and the damage caused to
one battleship. Nonetheless, the outgunned Americans
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ashore and set the stage for an air attack on his forces the
next day that cost the Japanese the damaged battleship,
another destroyer, and severe damage to other units operating
in the Solomons north of Guadalcanal.
Analysis of this engagement must point out the
mistakes repeated by the Americans. As at Cape Esperance,
radar contact with the Japanese was established well in
advance, yet confused reporting and Callaghan's attempt to
maneuver his unwieldy thirteen ship column wasted 26 minutes.
By the time both sides opened fire, both formations were
intermingled and the firefight that ensued was a melee.
Hesitancy had cost Callaghan his life and three of his ships,
yet the delay was less a procrastination than a frantic
effort to maneuver his formation into a position for optimal
gunfire. The attempt to "cross the T" of the advancing
Japanese resulted in the American formation literally
cutting through the Japanese formation.
The battle lasted a little more than half an
hour with the actual firing taking ten minutes. American
and Japanese were both fast with torpedoes, but the Japanese
gained the sole benefit from the use of torpedoes. Unlike
Cape Esperance, the Japanese held a distinct advantage in
the firepower of heavier guns, although the final tally
reflects the tactics of each navy: the damage inflicted
by the American forces was from gunfire while the more
serious Japanese damage resulted from torpedoes.
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b. The Battleship Action- November 14-15, 1942
The clash of Rear Admiral Willis Lee's two battle-
ship forces with Vice Admiral Hondo's bombardment force of a
single battleship and two heavy cruisers would have been
notable for its uniqueness if nothing else. It represented
the only occasion during the Solomons campaign that forces
approaching the prewar conception of the battle line were
matched against each other. Beyond this singularity, the
second phase of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal is note-
worthy for what it showed about the tactics of each side.
Rondo's group, labelled an "emergency" bombardment group,
was assigned the task Abe had failed at during the first
phase of the battle, the bombardment of Henderson Field.
Lee's force had been assigned as escort to the Enterprise
task group, but in an aggressive use of surface combatants,
it had broken off to station itself off the northern coast
of Guadalcanal. Like Callaghan and Scott, Lee had kept his
ships in a single column, destroyers in the van. However,
unlike the other American admirals, Lee had issued instruc-
tions authorizing more freedom of action for commanders
once contact had been made. If Lee sought to simplify his
2
C during the coming engagement, Kondo had complicated his
with a deployment designed to confuse the Americans. Kondo
had split his task group into four elements to patrol
around Savo Island and screen the main body against the
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group, two scouting destroyers, a cruiser-destroyer screen,
and the main body) was to sweep past Savo and shell American
positions as Japanese reinforcements were landed by another
group.
The engagement started well for Kondo because of
this division. Despite American radar, the Japanese picket
force spotted the American force first and when the American
radar detected both the picket group and the cruiser screen,
there was understandable confusion. The arrival of the
Japanese scout destroyers added to the confused American
tactical picture, but Lee's liberal attitude towards opening
fire allowed the American destroyers to select their own
targets and the American van and rear simultaneously engaged
the Japanese scout force and cruiser screen. Lee's battle-
ships held fire until Kondo ' s main body presented a good
target for American gunners. The ensuing exchange saw the
Japanese battleship, the Kirishima , sunk and the heavy
cruisers accompanying it damaged. The Americans lost two
destroyers and experienced a modest amount of damage to one
of their battleships, the South Dakota .
This lone battleship encounter was very much an
American style duel. Gunfire was opened at long range at
the correct target, the Japanese main body. The escorting
destroyers opened fire with guns and torpedoes independently
and their forcing of the battle helped draw the Japanese
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main body into the range of the American battleships. Radar
found its place in the American Navy's long range gunfire
model. Although it did not provide the edge in detection
in this battle, the radar controlled gunfire of the American
battleships vindicated the game floor: it took only seven
minutes of concentrated fire to disrupt the Japanese main
body and end Rondo's mission. Moreover, Lee's approach to
battle management stood in contrast to those employed
previously. He refused to overmanage his assets, and the
independence of his "commanding officers countered the confus-
ing picture the Japanese had presented.
4 . The Battle of Tassafaronga- November 30, 1942
After the relative success of the final stage of
the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Tassafaronga
represents a disappointing showing for the American surface
forces attempting to interdict Japanese resupply and rein-
forcement efforts at Guadalcanal. In this engagement,
Rear Admiral Wright's Task Force 67 held a clear advantage
over Rear Admiral Tanaka ' s Destroyer Squadron 2, yet the
battle saw one American cruiser sunk and two put out of
action at the cost of a single Japanese destoyer and the
accomplishment of the mission of landing troops and supplies
In this brief encounter the American forces had been osten-
sibly well prepared and alert. Wright's plans reflected
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encounters with the Japanese. Aircraft were on patrol to
provide advance warning and illuminate the Japanese for
American gunners. Radar contact was made early and Wright
made an initial move to close the Japanese who were already
close to the beach and should have made an easy target. Per-
haps the most critical shortcoming of the American prosecu-
tion of the battle was the refusal to open fire in a timely
manner. Wright delayed his first torpedo attack for five
minutes while he maneuvered closer and, although he managed
to open fire first with torpedoes, the Japanese skill at
torpedo tactics was a crucial advantage. While the Americans
scored no torpedo hits in their two attacks, the three Japan-
ese attacks all drew blood.
The failure of American forces to inflict damage pro-
portional to their relative strength was the result of several
factors in this engagement. While Wright opened fire aggres-
sively, he had maneuvered his force alternately from a line
of bearing to a column and back, finally presenting Tanaka
a beam aspect which enhanced the chance for Japanese torpedoes
to strike home. American gunfire quickly removed one Japan-
ese destroyer from the battle, yet the float planes sent to
illuminate the Japanese force failed to drop their flares
and the majority of the Japanese destroyers were able to
withdraw, firing more torpedoes as they retreated. Overall
American torpedo tactics were inferior- fired at extreme
range and at opening targets- yet the Americans failed to
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grasp the uniqueness of the Japanese ability to use this
weapon. This battle was conducted at a relatively long
range, about five miles, and this longer range should have
fit into the American style of fighting far better than it
did.
The results of Tassafaronga showed Japanese deter-
mination applied with well rehearsed tactics. Conversely,
the Americans were still attempting to capitalize on past
mistakes and improve on existing tactical conceptions.
Wright's maneuvering showed an appreciation of how difficult
the column was to manage in battle, yet he failed to unleash
his destroyers for independent attacks. Radar's potential
was still largely unexploited, with the new system considered
good for initial detection but not offering any discernible
edge when it came to weapon deployment. American destroyers
were eager to get into the battle, yet the belief that their
place was with the main body persisted at Tassafaronga. When
the struggle for the central Solomons would commence the
following summer, the destroyer would be promoted to a new
role in the night engagement, that of delivering lethal
torpedo strikes.
5. The Battle of Kula Gulf- July 5, 1943
The Battle of Kula Gulf, some nine months after the
last major engagement off Guadalcanal, reflects the same
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Solomons, the Japanese continued piecemeal efforts to resupply
their own forces at night. The Japanese task groups attempt-
ing this mission faced a dichotomous situation. While these
cruiser-destroyer forces were expected to protect themselves
from the prowling American cruiser-destroyer groups, they
were expected to simultaneously transport and debark troops
and supplies. American air superiority, now firmly entrenched
in several airfields in the Solomons, forced the Japanese to
continue these efforts at night. The need to support the
resupply efforts made the Japanese less aggressive and will-
ing to seek battle, a shift that put the United States forces
in the area clearly on the offensive. Nonetheless, the
Japanese skill at night fighting with surface combatants
remained.
During the Battle of Kula Gulf, considered by this
analysis in two phases, American Rear Admiral Ainsworth
encountered a seven destroyer force under Rear Admiral
Akiyama in the process of offloading troops and supplies on
Kolomabagra. Ainsworth 's force consisted of three light
cruisers and four destroyers, setting up something of a
representative clash: the new light cruisers, sporting the
rapid fire six inch guns with radar guidance, represented
American gunnery at its most advanced. Conversely, Akiyama'
s
force now had its own radar as well as the "Long Lance"
torpedo. As in the battles of the previous year, the
American radar detected the Japanese first, and Ainsworth
218
immediately turned his force into a line of bearing to
approach the Japanese force. The Japanese force was split,
attempting to complete landing operations and it started the
encounter in a column. The opening shots of the battle were '
from Americans with gunfire, the Japanese with torpedoes.
The Japanese took this first stage of the encounter in terms
of damage caused; one American cruiser was sunk by torpedo
fire while one Japanese destroyer succumbed to gunfire. At
this critical stage the difference in strategic application
became evident. The lead Japanese destroyers, the support
element of the force, withdrew while Ainsworth detected and
pursued the following units of Akiyama's force that had been
engaged in landing operations. The Japanese were short of
destroyers and cautious. The American force's mission was
to seek and engage the enemy and Ainsworth held an opening
advantage against the Japanese destroyer-transport force
struggling to rejoin. This phase of the battle saw American
doctrine as designed. Ainsworth' s destroyers launched a torpedo
attack while the remaining cruisers opened fire at 12,000
yards. Two of four Japanese destroyers were damaged by
gunfire, and, after three minutes of uneven action, all were
forced to retire in the opposite direction from the first
group.
Kula Gulf was a somewhat costly victory and of
questionable strategic significance. It stands in contrast
to the previous battles of the Solomons, however. The
219
American group was able to out maneuver and out shoot the
Japanese partly because of respective missions, but also
because of superior management of forces. As in later
battles, forces were engaged longer and weapons were employed
more liberally with the Americans showing an increasing
ability at decision maneuvering.
6 . The Battle of Kolombangara- July 12, 1943
At first glance the Battle of Kolombangara seems a
replay of Kula Gulf. Once again Ainsworth's cruiser-
destroyer force attempted to hinder a Japanese resupply
effort by a similar force under the command of Rear Admiral
Izaki as it rounded the northern tip of Kolombangara. This
battle, although in raw results is very similar to the one
of the previous week, was not as well conducted by the
American forces. An early factor that went against the
Americans was detection. The Japanese had developed a sys-
tem to intercept American radar and tracked the Americans
passively for two hours before Ainsworth's force gained
contact. Although Ainsworth's planning depended on surprise,
he had lost it and the Japanese were aware of what was
waiting for them. Independent torpedo attacks by the
American van and rear destroyers inflicted an early hit on
the Japanese flagship which was supplemented by gunfire
damage. A countering strike by the Japanese put one
American cruiser out of the battle, and, as the Japanese
force reversed course, Ainsworth faced a crucial decision.
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He had dispatched part of his destroyer force to chase the
retiring Japanese and was experiencing communications
difficulties. After maintaining his position for almost
twenty minutes, he was presented with a confusing picture
of the battle and a report from an air spotter that told him
he had damaged four Japanese ships. Apparently Ainsworth
believed this overly optimistic report and he turned to follow
the Japanese as well.
However understandable the American admiral's enthu-
siasm may have been, his aggressiveness cost him the battle
from that point on. The Japanese destroyers had rearmed
their torpedo tubes, reversed course towards Ainsworth'
s
force and were able to conduct another torpedo attack which
knocked out his remaining two cruisers and sunk one destroyer.
The potential- of Japanese night torpedo attacks was still
largely underestimated by American commanders.
Several peculiarities of this engagement are worth
noting. First, American destroyers had finally found their
place in the offensive task group mission. In the follow-
ing battles the "tin cans" would gradually supplant the
cruiser as the principal American attack unit. Secondly,
despite a growing awareness of the torpedo's potential, the
Americans had yet to realize how good the Japanese actually
were with this weapon. Part of this is due to the confusion
of battle and the misunderstanding of what ranges the Japan-
ese were firing at and what hits on American ships were
223
solely the result of the "Long Lance." Some of this failure
must be attributable to simple disbelief in the Japanese
ability to have and use such a weapon. Finally, American
damage control had become a significant resource conserver.
The engagements of the previous year had shown the torpedo
to normally sink a ship it had hit; this was not the case
at Kolombangara. Perhaps the newer American cruisers were
of heartier construction or their crews had become more
proficient at damage control but in any event, the Japanese
could no longer exact such damage with their principal
weapon.
7. The Battle of Vella Gulf- August 6, 1943
The discussion of the previous battles revealed an
increasingly offensive role for American destroyers and
with- the battle of Vella Gulf, the American destroyer took
the final step from escort to principal fighting unit. Task
Group 31.2, composed of six American destroyers in two
divisions, was under the command of Commander Frederick
Moosbrugger, a destroyerman who had supreme confidence in
the American destroyer's ability to best the Japanese with
torpedo tactics. Moosbrugger ' s faith ran contrary to the
conventional wisdom of long range gunnery but he had drilled
his units in night torpedo attacks using radar and felt that
he could combine the advantage radar offered into a well
coordinated stealthy attack. Moosbrugger planned to employ
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had done in. their torpedo tactics, but with a coordinated
flanking movement by the divisions somewhat akin to a "pincer"
trap. Moosbrugger rounded out his planning by conferring
with each of his subordinate skippers before departure from
Tulagi.
Moosbrugger ' s scheme to beat the Japanese at their
own torpedo game was an excellent combination of American
tactical advantages applied to a new scheme. Radar was an
advantage that American commanders had been inconsistent
in exploiting; Moosbrugger saw the advantage it would lend
to coordinated torpedo attacks instead of gunfire. Addition-
ally, American airpower in the form of the "Black Cats"
Catalina squadron could give his destroyers a real time
intelligence capability superior to that of the Japanese.
Finally, Japanese operations had changed in such a way that
made Moosbrugger ' s plan more feasible. The four destroyer
Japanese formation that approached Moosbrugger the night of
the battle was unescorted by a cruiser, leaving the Japanese
destroyers on their own in their run to resupply troops
on Kolombangara.
The plan worked almost flawlessly. Japanese were
in a single column while the American force employed two
short columns of DDs in an open line of bearing. Moosbrugger '
s
first division fired its torpedoes before being spotted by
the enemy and the coordinated attack scored kills on the
first three Japanese destroyers. While the first American
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destroyer division hauled clear, the second maneuvered into
position, crossing the "T" of the disrupted Japanese column
and forcing the remaining Japanese destroyer to retire.
The Japanese, caught by surprise, managed to fire a single
torpedo salvo that was ineffective against the American
destroyers who had followed a safe course of launching
torpedoes and turning away at high speed.
Moosbrugger ' s victory stopped almost two thousand
Japanese troops from landing and cost the Japanese three
precious destroyers. More than these tallies, it showed
the killing power available to the American surface task
groups. American reconnaissance was superior, radar was
used to deliver a sudden attack, air cover provided timely
intelligence that allowed the commander on scene to maneuver
into the position his plan had called for. At this stage
in the campaign the Americans had widened their tactical
perspective beyond the gun and had seen that the torpedo
was far more devastating a weapon than prewar conceptions
had held.
8. The Destroyer Action off Horaniu- August 18, 1943
Although the tactical success of the Battle of Vella
Gulf was not repeated at this relatively minor skirmish
between four American destroyers under Captain T. J. Ryan
and a similar force under Rear Admiral Ijuin, the clash is
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illustrated. As American ground forces moved to secure
Vella Lavella, the Japanese realized that their forces would
have to be evacuated. While the Japanese were a notoriously
tenacious opponent, their grudging evacuation of each of the
Solomon Islands was a tacit admission that they lacked the
forces to both transport and protect reinforcements. The
"Tokyo Express" was a bankrupt ploy yet Admiral Ijuin's
meager force was assigned the task of supporting a small
defensive position the Japanese had established at the
northeastern tip of Vella Lavella. Simultaneously, American
forces were being ferried around the island to solidify the
American hold on the island. As Ijuin's force entered the
vicinity of Vella Lavella, it was spotted during the daytime
by American air patrols and Ryan's force was hastily sent
out to intercept.
Airpower played a significant part in this engagement
For a change, both sides were supported by their respective
air cover which attempted to influence the battle with in-
accurate night bombing attacks. Neither side's aircraft
actually scored a hit, but the bombing runs staged the battle
Ijuin's force was dispersed by the attack while the Japanese
aircraft were slow in getting into position to do the same
against Ryan. Updated by his air patrol, Ryan closed the
Japanese force to radar range. Perhaps the most critical
move of the battle was the Japanese decision to open fire
231
at long range with both guns and torpedoes. Ryan's alert
maneuvering evaded all Japanese torpedoes and American long
range destroyer gunnery was clearly superior to Japanese.
The Japanese fled after an engagement of only four
minutes of contact. Left behind was the transport force
being escorted, several units of which fell victim to Ryan's
force. The quick abandonment of the primary mission by
Ijuin evidences the serious shortage of destroyers the Japan-
ese Navy was confronted with at this stage of the war; the
escort force was more valuable in his eyes than the troops
assigned his protection. The situation precluded as detailed
American plan as Moosbrugger had formulated and Ryan's force
was forced to fight on those well established precepts of
long range gunnery. Such guidance was not ineffective: by
this stage American formations were skillful at high speed
night maneuvering in the face of the enemy torpedo threat
and, true to American tactical form, Ryan's force had out-
gunned the Japanese in what amounted to a long range gun
engagement. Also evident was the American ability to coor-
dinate air and radar information into a coherent tactical
picture which allowed quick decisions. Americans had become
adept at avoiding damage. The next step was to learn how
to deliver damage on a consistent basis.
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9. The Battle of Vella Lavella- October 6, 1943
The next major encounter of American and Japanese
destroyers would be something of a draw. Again Admiral
Ijuin found himself in support of a troop force, this time
part of the evacuation force from Vella Lavella. This time,
however, he had sufficient resources at his disposal, with
a separate transport force which was able to retire prior to
the battle's commencement. The Americans were operating in
two divisions under Captain Frank Walker. Again the Americans
held a slight advantage in radar detection range but Walker
did not have the air reconnaissance available to him as
Moosbrugger and Ryan had. Both task groups started out with
their elements separated, a deployment that worked to Japan-
ese advantage. At the battle's onset the American divisions
were separated by almost twenty miles and Walker chose to
engage both Japanese divisions with the single American
divison in contact. He had hoped to counter the 2-to-l odds
by aggressiveness and he fired the opening gun and torpedo
salvoes of the battle.
Both commanders maneuvered boldly towards the other
during the opening stages of the encounter. Ijuin 's dis-
persal of forces confused his tactical picture and the
American initiative in opening fire with torpedoes cost
Japanese one destroyer. Two Japanese torpedo attacks by
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sinking one. The Americans were further frustrated by a
collision between two destroyers that delayed the undamaged
1 Bannon just long enough to keep her out of the battle.
As in previous encounters, the Japanese did not press their
attack: when his air patrol reported the American second
destroyer division approaching, Ijuin quickly withdrew.
Vella Lavella could scarcely be termed an American
victory, but both American torpedoes and guns were well
employed and prevented what should have been a Japanese
rout. Most importantly, the Japanese were forced to employ
their weapons on American terms. Ijuin was unsuccessful at
maneuvering his ships into gunnery position, was hampered in
his follow on attack by long range American gunfire, and
finally forced to launch his final torpedoes in desperation
as he fled the scene. (Note: These final torpedoes were
not entered in the accompanying computer analysis as they
were scarcely a serious attempt.) Although the Japanese
may have a more valid claim to victory at Vella Lavella than
the Americans, the battle was an indication that the Japan-
ese were no longer the sole masters of night surface
engagements.
10 . The Battle of Empress August Bay- November 2, 1943
The Battle at Empress Augusta Bay was the final
clash of large cruiser-destroyer task groups in the Solomons.
In response to successful American landings on the western
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of their Eighth Fleet at Rabaul and sent the four cruiser,
six destroyer force southward to hit the American transports
at Empress Augusta Bay. Rear Admiral Omori's force presented
a fairly even match to American Admiral Merrill's Tas.k Force
39. Although the American force had two more ships, the
Japanese had the bigger guns and the advantage that their
"Long Lance" torpedoes had given them since the beginning
of the campaign. A significant factor was on scene air
cover, the Japanese from their cruiser float planes, the
Americans from the airfields they had carefully built as
they marched their way up the Solomons chain.
As in the skirmish off Horaniu, air power made the
first decisive moves in the engagement. Merrill's patrol
sighted the Japanese almost an hour before the formations
were within radar range of each other (by this time the
Japanese had developed their own radar) and this allowed
Merrill to slow and prevent his force's detection by the
Japanese air patrol. An initial bomb strike by the American
patrol plane slowed the Japanese formation by damaging one
of the Japanese heavy cruisers. While Merrill's air cover
had served him well, Omori's underestimation of the size of
Merrill's force and this false intelligence led the Japanese
admiral to head his group straight for what he believed was
a smaller American force. With the stage for the battle
thus set, Merrill's battle plan was put into effect upon
his first radar contact.
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Merrill had combined both his own and Moosbrugger '
s
experiences of the past several months into a scheme that
combined the advantages of both. Merrill intended to detach
his destroyers for an independent torpedo attack on the
enemy's flank while the rapid fire of his six inch cruiser
guns would occupy the Japanese from a stand off position.
The plan was a synergism of more traditional American gun
tactics and the destroyer tactics developed during the course
of the campaign. It allowed Merrill to separate his forces
into a disposition that complicated the Japanese torpedo
attack while still allowing the American destroyers the use
of their torpedo power. The entire concept centered on the
Americans' growing ability to utilize radar and voice radio
for rapid evaluation of the situation and control of the
battle. The plan was aggressive, relying on good intelli-
gence and the ability to manage forces in contact.
The plan left the Japanese confused and the Americans
in an excellent position at the start of the battle. The
Japanese opened fire early and at extreme range to illuminate
the American forces which were split into the destroyer
and cruiser attack groups. The two American destroyer forces
launched their torpedoes without achieving any hits but the
results were still to the Americans' advantage. As the Japan-
ese screen turned to fire its torpedoes, two destroyers
collided. Meanwhile Merrill had skillfully maneuvered his
cruiser column to maintain an optimal gun range of 3 miles
240
and within two minutes he had fatally damaged the Japanese
cruiser leading one of the two Japanese supporting columns.
Omori had no accurate picture of the battle's first six
minutes and he erratically maneuvered his two CA main
body in an attempt to locate Merrill's main body as it
turned to maintain open range. The Japanese maneuvering
resulted in another collision, this time between a cruiser
and a screening destroyer. Aided by air dropped flares,
Omori finally was able to open fire with his main body some
twenty minutes after the Americans had, and by this time
Merrill had opened to a range where the Japanese guns had
minimal effect.
In strategic context, the Battle of Empress Augusta
Bay was a repeat of Savo, the first of the Solomons naval
engagements. The differences highlight how the tactics of
the antagonists had changed in the fourteen intervening
months. The American force was again on the defensive, but
at Empress Augusta Bay it had the intelligence necessary to
support a plan that took the battle to the intruding enemy.
Direct air support was critical to this battle yet it was an
advantage possessed solely by the Japanese at Savo. Geo-
graphy was a key difference in the two battles, with
Empress Augusta Bay fought in open waters where navigation
was not a hinderance. This was again a reflection of how
confident the American commanders were as to their ability
to intercept the Japanese; Merrill's forward defense of the
241
transport area allowed him to fight in a most advantageous
spot. For their part, the Japanese realized that they
needed to commit their combatants to an offensive role in
place of the escort mission they had .been assigned more
recently. Their plan remained centered on an undetected
approach to optimal torpedo range and a sudden massive
torpedo strike. The splitting of the American forces
frustrated this plan, forcing Omori into action where he
lost four ships due to confusion among his captains alone.
The Americans achieved their success through superior
2tracking of the enemy, C that supported the original plan,
and the ability to combine these elements and force the
battle on their terms. The clash graphically showed the
evolution of American tactics since the commencement of the
campaign while Japanese tactics had not adapted to this
shift.
11. The Battle of Capt St. George- November 25, 1943
The final naval clash of the Solomons off Cape St.
George was described as a "classic" by the Naval War College
in its review, and seems in retrospect to be a fitting end
to the naval campaign for the Solomons. The action pitted
an even match of five destroyers for each side. Captain
Arleigh Burke was ordered to intercept a "Tokyo Express"
run to Buka under Captain Kagawa. Burke, who first devised
the concept of splitting destroyer forces into independently














































z = £ < = £3 z £ 2 z £































































































































































































































hr UI ro ")






















































































































































o o o «
O < J Q
a> O O o
in
z
O v> (/> (rt
z z z z
— 3 3 3







z z I *->
<J o o









Vella Gulf. The offensive nature of Burke's mission contrasts
with Kagawa's. Three of the latter' s destroyers were laden
with troops and not there to fight. Burke, on the other
hand, had a primary mission of taking on his opponent free
of any other tasking. The difference in mission would
dictate the course and outcome of the battle.
Assisting Burke were a squadron of torpedo boats
("PTs") which made first contact with the enemy. The
combined use of the two forces paid off as the first con-
tact with the Japanese came from the PTs and their informa-
tion vectored Burke's two divisions towards the enemy.
Early radar contact allowed the first American division to
get in the first blow with torpedoes, an attack which
eliminated the two destroyers of the Japanese screening
element. After this first attack, Burke's second division
gained radar contact on the Japanese transport destroyers,
astern of their now engaged screen. As the first Japanese
destroyers were hit, these three destroyers immediately
fired their torpedoes and attempted to withdraw. Both of
Burke's divisions pursued at high speed and sunk one by
gunfire.
The details of this engagement are in stark contrast
to those of the earlier battles in the Solomons. The
American forces possessed the advantage of surprise and
complemented it with an aggressive' prosecution of the
battle. American command and control was perfect and
245
American torpedo performance had again beaten the Japanese
with what had formerly been their forte.
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY OF GAMES AND FLEET EXERCISES CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY
For the consideration of American Naval interwar wargames
and at-sea exercises, the games and "Fleet Problems" of the
period were surveyed to select those games and exercises that
were typical and those that would have provided lessons most
applicable to the Solomons campaign as it developed. A
variety of sources were utilized in this survey, the most
significant being:
1. The Files at the Naval War College Archives . Records
at the Naval War College are the most complete avail-
able in regards to the games played between the world
wars, and this material contains basic game scenarios,
staff solutions, rules for play, and assorted critiques
from the games actually played. The majority of the




National Archives Microfilm Records from the Inter-
war Fleet Problems . The most extensive collection of
records from the exercises conducted by the American
fleet during the 1920s and 1930s is reproduced as
Nars Microfilm Publication M494 which includes a
summary of annual exercises and their scenarios




3. The Navy Archives in Washington , D.C. The official
archives contain a variety of materials pertaining
to both the games and exercises from the interwar
period. The actual game and exercise records at
the Navy Yard do not comprise as complete a file
as the two previous sources. However, the Navy
archives contain valuable communications from fleet
commanders, the General Board, the CNO, and other
naval commands pertaining to the lessons learned
both during the at-sea exercises and on the game
floor at Newport.
4. "The Blue Sword," by Michael Vlahos . This book
reviews the role of Naval War College in the prep-
aration of American naval leaders for the war in
the Pacific. Vlahos has done a thorough survey of
the games and he offers several observations
concerning the games' impact on the Navy's planning
for World War II.
A. THE INTERWAR GAMES
The United States Navy's war games of the twenties and
thirties have been popularly acknowledged for their role in
planning the World War II Pacific campaigns. Throughout the
interwar period, a total of 316 major games were played at
the Naval War College with some 212 of them devoted to
likely Pacific campaigns. Table I provides an overview of
of these games as relating to this study.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF INTERWAR GAMES
TOTAL GAMES PLAYED 316
TOTAL GAMES PLAYED IN PACIFIC 212
GAMES WITH GEOGRAPHIC EMPHASIS
CENTRAL PACIFIC/CAROLINES 4 3
PHILIPPINES 11
NORTHERN PACIFIC 6
GAMES WITH SPECIFIC TACTICAL THRUST
BATTLE LINE ENGAGEMENTS 6
CRUISER-DESTROYER ACTIONS 2 9-
LOGISTIC/CONVOY OPERATIONS 54
Table I does not provide an all inclusive summary of the
games played at Newport but only specifies those games which
had a clear focus on the categories noted in the table.
These more specialized cases were games devoted to the
single purpose specified as opposed to games with several
tactical or strategic thrusts. For example, the Pacific
games not accounted for in one of the geographic areas speci-
fied would have dealt with a more general scenario featuring
play in specific theatres only as part of a larger campaign.
The singling out of those areas and tactics for certain games
emphasizes the situations most focused on at Newport. Battle
line and logistic games were obviously important while
cruiser-destroyer actions were less frequently the subject
of specific games. The Central Pacific drive of the war
was the most frequently played of the Pacific scenarios
249
while actions around the Philippines and in the Northern
Pacific were considered less often.
The games at the War College were divided into several
categories based on the type of play utilized. Most were
divided into the classifications of either "strategic" or
"tactical." The former assigned college students the
organization of a campaign-level problem and was "played"
via a written exercise which required students to complete
an "estimate of the situation" and recommended courses of
action. The planning model for this exercise, found in
Sound Military Decision (S.MD)
, required students to estab-
lish campaign goals and general plans for their attainment.
Tactical games were centered on simulated engagements between
gameboard fleets utilizing the rules described in Chapter IV.
"Operational" games were the major gaming events of the
War College, with up to five held per year. These large
scale games were a combination of the strategic and tactical
games and involved the planning and simulated conduct of a
theatre campaign.
Regrettably, few actual records of game play remain
in the War College archives, so it is impossible to study
the actual lessons learned by War College students in many
cases. The complete games and the "textbook" solutions from
the college staff are still on file and they form the basis
for the conclusions reached in Chapter IV.
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B. THE INTERWAR FLEET EXERCISES
Regular fleet exercises were carried out by the United
States Navy from 1923 through 1940. These large scale exer-
cises, known as "fleet problems" were usually held annually
in the spring. As in the games of the period, each exercise
focused on specific strategic and tactical objectives which
were reflective of the Navy's concerns about potential
enemies. In reviewing these exercises, several seem partic-
ularly applicable to the problems encountered in the Solomons
The scenarios of all twenty one fleet problems were examined
for similarity to the strategic and tactical characteristics
of the Solomons campaign. Of these, eight were considered
to be of particular value and were most heavily relied upon
in arriving at the conclusions made in Chapter IV. These
exercises are briefly summarized below:
1. Fleet Problem I- February 1923
A) Objectives : To exercise high level commanders at
making estimates of enemy actions and issuing
war plans; to exercise the fleet in large scale
maneuvers; to evaluate existing war plans and
tactical doctrine.
B) Summary : This first attempt to exercise the post
war fleet produced few actual results save the
impression it made on the Navy's leadership. The
post war decline had reached an ebb and the exer-
cise was seen as part of an attempt to revitalize
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the service. This exercise's scenario was based
on a Blue versus Black (Germany) conflict around
the Panama Canal. This convenient scenario would
be played many times during the twenties and
thirties as it allowed the "new" American Navy
the opportunity to develop operational concepts
for land and sea based naval air power and fleet
mobile logistics.
2. Fleet Problem IV- January 1924
A) Objectives : To simulate the projection of American
naval power into the western Pacific in an attempt
to establish bases within 500 nm of the Japanese
mainland.
B) Summary : This exercise was one of three separate
exercises held during the same timeframe, each
dealing with some phase of a war in the far east.
(Other phases dealt with the transit westward.)
Integrated into the operation was the Fleet Marine
Force and logistic elements. Tactically, the
exercise featured the use of submarines in support
of the fleet and the USS Langley participated in
one of the earliest attempts at projection of
sea based "TACAIR." Many of the concepts attempted
during this exercise would become routine in the
Solomons.
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3. Fleet Problem VII- March 1927
A) Objectives : To exercise the fleet in a variety
of wartime operations; to practice scouting,
search and attack tactics against convoys under
heavy escort.
B) Summary : The tactical emphasis of this exercise
was on several factors that would be critical in
the Solomons, particularly the protection of own
logistic forces and the attack of an enemy's.
This exercise was the first where commanders made
official note of the light cruiser's ability to
coordinate surface attacks. Although the opponent
in this exercise was again Black. The exercise
featured several violent Solomons-like night
actions with extensive torpedo attacks.
4. Fleet Problem VIII- April 1928
A) Objectives : To exercise the fleet in both offen-
sive and defensive operations over extended
distances.
B) Summary : This exercise was probably the best
rehearsal of the Pacific strategy to date, although
the scenario was similar to that of other exercises,
the scope of this exercise was far more ambitious
than previous fleet problems. In extending the
operations area from San Francisco to Hawaii,
logistics was a real concern and underway
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replenishment was extensively utilized on a large
scale. For the first time during the exercises,
the principal opponent was orange (Japan) . Per-
haps foreshadowing the Solomons, the orange fleet
made extensive use of light cruisers in its attacks
on the Blue fleet.
5. Fleet Problem X- March 1930
A) Objectives : To practice a scenario where the
opposing force was of equal strength; to concen-
trate on the use of light forces and naval air
forces in search operations; to investigate the
strategic situations which might face American
forces in the Caribbean.
B) Summary : Although the setting for this exercise
was in the Caribbean, several aspects of the
exercise pertain directly to operations as carried
out in the Solomons campaign. The use of land
based air power in support of surface forces was
practiced at length during this exercise, and
the scenario featured forces evenly matched much
as American and Japanese forces would be in the
Solomons
.
6. Fleet Problem XVI- May 1935
A) Objectives : To simulate the various elements of
a major strategic offensive, including the capture
and defense of an advance base.
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B) Summary : The exercise area for this problem en-
compassed the Northern Pacific from Alaska to
Hawaii to the west coast of the United States.
The scenario developed for this exercise was
designed to make use of this wide area in test-
ing strategies for a full scale Pacific war. In
addition to the usual fleet operations, the Fleet
Marine Force and army troops participated in the
power projection phases.
7. Fleet Problem XVII- April/May 1936
A) Objectives : To exercise the fleet in a wide range
of operations including submarine and anti sub-
marine operations, replenishment at sea, communica-
tions, and combined air and surface tracking.
B) Summary : This problem was a series of high tempo
evolutions which rehearsed many of the tactics
later employed in the Solomons. Specifically,
the exercise emphasized the tracking of opposing
surface forces with air and surface ships working
in unison. This skill would give the United States
a crucial advantage in several instances in the
Solomons
.
8. Fleet Problem XXI- April 1940
A) Objectives : To conduct separate fleet operations
in support of two distinct maritime theatres; to
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test the fleet's ability to carry out the full
range of operations, both offensive and defensive,
while supporting a two ocean war.
B) Summary : This exercise, held on the eve of
American involvement in World War II, was as
thorough a simulation of the strains the coming
conflict would put on the Navy as possible. Com-
mand and control was the most practical element
exercised by the scenario, as the actual opera-
tions undertaken bore little resemblance to those
of the war. In relation to the Solomons, the
exercise provided an opportunity to concentrate
on logistics to a remote theatre. The scope of
the exercise also forced the Navy's leadership to
prioritize resources when faced with a series of
conflicting demands. The exercise was particularly
effective in this area since a variety of allies
and adversaries were assumed in the scenario.
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APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTION OF MODEL UTILIZED TO GENERATE EXPECTED BATTLE
RESULTS
For the comparison of actual Solomons battle results and
the expected outcomes cited in Appendix A, a computer simula-
tion was employed which was based on the rules of the Naval
War College war games. The rules used in this simulation
were taken from those used in the 1940 and 1941 games, thus
representing the most current data available to the United
States Navy at the beginning of the war. In constructing
the model, it was desired to simulate the battles of the
Solomons under conditions that the commanders involved would
have preferred. The simulation therefore assumes that both
forces would have had perfect command and control, a precise
knowledge of opponent's order of battle and location, and
the ability to employ all weapons available at the commence-
ment of battle. However, the simulations were undertaken
under the same constraints faced by the actual participants;
engagements were at night, at close range, and of limited
duration. The structuring of the simulation in this manner
provides an estimate of "ideal" battle results for each of
the Solomons engagements, the type of results the American
commanders during the campaign would have most likely expected
or similar to what the outcomes of the battles would have been
if played at Newport.
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A. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The simulation used was written in Fortran IV (Unstruc-
tured) and compiled using the WATFIV Compiler. The program
was run on the IBM 360 AP system at the Naval Postgraduate
School. The data source for input to the simulation was
the data base generated from the analysis done in Chapter V
and Appendix A. The coding of the simulation program and
the input data are appended.
1 . Inputs
Inputs to the simulation model were dictated by the
assumptions as outlined above. The parameters for simula-
tion were the range the actual battle was commenced at, the
duration of the battle, and the ships which actually partic-
ipated in the battle. These were assumed to be constraints
that the commanders involved would have been forced to
accept. For the simulation, variables such as range, and
duration of battle were assumed to have been dictated to
the commanders involved. This is a reasonable assumption
since the geography of the Solomons, the environment, and
conflicting tasking often determined these factors in the
actual battles. Also input were the number of torpedoes
each side could fire, based on the total number of tubes
available to each side. In accordance with the game rules,
it was assumed that the maximum range for American torpedoes
was 8000 yards and 16000 yards for Japanese.
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From these basic inputs, the War College "Fire
Effect Diagrams" were utilized to determine the life expec-
tancy and fire power potential for each ship in the
engagement. (The sequencing of each engagement is des-
cribed below.) The lifespan of each ship (given in the
number of 14 inch hits the ship could withstand) was also •
transformed and stored for use in the determination of
damage in accordance with War College rules.
2 . Modeling of Torpedo Attack
Consistent with the assumption of perfect battle
management by each commander, it was assumed that each side
would fire torpedoes upon first contact and that within
the span of the first three minutes move each unit would
be able to fire all of its torpedo tubes.
A subroutine called by the main program calculated
the effect each side's torpedo fire would have and deter-
mined at what time each side's torpedoes would strike the
enemy. The game rules determined the number of torpedo
hits suffered by a formation based on the number of tor-
pedoes fired in relation to the size of the targeted
formation. It was assumed by the model that each side
would have the benefit of firing at the enemy's column
from the beam, an assumption consistent with the American
game's presupposition of a gun engagement as optimal. The
model yielded PH of around 0.1, a rate consistent with
those experienced in the Solomons. This subroutine also
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accounted for the effect of multiple hits as per game
instructions. In calculating multiple hits, it was assumed
that principal targets would be most likely targeted for
additional torpedo hits and the program prioritized the
sequencing of second and subsequent hits accordingly.
The torpedo damage subroutine calculated the damage
done to each ship and the time in the simulation that the
damage would occur. This information was then returned to
the main program for integration into the damage caused by
gunfire.
3 . Gun Engagement and Timestepping
Central to the modeling of naval combat by the
interwar games was the concept of attrition to a naval
vessel's fighting capabilities and seaworthiness over the
course of the battle. Engaged naval units lost their capa-
bilities over the course of each of the three minute moves
during the game's play. As the original lifespan of a
vessel (as measured by its ability to withstand a certain
number of 14 inch gun hits) was diminished, its ability to
fight, communicate, and maneuver were attrited until the
ship was considered sunk at a loss of 90% of its original
42lifespan. The fire effect tables and diagrams gave ideal
42Both the tables and diagrams contained the same data,
except the diagrams were condensations of the more general
tables which were pre calculated for common ship classes
and thus required less calculation by game players.
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capabilities for a ship in the game to attrite an opposing
unit. This figure, based on range, aspect, and method of
spotting, was modified according to a variety of factors as
discussed in Chapter IV.
In the computer simulation, the forces which took
part in each battle were paired off against each other in
the manner most logical and consistent with the noted
assumptions concerning command and control. In general this
resulted in the heavier or most valuable ships of each force
engaging each other, the next most important engaging each
other, and so on until all ships of each side were engaged.
Utilizing the actual duration the forces were engaged, the
simulation program "timestepped" through each of these
engagements, checking for damage to each unit at the conclu-
sion of each timestep and degrading ships 1 capabilities as
called for by the game rules.
The most significant modification to the fire power
capability of the units in the Solomons simulation was due
to the effect of darkness. In the game's maneuver rules,
this degradation is obtained from tables and runs from 50 to
80 percent of the original fire power capability of a unit,
based on ship type and range. For simplification of the
simulation program, a linear function for this degradation
based on range was approximated via a single linear regres-
sion model. Validation of this regression model indicated
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it provided values for the night degradation of fire power
consistent with the original game tables at a ninety percent
confidence level.
4 . Damage Assessment
In the interwar games, the damage to a ship as
outlined above impacted upon the unit in two signficant
ways. First, the unit lost combat and combat support capa-
bilities (maneuverability, communications) until the ship
was actually declared sunk. Secondly, the ability to
inflict damage was reduced proportionally to the total damage
sustained with a further degradation to fire power potential
based on range. In the relatively short battles of the
Solomons, the effect of speed and communications was con-
sidered to have a minimal impact on the battle. However,
fire power degradation, which ranged up to 80% in a single
move, was modeled by the simulation via logical comparisons
of damage sustained in the course of a move.
Data on torpedo hits passed from the torpedo evalua-
tion subroutine was integrated to gun damage for the timestep
in which the torpedoes would have struck. The aggregated
effect of torpedo and gun damage at the close ranges typical
of the Solomons was graphically displayed by the simulation
and is consistent with both records of the actual games from
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